SOURCE | Societal Security Network

VIRTUAL CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR RESEARCH SUPPORT AND COORDINATION ON SOCIETAL SECURITY

# D3.4 ANNUAL SOCIETAL SECURITY REPORT 1

This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 313288.

# D3.4 Annual Societal Security Report 1

**Abstract:** This reports presents the results of the first round of the Annual Societal Security Report, based on different data sources. It provides the basis for the next four annual reports and represents the prototype for the upcoming surveys. Different data sources are used to develop a complex view on different aspects of societal security.

**Contractual delivery date:** M15 (M12)

**Actual delivery date:** M16

**Version: 1**

**Total Number of pages:** 112

**Author:** Reinhard Kreissl (VICESSE)

**Contributors:** Norbert Leonhardmair, Matthäus Vobruba (VICESSE)

**Reviewers**: J. Peter Burgess (PRIO), Mirjam Huis in 't Veld (TNO), Médéric Martin-Mazé (KCL)

**Dissemination level:** PU

Deliverable submitted 13 April 2015(M16) in fulfilment of requirements of the FP7 project, SOURCE – Virtual Centre of excellence for research support and coordination on societal security (SEC-2012.7.4-2: Networking of researchers for a high level multi-organisational and cross-border collaboration)© Copyright 2014 the SOURCE Consortium (PRIO, FOI, CIES, FhG, TNO, CEPS, VUB, VICESSE, KCL, EOS, TEC, Sciences Po). All rights reserved. This document may change without notice.

## Contents

Introduction ... 1
1. Some methodological caveats ... 5
2. Security in the Media – A selective Chronique Scandaleuse of the Year 2014 ... 8
2.1 Islamic Terrorism - Foreign Fighters in Foreign Countries ... 9
2.2 Migration ... 14
2.3 Ebola ... 16
2.4 Ukraine – Russia ... 19
2.5 Other Foreign Affairs / Extra-European Threats ... 21
2.6 Societal Security in media discourse ... 22
3. Security topics on the Internet – What users look for and chat about ... 24
3.1 Twitter ... 24
3.2 Wikipedia ... 26
4. First results form the SOURCE online-survey on societal security ... 34
4.1 Socio-demographic information ... 36
4.2 Cumulative results for selected variables ... 39
4.3 Results from cross tabulations ... 43
5. First results from interviews ... 46
5.1 Dimensions of mundane security ... 48
5.2 Friends and family ... 50
5.3 Economy ... 50
5.4 Public authorities and the state ... 51
5.5 Ecological security ... 52
5.6 Public and private ... 53
Appendix ... 54
Twitter ... 55
Wikipedia ... 57
Data overview SOURCE online Societal Security Survey ... 75
Questionnaire ... 102

## Introduction

The idea to capture the state of (perceptions of) societal security[1] for Europe, on the basis of empirical evidence is ambitious. The toolkit of empirical social science research offers a wide array of opportunities to collect data covering different dimensions of security. A large number of surveys, addressing questions of security, surveillance, privacy, perceived and objective security threats has been conducted over the last decades in Western societies, some globally, some European, some at national level. There is also a growing body of open-data sources available that can be harvested for an analysis of societal security, compiling information on economic and social indicators from crime statistics to unemployment rates and epidemiological health data.

These data comprise information about perceived security threats, security measures and emerging societal security threats in the broadest sense. A number of European research projects such as PACT and PRISMS have recently conducted European-wide representative surveys collecting citizens' attitudes towards surveillance, privacy and security in a more focussed way. The PRISMS project also conducted a meta-analysis of surveys, identifying for the last 30 years 260 surveys "at the intersection of privacy and security/trust/surveillance, of professional and/or political importance. The date span of the inventory ranges from 1985 to early 2012." (PRISMS D7-1, p.21).

Taking a look at the 260 surveys, analysed by the PRIMS consortium, reveals a number of interesting results. The number of surveys has increased constantly and rapidly over the last 30 years. This mirrors the overall growth of data sources made available on the Internet.[2] But it also points to an interesting theoretical problem of information inflation or information overload, to use a term popularized by A. Toffler in his seminal book from 1970.[3] With the increase of information available for cognitive processing, the problem of theoretically motivated selectivity arises: how to choose, select and decide among the available, and often incompatible, nonetheless in and for themselves individually relevant data sets?

With this inflation of data an alternative strategy of analysis operating without any theoretical assumptions or hypotheses has gained prominence in recent years under the heading "Big Data". This

[1] The concept of societal security is elaborated in the DOW of the SOURCE project and refers to the self-preservation of society, as opposed to the self-preservation of the state. Taking society as the core object opens up the notion of security. (See DOW SOURCE, Part B, 1.1 Concepts and Objectives)

[2] A superficial screening of relevant data repositories available online yields an impressive list:
http://aws.amazon.com/de/publicdatasets/ (Amazon public data sets)
http://www.google.com/publicdata/directory (Google public Data sets)
https://www.govdata.de/ (Data from Germany)
http://www.data.gov/ (US Government Open Data)
http://data.gov.uk/ (UK Government Open Data)
http://publicdata.eu/ ; http://www.epsiplatform.eu/ (EU Government Open Data)
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Startseite.html (German statistical government office)
http://www.statistik.at/ (Statistik Austria)
http://stats.oecd.org/ (Statistics complied by OECD)
http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language= (statistics complied by WTO)
http://www.who.int/research/en/ (statistics compiled by WHO)
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm ; http://data.un.org/ (statistics compiled by UNO)

[3] Toffler, A, 1970, *Future Shock*, New York, Random House

approach relies on pure data analysis, hoping to find correlations among different data and taking such correlations as results in and for themselves without developing any prior theoretical hypothesis. This approach has triggered critique from different sides.[4] What we see is an unprecedented growth of data facilitated by the availability of low cost data processing and storage capacity, lowering thresholds for the electronic storage of all kinds of information. While this problem is haunting social analysts and empirical researchers, it also affects lay persons in their everyday life.

Looking at this situation from an individual person's perspective who is exposed via many different channels, with a myriad of bits of news, what emerges is an exposure to informational white noise and the question is, which pieces of information are consciously perceived and trigger reflective action.[5] While at the level of news coverage there are certain security relevant topics making headlines and triggering heated public debates for a limited period of time, media interest often fades as quickly as it started. Today it may be terrorism, tomorrow the outbreak of Ebola and the day after a breach of data protection laws by a national security agency or an emerging economic and fiscal crisis of the state. Trying to reconstruct a *chronique scandaleuse* of media-hyped security topics over the period of one year, yields a rather scattered picture, a patchwork of events (or groups) dramatized and put in the spotlight for a short period of time only to vanish into oblivion after having had their fifteen minutes of fame (to quote Andy Warhol).

How this is reflected in collective memory and public consciousness is an interesting question, also from a psychological perspective. While citizens as recipients of media may be continuously and heavily exposed to very heterogeneous security related topics, from threats of terrorism and other forces of evil to breaches of privacy, they may nonetheless maintain a state of ontological security in their daily walks of life. This is all the more important since beyond information about security threats broadcasted through popular media there are many other elements in the mundane everyday world related to security measures like CCTV cameras in the streets, scanners and screening points at different places like airports or other locations like public buildings. Citizens have to identify themselves when entering controlled spaces, or accessing services, using biometric features (e.g. fingerprints), PIN codes or material tokens (e.g. swipe cards). Security has become a constant element of everyday life in a more or less explicit or subliminal way[6]. Security alerts may be more or less subtle, but they are everywhere. This creates a situation that could be termed "banal securitization" to borrow a term from Michael Billig,[7] where security is flagged on a daily basis to keep citizens alert.

This creates at the phenomenological level of everyday life a somewhat paradoxical situation. On the one hand security alerts are omnipresent and citizens are constantly reminded to act prudently in a security conscious way (when entering into an economic transaction, storing or publishing their data on the Internet, when moving in public space, entering defined security zones like airports, etc.), on

[4] See e.g. the special volume of the *International Journal of Communication* 8 (2014); Weinberger David, 2011, *Too Big to Know*, New York, Basic Books

[5] Media research and Mass communication studies have produced an impressive body of literature on the reception of news since the early days of Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al. We will not go into detail here, but take media coverage as an input for our analysis without embarking on the intricate questions of effects on the recipients.

[6] Douglas and Lianos coined the term „dangerization" to capture this transformation of the social world. Lianos, Michael, Douglas, Mary, 2000, Dangerization and the End of Deviance. *Brit. Journal of Criminology*, Vol 40, p. 261-278

[7] Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London, Sage Publications

the other hand a constant state of preventive paranoia, continuously screening the world for security threats and reflexively considering prudent counter measures cannot be constantly maintained without creating severe psychological damage. Generalized and stable trust in the world as psychological default state has to prevail to maintain one's mental sanity.

By way of thought experiment it could be asked, why – given the strong concerns of security experts, of threat assessments and vulnerability analyses circulating in public discourse – a majority of citizens seems rather unconcerned. Taking the scenarios entertained by professional security experts at face value, modern societies appear to continuously live at the brink of disaster. Such experts come in different shapes and sizes and disguises and can be found in many domains – from crime to economics, from epidemiology to environmentalism.[8] The dynamic of competing threat scenarios appears to be fuelled by the same mechanisms as the dramatized media hypes.[9]

Against the background of a cultural and media environment, where security is flagged constantly in many different ways on a daily basis, the results of large-scale population surveys are rather sobering, when measured against politically highly prioritized security risks like migration, terrorism and organised crime.[10] Youth unemployment seems more a concern than a terrorist attack, getting a serious sickness worries respondents significantly more than immigrant families moving into their neighbourhood. Screening the findings of large scale surveys with regard to fears and anxieties spreading among European citizens it seems to be more the mundane problems (unemployment, financial stability, sickness) that worry the lay citizens. In contrast there are signs for what could be called a "paranoid state" in some countries.[11] While this state paranoia seems primarily to flourish under autocratic regimes, overblown security measures are sometimes met with suspicion and critically put into question in democratic societies.[12]

[8] An interesting case to be found under the heading of environmental security is the debate about „bee-gate", predicting major environmental disasters as a consequence of the use of neonicotionids as pesticides in agriculture. See: http://geneticliteracyproject.org/2014/12/12/bee-gate-part-ii-european-iucn-task-force-mired-in-corruption-scandal-over-neonics-ban-plot/ . Such campaigns can be politically reinforced by social media activities launched by citizen-driven campaign platforms like AVAAZ. Through this platform a petition against the use of bee-killing pesticides with 2.6 million signatures was presented to European policy makers in May 2013 (see http://avaaz.org/en/highlights.php).

[9] A smart strategy seems to be applied by the group publicizing the „Snowden revelations ". Releasing recurrently small bits of scandalous information over a longer period of time they manage to keep the topic on the agenda of the media. With this strategy a substantial share of voice can be captured for the revelations over a longer period of time.

[10] Based on an analysis of publicly available databases between 2003 and 2011 only 16 instances of acts of terror, creating major damage could be identified in European member states. Compared to other security relevant events, like flooding or other extreme weather conditions, this is an insignificant number. (COSMIC D1.1 p. 19) Nonetheless terrorist attacks can trigger more media response. This figure of course is contested, see Europol 2014 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014. What counts as serious terrorist acts depends on who does the counting.

[11] See e.g. Rozic, Peter S.J., 2015, The Paranoid State, *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 23, No.1, Winter 2015

[12] In Germany the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a liberal daily newspaper comparable to the Guardian in UK, ran an article on the "feeling of security" (Gefühl der Sicherheit) on March 7,2015, addressing the problem of extensive visible security measures in a number of German cities over the last weeks. Several public events had been cancelled recently, based on threat assessments by security forces. The article points out that such pre-emptive measures tend to erode the general public's trust in the police.

Comparing the publicized security problems and the security experts' assessment on the one hand with lay perceptions and empirical evidence about events on the other, a number of differences emerge. While media and experts tend to highlight spectacular security threats, ordinary citizens tend to worry about more mundane security problems. This can be seen in survey results, where respondents can choose among a number of fixed responses, but even more so in interviews that leave more room for spontaneous statements and elaboration of individual narratives.[13]

While at the level of individual attitudes, different aspects of security may surface as objects of cognitive concern, there seems to be no strong or consistent impact of such concerns on the day-to-day routine behaviour. This can nicely be demonstrated in domains like environmentalism.[14] Similar findings could be cited for health[15] or use of social media and privacy concerns.[16] While there seems to be a link between security related topics, scoring high in public discourse through media coverage and citizens' interest and probably abstract concern about these topics, mundane security issues seem to prevail, when investigating security in a bottom-up fashion and interviewing citizens in their natural socio-cultural habitat.

These different types of concerns or security problems also create different remedial actions. While "big" security problems, as laid out in policy documents[17] require primarily actions of the state, involving the citizens as bearers of fundamental rights, the mundane security concerns have to be solved on the ground by the active citizens themselves, where state policies can be either supportive or have a negative effect. The big problems, identified by the EC are preventing and fighting serious and organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, strengthening the management of our external borders and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters. These problems do not resonate in the daily lives of citizens, unless they are explicitly asked to assess their relative relevance as is executed e.g. in survey research. This points to a dual reading of security problems and also to a dual role of the state or public authorities. Serious and organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, the management of external borders and resilience to natural and man-made disasters are no tangible objects for the lay citizen, nothing that is encountered in everyday life. Spectacular events presented

[13] Murray Edelman in his work on the political Spectacle has elaborated on this multiplicity of views and how this drives political discourse about security, see Edelman, Murray, 1988, *Constructing the Political Spectacle*, Chicago, Chicago Univ. Press

[14] See e.g. Scott, David; Willits, Fern, K., 1994, Environmental Attitudes and Behavior, *Environment and Behavior* March 1994 Vol. 26 No. 2 239-260, presenting data from an US-study. Europeans seem to be somewhat more concerned about environmental issues and, under certain circumstances, tend to change their behaviour at least to some extent. (see Special Eurobarometer 295, 2008 on *Attitudes of European citizens towards the environment*)

[15] A convincing, though unconventional study was conducted by William Rathje and Collin Murphy, demonstrating that respondents' answers regarding alcohol consumption could be proven heavily biased by analysing the garbage they produced and counting the bottles they disposed in their garbage. See Rathje and Murphy, 2001, *Rubbish!: The Archeology of Garbage*, Tuscon, Univ. of Arizona Press.

[16] Privacy advocates recurrently point to the threats of data processing by state agencies and large companies, they present convincing evidence and get public attention, but the effects outside the academic community are in most cases negligible. See among many Frank Pasquale's 2015 book *The Black Box Society. The secret Algorithms that control Money and Information*, Boston, Harvard Univ. Press; or Julie E. Cohen, 2012, *Configuring the Networked Self. Law, Code and the Play of Everyday Practice*, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press

[17] See European Commission, 2010, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (COM 2010 673 final); The final implementation report of the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010-2014 (COM 2014, 365 final).

through public media may give the ordinary citizen a second-hand idea about organized and serious crime and terrorism, but for the great majority of citizens, they will never materialize as immediately and personally perceived threats. This is not to say that such problems are irrelevant or should be ignored. They have to be addressed and it is the task of policy makers to put them on the agenda and develop counter strategies. But they are not the typical problems citizens experience in their everyday lives. Typical problems relate to a set of different issues, ranging from job security, a stable and robust social network of friends and family, reliable provision of social services at the local level and a physical environment that fosters feelings of what could be called "ecological security".[18]

Mundane security and the big security problems are interconnected in many different ways. All security is local, and the security problems flagged in political security discourse, like terrorism or organized crime, are to some extent rooted in local settings. Segregation, poverty, racism and exclusion of ethnic minorities in local neighbourhoods breed radicalization and crime.[19] On the other hand, security policies addressing the "big" problems can heavily affect the lives of local communities. Stepping up control and surveillance in a Muslim neighbourhood may alienate members who are exposed to frequent stop and search procedures by police officers. Major policy initiatives curtailing citizens' freedoms and privacy in the name of security may affect daily routine activities in substantial way, creating chilling effects.[20]

Security unfolds as a topic in public discourse, as an issue in virtual social media exchange, as a problem to be addressed on the policy agenda and as a dimension of the everyday life of citizens. These different securities are more or less related and reinforce each other, although they may be in and for themselves very different. We will try to capture this complexity and provide evidence in the following pages.

## 1. Some methodological caveats

Different methodologies using different tools produce different results. Hence we take several approaches to analyse societal security. While many methodologies emphasize their objectivity, conceiving of tools as neutral means to investigate and analyse (social) reality it should be taken into account that two main types of limitations have to be considered.[21] First, each tool in the empirical

[18] This entails very different aspects from clean streets, sufficient lighting of public spaces, a safe public transport system, the absence of "dangerous" people in the street, and a positive sense of community in the immediate neighbourhood.

[19] The theoretical relevance of local socio-cultural analysis for security problems has been demonstrated recurrently since the seminal works of the so-called Chicago school, see e.g. the study of William F. Whyte from 1943: *Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum,* Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press (4th edition, 1993),

[20] The term chilling effect is often used in Surveillance Studies to describe what in less friendly terms could be called preventive paranoia, i.e. an attitude preventing citizens to exercise their legal and legitimate rights of freedom of speech, political engagement and public protest.

[21] It should be noted that this kind of problem has triggered elaborate debates in methodology and epistemology of the (social and natural) sciences. For a brief overview see Hacking, Ian, 1999, *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Univ. Press

research process is selective, i.e. emphasizing some aspects of complex social worlds while ignoring others. Secondly, empirical research in most cases involves an observer effect, i.e. social reality or actors react to the "stimuli" produced by the observer. While observer effects can be minimized, by using non-reactive methods, from document to media analysis or observation, selectivity has to be accounted for in one way or the other.

In the first wave of the SOURCE societal security survey we apply reactive and non-reactive methods alike. While the analysis of traditional and social media and proxy indicators are non-reactive, the online survey and interviews have to be considered as highly reactive, i.e. producing observer effects, most obviously by providing respondents with a cognitive framing when asking them about security-related topics. We try to control for this effect by keeping the stimuli in the interviews as open as possible, not limiting the questions to security in the narrow sense of external threats as listed e.g. in the European Internal Security Strategy, but rather starting by asking respondents what security means for them personally. This often creates a different trajectory, focussing on issues that are not threat-based like e.g. fear of crime and terrorism.

It should also be noted that our data sources work on different scales and there is no common metric to link interviews with social media analysis or findings from the online survey. All of the data sources used in this survey have their own scales and reference systems. Relating them in an interpretative frame requires the elaboration of a complex theoretical context. We consider this task of theorizing societal security as an on-going challenge following a strategy of iterative re-entry from empirical evidence to theory and back. Since this work package is data-driven and theory-driven alike, we face another challenge. The categories used are to a large extent taken from the domains we investigate and observe. We are operating in many cases with natural language expressions or concepts, as they develop on the Internet. This can be seen, when looking at the analysis of social media discourse or the screening of security issues in public media. Security relevant issues are framed differently in mundane discourse than in formal policy papers. While there may be some semantic overlap between the linguistic expressions used in the Internal Security Strategy documents of the European Commission and the wording found in Wikipedia, Twitter or Google search, the language (and the conceptual structure) are different. This is also true for the interviews. Laypersons are not using the vocabulary of security or policy experts. They talk about security in different terms and hence a different picture emerges with regard to the everyday perceptions of security. The challenge is to link these different vocabularies or semantic-cognitive universes.

The data sources can be used for different purposes to demonstrate and analyse how the complex field of security unfolds in different societal discourses and practices at different scales. A brief screening of media coverage of certain topics can give an overview which events were considered newsworthy and how they were presented to the general audience of readers. An analysis of Twitter feeds can help to estimate the frequency of certain security relevant phrases and words (or combinations thereof) in the global Twitter-sphere.[22] Counting frequencies of page hits for selected, Wikipedia articles hints at the temporal distribution of public interest in specific security related topics. When working with data from online sources like Twitter or Wikipedia the problem of limiting the

[22] Twitter is one of the most popular global messaging services with 500 million registered users who send 400 million tweets every day.

geographical coverage arises. While surveys, interviews and even media data can be assigned to a given geographical area, communication or traffic in the sphere of the Internet is global and the technical/methodological options to geo-locate messages is limited.[23]

Looking at the results of large-scale surveys can help to validate the results of our online-survey that worked with a limited number of targeted respondents, assess the relevance of certain security topics and get an idea about citizens' attitudes towards security relevant problems and dilemmas. Narrative interviews with selected respondents provide an in-depth view on what we call security on the ground, i.e. the individual perception of security, contextualized with a person's social situation and life history. Last but not least we can use a number of general socio-economic and social science research based indicators to provide comparative background information for different countries included in the analysis. These different data source combine to produce a dense patchwork of what we consider to be relevant dimensions of societal security.

This report is the first in a series of five over the coming years and it is designed as proof of concept, demonstrating what can be done to capture the complex concept of societal security, when combining different data sources. The full analytical value will unfold over the years by making comparative assessments possible and refining the empirical approach as well as the theoretical conceptualization of societal security.

[23] Google is the only data source providing useful locational information, although only to a limited extent depending on the absolute numbers of requests at a certain location.

## 2. Security in the Media – A selective Chronique Scandaleuse of the Year 2014

Despite the advent of the Internet and social media, operating at the level of horizontal networks, occasionally creating viral arousals[24], agenda setting in public discourse is still mainly in the hands of traditional news media. As such Television, Radio and Newspapers still have a huge influence over the domain of public discourse. These classical media in most cases determine what becomes a topic of public debate – last but not least in the often anxiety-ridden domain of security topics. They still are the dominant gatekeepers when it comes to public arousal, scandalizing and fuelling citizens' fears and anxieties, hopes and tastes. And being commercial enterprises, trying to catch public attention to increase sales figures and numbers of readers, viewers and listeners, they compete for a share of voice and limited public attention. Reaching out to the largest possible audience is one of the main economic objectives of the media. Hence the spiraling of scandals and moral panicking as a consequence of competition among different media for limited public attention. As Baran and Davis (2015:270) rightly observe, "Like all media commodities, news must be attractively packaged, and a primary means of doing this involves dramatization."[25]

While share of voice is limited, public arousal is not a zero sum game. It can be fuelled up to the level of vigilant action. Over- and underreporting can produce biased public perception of security related issues.[26] Scholars like Greg Barak and Katherine Beckett have demonstrated how crime news is tied into a feedback cycle of media, police, public interest, political strategy and crime reporting to the police. What is perceived as a security problem in the domain of crime and terrorism to a large extent depends on the reinforcement of selected information and politically loaded topics through public media.[27]

But the strategic use of public media in the domain of security not only involves politicians or law enforcement institutions. Private actors do play a crucial role here as well. Blunt commercial interests shape media reporting about security issues in more or less subtle ways. Very often corporations or public authorities intervene into the work of journalists behind the scenes to influence (or prevent) the flow of information.[28] But there are also open forms of using the media for specific corporate interests. A good example for the less subtle way is the "protection now" section of the BBC[29], a

[24] Berger, Jonah; Milkman, Katherine L., 2012, What Makes Online Content Viral?. *Journal of Marketing Research* April 2012, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 192-205.
[25] Baran, Stanley, J.; Davis, Dennis, K. 2015, *Mass Communication Theory: Foundation, Ferment and Future* (7th edition), Stamford, CT, Cengage
[26] An interesting study investigating fear of crime is Boulahanis, John ,G., Heltsley, Martha, J. 2004, Perceived Fears: The Reporting Patterns of Juvenile Homicide in Chicago Newspapers. *Criminal Justice Policy Review* June 2004 Vol. 15 No. 2 p. 132-160
[27] See e.g. Barak Greg (ed.), 1994, *Media, Process, and the Social Construction of Crime. Studies in Newsmaking Criminology*, New York, Garland Publ.; Beckett Katherine, 1997, *Making Crime Pay, Law and Order in American Politics*, New York Oxford Univ. Press
[28] The most recent prominent case was the intervention of the British MI5 in the reporting of the Guardian about the revelations of Edward Snowden. This again made headlines and led to a heated debate about freedom of press in Western societies.
[29] http://www.bbc.com/capital/specials/protection-now

collection of news, covering health, data protection, personal safety, environment, and research and technology. This "protection now" section is sponsored by AXA, an international insurance group, while it is made up like a normal BBC page. Users can subscribe to a newsletter or Twitter account to receive up-to-date information about topics considered as relevant for their "security" or "protection" by the editors, i.e. the corporate sponsor.




In the following pages we will present a selection of security topics that made headlines in 2014, trying to focus on reports based on good journalistic practice. This is not a comprehensive account of all events and catastrophes. Rather we want to demonstrate how media coverage sets the tone for security talk in public discourse. We chose Islamic terrorism, migration, the outbreak of the Ebola crisis, the conflicts in Ukraine and selected other international crises. All of these topics are presented in the media in specific ways, producing specific framings, insinuating different types of feelings and reactions, from fear to outrage to compassion. What we are aiming at here is the level of public discourse about security, i.e. the realm of socially and politically accepted (albeit occasionally contested) ways of talking about specific issues in a society.[30] As mentioned in the introduction this covers only one dimension, albeit an important one of societal security. Apart from individual exposure to a security threat (e.g. as a victim of crime), citizens are informed about what they should consider as security relevant primarily through different media channels.

## 2.1 Islamic Terrorism - Foreign Fighters in Foreign Countries

While Islamic terrorism and the Greater Middle East have been perceived as sources for security threats in Europe constantly since at least the 9-11 attacks, they came especially close to Europe this past year. Islamic terrorism after 9/11 had a proper name and that name was al-Qa'ida. Terrorist attacks or suspects automatically were linked to this organization that developed into a household word in Western societies over the last decade. al-Qa'ida had become synonymous for a new type of non-state predator, operating globally on a decentralized, network-type structure, with national chapters in a number of countries, often declared as failed states and spreading out also into West-

[30] In this section we limit the exemplary cases presented for demonstration mainly to English language media (like Guardian, BBC, or news agencies like Reuters, AP, etc.), which makes reading more convenient. Data were collected from the online editions of these media available on the Internet, using pre-defined search terms based on a list of major security-relevant events for the year 2014. The underlying analysis comprises German language news outlets from Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and to some extent also French, Slovakian and Italian media. A comparative analysis, addressing national differences will be presented in a separate working paper at a later stage. We also will not embark on the complex debate about a post-national European public sphere at this point. Although it should be noted, that an understanding of European security issues could benefit from a clear conceptual foundation here.

ern societies, where terrorist cells and so-called sleepers were supposed to present a continuous low-level threat, requiring (and justifying) highly intrusive security measures.

This changed, when in February 2014 the Iraqi terrorist group ISIS/ISIL first attracted strong media attention, after al-Qa'ida's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stopped any cooperation with the group. First this was conceived and reported as local struggle within the Syrian rebel groups and the focus was on how this will affect the civil war.[31] But with ISIS/ISIL's swift victories over the Iraqi army and huge territorial gains in the region the reporting significantly changed. Now it was most about the origins of the organization, their funding and how their military prowess could be explained.[32]

Much of the reporting entailed an underlying tone of accusation towards the governments of Europe and the USA. With the start of Ramadan end of June 2014, when ISIS/ISIL declared to have set up a new caliphate[33], there were also an increasing number of reports on Europeans fighting for this jihadist group.[34] While "war tourism" as such is not a new phenomenon and there had been previous reports about fighters from Europe in Syria, the brutality of the foreigners fighting for ISIS/ISIL was broadly reported. The beheading of American journalist James Foley, who was reporting for Agence France-Presse, by a Muslim from the UK, dubbed Jihadi John after his infamous action, especially received a lot of coverage.[35]

ISIS/ISIL as the new player on the scene of international terrorism seems to take a quantum leap in political marketing, producing promotional material not only to create public arousal, distributing video footage of committed atrocities among its enemies (i.e. Western societies deliberating the cause in public media discourse), but also to attract followers among young citizens of Western soci-

[31] Al-Qaeda disavows ISIS militants in Syria http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26016318
[32] Who are ISIS? http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/isis-too-extreme-al-qaida-terror-jihadi
[33] Islamisten rufen Kalifat aus http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/irak-isis-extremisten-rufen-islamisches-kalifat-aus-a-978202.html
[34] http://www.dw.de/deutsche-dschihadisten-auf-isis-terrormission/a-17710303
[35] Beheading shocks the world http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28867627

eties who are strategically targeted using new social media and the Internet. This adds a completely new dimension to the domain of "cyber warfare".[36]

This also is a good example of the increasing relevance of media in conflicts, wars and other areas of security discourse. Just as national armies have learned their lesson from former wars like the one in Vietnam – by introducing the concept of the "embedded journalist" to keep control over media reporting from conflict zones, so have their counterparts by making use of media to address the global audience and target specific groups.[37]

ISIS/ISIL's capture of Yazidis' towns[38] and their subsequent flight to Mount Sinjar, along with the atrocities committed against Kurds and Christians led to the direct involvement of the United States and European Powers together with their Arab allies in the conflict.[39] This again brought a number of new ethnic groups center stage of public attention.

With the siege of the Kurdish city of Kobanî, starting in September, the focus was solely on the Kurdish fighters defending the city. These fighters clearly had the public's sympathy, made evident by how the Turkish government's actions were scolded.[40] Turkey's role in this conflict is ambivalent and this also affects the ongoing public debate about Turkish EU-membership. Being tied into Western geopolitics as member of the NATO, Turkey still is not accepted as a suitable candidate for full EU-membership and their involvement in the ensuing conflicts makes it even more difficult to take what might be called an accepted hegemonic stand on this issue in European public discourse.

[36] National police authorities started to hire experts with academic degrees in Islamic studies to build up observatories, assessing the development of Jihadist activities on the Internet. The propaganda war had spread out into the virtual domain and this produced a number of problems for all branches of Law enforcement.

[37] The strategy of „embedding" has created controversial debates among media professionals. As David Ignatius from The Washington Post writes in an opinion piece from May 2, 2010: „(E)mbedding comes at a price. We are observing these wars from just one perspective, not seeing them whole. When you see my byline from Kandahar or Kabul or Basra, you should not think that I am out among ordinary people, asking questions of all sides. I am usually inside an American military bubble. That vantage point has value, but it is hardly a full picture." (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001100.html)

[38] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11019119/Who-are-the-Yazidis-Profile-of-Iraqs-misunderstood-devil-worshippers.html

[39] US Airstrikes http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28709530

[40] Turkish Government rejects criticism http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29799646

BBC News Sport Weather Earth Future Shop TV Radio More... Search

NEWS MIDDLE EAST

Home UK Africa Asia Australia Europe Latin America Mid-East US & Canada Business Health Sci/Environment Tech Entertainment Video

28 October 2014 Last updated at 09:53 GMT

Share

Lyse Doucet
Chief international correspondent
More from Lyse | Follow Lyse on Twitter

Islamic State crisis: Turkish PM rejects Kobane criticism

Top Stories
Iraq moves against IS in Tikrit
US police shoot homeless man dead
Emwazi 'not huge concern' at school
Kerry to tackle Lavrov on Ukraine
N Korea opens fire as drills start

With the stalemate in Kobanî and no major developments "on the front", interest in the story was somewhat reduced but still regularly reports can be found in the news. Only when Kurdish forces, supported by western air strikes, ended the siege in early 2015, the topic was once again in the headlines.[41]

Western support for Kurdish fighters created an awkward situation for European secret services and law enforcement agencies. While they had followed the strategy to prevent young Westerners to travel to the crises areas in Syria to join the rebel groups, they now suddenly were confronted with a new type of "freedom fighters": young Kurds who wanted to help liberate the city of Kobanî and go after the ISIS/ISIL forces. The authorities either had to come up with a distinction between good and bad war tourists or they had to ban the presumably good ones from leaving Europe.[42]

With the differentiation of "the" Islamic Terrorist splitting up in a number of different groups with different goals and affiliations, forming coalitions, following a political rationale that was difficult to comprehend for a lay audience in European public media discourse, interest and media coverage waned.

With Boko Haram (meaning western education is forbidden), a Nigerian jihadist group was also regularly in the news, albeit significantly less then ISIS/ISIL, who they pledged allegiance to during 2014. Although reports about this group can be found as early as 2009[43], it was the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping on the night of April 14th-15th, which brought them the greatest attention thus far.[44] This event received ample public attention because it had a strong human-interest dimension: young girls kidnapped by radical Muslim militants, not only creates anger against the predators but also feelings of compassion for the young helpless victims. While such spectacular events often provide the pretext for a policy of getting tough on terrorists, they also give room to compassionate concerns presented in the media by political figures. A case in point here is the reaction of Michelle Obama.

[41] http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/02/mideast-syria-kobani-ypg-idINKBN0L61FN20150202
[42] Personal communication, European national security official
[43] Nigeria sect head dies in custody news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8177451.stm
[44] http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/entfuehrte-maedchen-in-nigeria-verschleppt-weil-sie-zur-schule-gehen-1.1938392

The picture of First Lady Michelle Obama, holding a sign, saying "#bringbackourgirls" (a Twitter campaign), could be seen in media around the world. It boosted the attention, this kidnapping received in public discourse.

Boko Haram declaring the establishment of their own caliphate[45] and the spread of violence into Cameroon[46], were the other most reported incidents concerning the group.

Boko Haram's attacks on Baga in January 2015, causing over two hundred fatalities, were overshadowed by the assaults on French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket in Paris by French terrorists.[47] This attack was probably the most reported Islamist terror attack in the past year.[48]

This brief *tour d'horizon* of European media coverage of some of the more prominent Islamic terrorist activities shows different forms of how this phenomenon was related to security in the year 2014. As long as Islamic terrorists acted in their conflict zones European public concern was only moderate. And the more so, when the conflicting parties could not be gathered under one comprehensive label. Reports about victims of their attacks on the ground in their homelands received public attention in those cases that involved Europeans. While body counts of native casualties were reported, the real arousal started when Europeans were beheaded and this was televised via You Tube. Potential security threats on European soil emanating from these groups also appeared to worry public discourse. Reports of European "freedom fighters" returning from the combat zones and presumably planning attacks within Europe could be found throughout the year. At the same time the action of Islamic terrorist groups triggered reactions of compassion as could be seen in the case of the kidnapping of the Muslim girls.

[45] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/03/nigeria-talks-boko-haram-advance
[46] http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Boko-Haram-slaughter-dozens-in-Cameroon-village-20141228
[47] http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/terroranschlag-auf-charlie-hebdo-in-paris-12-tote-13357436.html
[48] This demonstrates the importance of geographical and/or cultural closeness of incidents to media interest and perceived security threats by the public. The stronger the link to the country one lives in, the more interest in news can be observed along with more interest in details (see: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11351855/How-did-the-Paris-terrorists-get-hold-of-their-weapons.html). France is closer to other western countries, than Syria and Iraq, which in turn are closer than Sub-Saharan Africa.

### 2.2 Migration

Closely linked with the conflicts in the MENA-Region[49] as well as Sub-Sarah African conflicts and poverty is the stream of refugees towards Europe. This stream grew continually since the early 2000s. Since 2009 there were also a growing number of casualties from sinking migrant ships in the Mediterranean. In the broad media coverage migration received in 2014, we identified two major narratives about this topic in the public. On the one hand there was the reporting on the suffering of these refugees around the time of major incidents for example when the Italian navy saved over 1000 refugees in early January.[50]




# Italian navy rescues over 1000 migrants from boats in 24 hours

ROME | Fri Jan 3, 2014 5:26am EST

Similar events happened all year, with very similar spikes in reporting and reaction.

On the other hand the second narrative, which was used by a number of conservative media, but not supported by liberal mainstream public media discourse was the reading of migration as entertained by rightwing parties in Europe. They opted for stopping any help to refugee ships in distress as can be seen in this headline from an Italian newspaper:

# Lega Nord: Stop invasioni. In piazza contro clandestini e Mare Nostrum. Ed è scontro

18 ottobre 2014

There is also an important difference in wording and semantics. Those opposed to help these ships are referring to individuals trying to cross the Mediterranean as “migrants” and avoid the term “refugees”. The issue of migration and/or asylum scores high in political and media discourse and also has been listed as one of the major threats in the Internal security strategy of the European Union[51]. But very little is known about the general population’s attitude. Looking at the situation in Austria a kind

[49] Middle East and North Africa
[50] 1000 refugees rescued by Italian Navy http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/03/us-italy-migrants-idUSBREA0208X20140103
[51] See e.g. European Commission, *The final implementation report of the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010-2014* COM (2014)365 final

of NIMBY-situation emerges[52]. While media were criticizing national governments within the EU for not receiving a fair share of asylum seekers and regional administrations within the country for not providing decent and sufficient housing for those ending up in Austria, the readers' comments in the blogging section of the online media gave a different impression.[53]

The topic of refugees/migrants is interesting from a European security perspective since not only it demonstrates the two readings of the problem as expressed in the choice of the words "migrant(s)" and "refugee(s)". At the same time it creates conflicting effects. On the one hand the debate reinforces the image of Europe as a fortress (Fortress Europe is a frequently used term), triggering fears of a tsunami of poor from the Global South to European mainland. On the other hand national governments in Europe hold different positions on this issue. For countries in the Mediterranean (Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Italy, Spain) the question of refugees scores high on the national security-political agenda, whereas other countries, that are not immediately affected as port of entry from the South do not share this concern in the same way. This can lead to conflicts as in the case of Italy, where the government started their own activities (under the bold heading of "mare nostrum" – our sea) to step up security and keep migrants off their shores. This program received critical comments from the European border control agency FRONTEX and conflicts about funding and responsibilities ensued in 2014 as this title of the Independent nicely demonstrates.[54]

Looking at the results from European surveys on perceived security threats the differences between countries immediately affected and others that do not share a physical border with non-Schengen states used by unregistered migrants and asylum seekers the different attitudes are nicely reflected. While the average number of citizens concerned about "illegal immigration" as the most pressing security concern in their country in Europe was 13%, these figures reached 55% in Cyprus, 38% in

[52] NIMBY is the popular acronym for a policy dilemma regarding public goods and the distribution of costs. Not In My Backyard refers to a position where everybody agrees to have e.g. more prisons, sewage dumps or power plants, but refuses to have them built in their immediate vicinity or "backyard".
[53] http://kurier.at/chronik/oesterreich/asyl-der-unwuerdige-streit-um-fluechtlinge/87.147.341
[54] http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2014-10-23/local-news/Illegal-migration-Frontex-chief-says-he-didn-t-know-Italy-is-scrapping-Mare-Nostrum-6736124254

Malta, 28 % in Greece and 24% in Italy.[55] Regional and geo-political differences do play an important role here.

### 2.3 Ebola

As opposed to Islamic Terrorism and Migration the Ebola virus is not a person-related security threat and hence displays a somewhat different dynamic in public media discourse. While the bearer of the security threat may be an infected person, it is the (invisible) virus that creates a security threat and hence symbolic loading and public discourse may be different.[56]

The Ebola crisis started in December 2013 in Guinea, but there was no mainstream media coverage about the outbreak until March 2014, when it was still not clear which disease was actually responsible for the casualties in West Africa.[57]




# Mystery hemorrhagic fever kills 23 in Guinea

CONAKRY | Wed Mar 19, 2014 7:31am EDT

By the end of March the topic had been picked up by mayor news outlets, and the disease was identified as Ebola.[58] In the subsequent months the topic had little but steady media coverage, portraying it as an African problem and in addition the duty for industrialized countries to help was emphasized. Most of these reports focused on either western aid organizations, the UN's appeals or the possibility of this Ebola outbreak becoming a worldwide pandemic.[59] A second recurrent narrative focused on the problems relating to the treatment of patients in Africa[60], like their distrust in Western medicine or the wide spread belief in superstitious explanations for the outbreak of the disease.[61] The prob-

[55] Special Eurobarometer 371 on Internal Security, p.12
[56] See e.g. the analysis of the Anthrax hype in the United States Sarasin, Philipp, 2006, *Anthrax. Bioterror as Fact and Fiction*, Boston, Harvard Univ. Press
[57] Mystery hemorrhagic fever kills 23 in Guinea www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-guinea-fever-idUSBREA2I0QM20140319
[58] Deadly Ebola virus reaches Guinea capital Conakry - UN www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26701733
[59] Infektion: Das passiert bei einem Ebola-Verdacht in Deutschland www.spiegel.de/gesundheit/diagnose/verdacht-auf-ebola-infektion-das-passiert-in-deutschland-a-986938.html
[60] Relatives remove Sierra Leone Ebola patients from clinic www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/28/relatives-sierra-leone-ebola-patients-clinic
[61] Ebola in West Africa A perfect storm http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/07/ebola-west-africa

lem was framed in a way that treated the local population as backward and unwilling to accept the benevolent and effective solutions of modern, scientific, Western medicine to their problem.

# Relatives remove Sierra Leone Ebola patients from clinic

## World Health Organisation warns that Ebola is still spreading across west Africa nearly two months after outbreak was reported

The coverage completely changed after the first Ebola patients were evacuated to the United States and Europe in early August.[62] The security threat was moving towards the homeland and thus became more threatening, though in a rather diffuse way. The imagination of a virus, hitherto operating in a far away region, moving towards one's own country and possibly spreading out there, fuelled new fears and anxieties, reflected in the media coverage. The images presented create a graphic idea of protection. Paramedics in protective gear, standing somewhere in the open between fences and pointing in different directions, obviously using a kind of nonverbal sign language to communicate seem to operate in a highly contaminated environment. Images like this invite the viewer to see him/herself as standing unprotected next to the two figures. They give rise to a feeling of insecurity and lack of protection. The key message seems to be that the virus is everywhere. Even if no infected person can be seen in the picture the picture clearly conveys the need to protect against an invisible malicious agent in the environment, leaving no part of the body exposed to the threat of contamination.

[62] Ebola outbreak: US aid workers infected with virus evacuated from Liberia for treatment www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-us-aid-workers-infected-with-virus-evacuated-from-liberia-for-treatment-9644204.html

# Ebola outbreak: US aid workers infected with virus evacuated from Liberia for treatment

The Americans are being flown to Atlanta for isolation treatment after contracting the highly infectious disease

HEATHER SAUL | Saturday 02 August 2014

With these evacuations Ebola became front-page news, and coverage increased when Western medical staff, having had contact with these patients, caught an infection themselves. But interest decreased rapidly when it became evident that these were isolated cases and the risk of an epidemic in Europe or the United Sates was close to zero. There have and still are isolated news items about Ebola but nothing like the media fuelled panic during late summer and autumn 2014.[63]

[63] This can nicely be demonstrated when looking at the temporal distribution oft he hit rates in Wikipedia. After the news of infected health workers in the US hit rates rose for a brief period only to return their low level after a few days. See below the chapter on societal security and social media. See below "security topics on the Internet"

### 2.4 Ukraine – Russia

The struggles between Pro-Western Ukrainians and Pro-Russian Ukrainians have been a source of conflict since the Orange Revolution in 2004. The current situation erupted when then President Viktor Yanukovych declined an agreement with the European Union in 2013. This subsequently led to protest in the streets and his removal from power on February 22nd 2014.[64] What makes the conflict between Ukraine and Russia stand out from other sources of insecurity is that it revitalizes a conflict scheme from the era of Cold War and that it at the same time forces Europe to act as a unified political player. Finally Ukraine is in the immediate neighborhood of the European Union, sharing borders with Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. While the effects of this conflict may not be felt (or imagined) as close and immediately like an infectious disease, a terrorist attack or an increased number of asylum seekers it nonetheless can develop into a severe crisis given the dependence of Europe on natural gas supplies from Russia with pipelines crossing Ukrainian territory.

The Telegraph

Home Video News World Sport Finance Comment Culture Travel Life Women

USA | Asia | China | Europe | Middle East | Australasia | Africa | South America | Central Asia

France | Francois Hollande | Germany | Angela Merkel | Russia | Vladimir Putin | Greece | Spa

HOME » NEWS » WORLD NEWS » EUROPE » UKRAINE

Ukraine crisis: Viktor Yanukovych leaves Kiev for support base

US warns deal remains 'very, very fragile; as president visits eastern stronghold of Kharkiv

The next day Pro-Russian demonstrations were held on Crimea and 26th of February masked Russian Troops started to seize strategic positions on the peninsula. A move not anticipated by Western governments or media.[65]

[64] Ukraine crisis: Viktor Yanukovych leaves Kiev for support base www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10655335/Ukraine-crisis-Viktor-Yanukovych-leaves-Kiev-for-support-base.html

[65] Unlikely odds of a Russia-Crimea reunification www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/unlikely-odds-of-a-russiacrimea-reunification-9155580.html




After initial denial they were identified as Russian troops two days later.[66]

The move was widely condemned by Western governments but any military action against Russia was ruled out categorically. Instead, sanctions were imposed on Russia and its supporters in Crimea. The media focused on potential costs of such sanctions or even further sanctions, the prospect of a similar intervention by Russia in Eastern Ukraine and the upcoming referendum for unification of Crimea with Russia. After the referendum had been held, focus of the Ukraine crisis shifted to the problems faced by the new government and the struggles within the European Union on how to handle the situation.

The media attention on Ukraine increased during summer 2014 after fights in the eastern regions erupted. With increasing military aid by Russia the situation gradually transformed into an armed struggle but contained to Eastern Ukraine. Some incidents amidst this conflict spiked particular interest in the public, such as the capture of OSCE-Members or downing Flight MH17. Other than these incidents, the focus was on diplomatic action between EU-member states as well as the EU, America and Russia. The reports on the fighting stayed in the news but began to fade from the focus of interest.

[66] Russia admits that it has moved troops in Ukraine www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10668357/Russia-admits-that-it-has-moved-troops-in-Ukraine.html

### 2.5 Other Foreign Affairs / Extra-European Threats

Other than the crisis in Syria/Iraq the Middle East was also a hot bed in Libya and Israel. Following the ousting of dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi the country started spinning into chaos and is now at the brink of becoming a failed state. Such an entity located directly in Europe's vicinity is troublesome and was reported as such. But there were few incidents that would have made it front-page news and therefore the issue remained in the back row of media interest.[67]

# Tripoli residents face dilemma after Libya Dawn take control of capital

Locals say their homes could be robbed if they leave, and if they stay they risk being rounded up by Islamist militias

Quite differently was the situation in Israel. Following the murder of three Israeli youths and a revenge murder of one Palestinian boy, Hamas commenced once again its rocket strikes on Israel. In turn the Israeli Defense Forces started a combined air and ground offensive on the Gaza strip. While the Israeli-Palestinian is one of the oldest ongoing conflicts, the relative peace between incidents prompted a lot of media coverage. Although the headlines mimic to those seen during the last Gaza conflict in 2012.[68]

# Hamas rockets land deep in Israel as it bombards Gaza Strip

BY NIDAL AL-MUGHRABI AND ORI LEWIS

GAZA/JERUSALEM | Tue Jul 8, 2014 7:51pm EDT

Amongst the most unexpected outcomes from the rising threat of ISIS/ISIL was the progress made in the Nuclear Talks between Iran, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany. While these talks had been held since 2006 they gained traction in 2014 when the United States and Iran saw themselves united by a common enemy. Although the talks did not lead to an end of the sanctions imposed on Iran or normalization in their relationship to the West, the country has not been presented as a threat in media.[69]

[67] Tripoli residents face dilemma after Libya Dawn take control of capital www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/31/tripoli-residents-libya-dawn-islamist-militias

[68] Hamas rockets land deep in Israel as it bombards Gaza Strip www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/08/us-palestinians-israel-idUSKBN0FC0JP20140708

[69] Iran and EU reach technical settlement on nuclear talks www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b8654ee2-7a24-11e3-a3e6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3TJsx7Ki7

# Iran and EU reach technical settlement on nuclear talks

By Sam Jones in London

This was one of the few examples for 2014 where a previous hostile situation and potential security threat was dissolved and received broad media coverage.

News on Afghanistan centered around two topics: attacks by the Taliban on the one hand and the end of NATO's ISAF mission on the other. The attacks, as incidents, were repeatedly headlines for short periods around their occurrence, while the troop reduction was mainly second tier news. Considering former German Minister of Defense Peter Struck once justified the mission by claiming "Germany's security is also being defended in the Hindu Kush, too," the lack of media attention suggest the media does not share his opinion.

### 2.6 Societal Security in media discourse

Modern mass media create their own reality. They produce, as Niklas Luhmann rightly observes, a closed, recursive system of communication.[70] Media react to other media and take up what is perceived as fit to print or broadcast and that is typically information from other media sources.

As we tried to demonstrate in the previous pages, complex, interrelated events in far away lands can be reduced or condensed into single headlines, supported by often highly emotional pictures. Media bring home clear-cut messages for unclear or opaque problems, operating with simple schemata of good and bad, heroes and villains, causes and effects. The bad guys go after the good guys and it is the task of law enforcement, security services and politicians to protect citizens against the bad guys or other security threats. In the European media discourse political actors themselves can become the villains and there were a number of highly dramatized security events focusing on internal problems originating in Europe (tax fraud and corruption, financial crises, unemployment, overblown surveillance of citizens, freedom of press, to name just a few). We did not cover these issues and instead were looking at some of the more popular events making headlines in the last year that originated outside Europe, but were supposed to affect the internal security of the European Union. Public discourse about security comprises topics and schematized interpretations provided by the type of media reports we presented in the previous pages. In the context of the SOURCE societal security survey we conceive of media reports about security relevant events and groups as a kind of semantic or conceptual toolbox used by different actors in different discursive arenas or forums. Media play a key role in agenda setting, putting a pool of security relevant issues in the spotlight of public attention. But one has to be careful not to conceive of security in the media as a blue print of the concerns of citizens. The relation between public concern and media discourse is complex, involving feedback cycles between public arousal, political strategies and media hype.[71] The extensive media coverage of security relevant events provides the pool of publicly acceptable concepts and interpretations to

[70] Luhmann, Niklas, 2000, *The Reality of the Mass Media*, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press

[71] See Katherine Beckett op. cit., who critically examines what she calls the „democracy-at-work" hypothesis, stating that political initiatives presented as remedial action are driven by popular demand of citizens. Beckett can demonstrate in her analysis that media hype, driven by political actors preceeds public arousal.

talk about security. Different actors can pick up this media-shaped vocabulary to attract public attention and put their issues or policies on the agenda.

In order to gain a better understanding how citizens react to security relevant topics it is necessary to go beyond the media coverage and analyze the reaction of the public. This can be done in different ways. Large-scale surveys are one of the standard approaches to elicit attitudes and opinions about security-related concerns held by the population at large. Another approach is to analyze the activities on the different Internet platforms, hit rates in search engines or queries on sites like Wikipedia. Taking security issues, as put on the agenda by the media as a starting point, we analyzed Internet traffic to find out, whether and how the communicative offer presented to a general audience by the media, resonates with public interest.

# 3. Security topics on the Internet – What users look for and chat about

The Internet has become one of the main sources for information and provides the platform or infrastructure for a whole array of new forms of horizontal communication or information exchange. Traditional media and new media merge increasingly, with newspapers offering on-line editions of their daily releases with a blogging section for every news item and TV stations inviting their audience to comment in real time on what they can see on the screen. Media-hyped events like the Oscars or Super Bowl trigger remarkable activities in the blogosphere. Almost 25 million tweets were sent during the broadcasting of the 2014 Super Bowl final in the US, i.e. some 380.000 tweets per minute. Facebook presented similar figures for these events. These are corporate marketing data and it is difficult to really assess their validity in a scientific context. Nonetheless, they provide a rough idea of how many users are actively involved and interested in specific popular events.

Since it is very difficult and/or expensive to receive a solid data set from social media corporations like Twitter, Facebook, Google or Wikipedia, we have to rely on the data made accessible or harvested with available tools in our analysis.[72] While we would not want to make these data the basis for more complex computations, we deem them sufficiently reliable and valid to identify general trends over time and to demonstrate the scale and temporal dynamics of public interest and arousal in the domain of societal security.

In the following pages we will present selected findings from our analysis of Twitter data and queries addressed to Wikipedia for specific security relevant concepts and events. The data we could retrieve from Twitter are of limited use for several reasons.[73]

## 3.1 Twitter

Twitter is one of the largest messaging services and screening the tweets for security relevant content or messages, it provides an entry point when trying to understand, how citizens react to and/or perceive of security relevant content, circulating in the discourse of public media. We used two different strategies to collect data from the Twitter universe: we collected all tweets based on a screening for pre-defined key words over a limited period of time.[74] This produced 22973 relevant entries, counting how often these terms were used in the exchange among users of Twitter in this time period.

[72] The generation of the database for the analysis of social media will be discussed in a separate working paper. We are still working our way through the virtual jungle, harvesting and documenting what is on our way and building up the technical soft- and hardware infrastructure to be used in the next reports.

[73] Given the sheer quantity of data and the restrictions imposed by Twitter the sampling strategy used by the provider cannot be exactly identified. Drawing a sample of 0.1 percent is an option provided by Twitter but even then it is hard to determine the quality of this sample. Twitter offers full access to their database at considerable costs. This commercial option is beyond the scope of the SOURCE project.

[74] The time period for sampling was 5th March 10 a.m. until 12 a.m. and yielded the following results for the terms crime (5271), financial crisis (1907), justice (3807), migration (2364), security (3572), social security (1928), surveillance (1901), and terrorism (2168). While this may sound like an impressive result, it is only a small faction of the overall traffic on Twitter.

The other type of data retrieved from Twitter sources was a sample of approximately 300.000 tweets provided by the company and representing a real-time sample of all tweets produced between approximately 10 and 12 a.m. on the 5th of March. We chose a date where no media-hyped security relevant event made the headlines. The idea was to get a rough idea of how often security topics are communicated in this medium.

While it cannot exactly be determined how the sample of 300.000 real-time tweets was drawn, an analysis, searching the text of these tweets for a list of 15 security relevant terms and 131 word combinations, where these terms were used (see Appendix Twitter) showed, that only 0.27% of all tweets in the sample contained one or more of these words.[75] Among the top twenty of words used in the sample, no security relevant term was listed. We did a manual search of relevant terms to delete all those messages that had no security relevant content.[76]

Looking at word combinations in Twitter messages we found that "security" is linked with all other concepts in our list of relevant terms. It should be noted that the list below is based not on the concepts alone, but entails the word combinations in the search list used to filter the Twitter messages, e.g. under the heading "security" all tweets that contain "cyber security" are registered as well.

| Term | crime | financial crisis | justice | migration | security | social securtiy | surveil-lance | terrorism |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| crime | 3706 | 0 | 16 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 23 |
| financial crisis | 0 | 1385 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| justice | 119 | 1 | 1858 | 4 | 28 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| migration | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1820 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| security | 19 | 4 | 23 | 7 | 3011 | 1935 | 123 | 49 |
| social security | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 81 | 1413 | 0 | 0 |
| surveil-lance | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 1692 | 7 |
| terrorism | 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 20 | 1 | 19 | 1939 |

Word combinations with security in Twitter sample

Computing combinations of more than two words narrows down the figures even more. The results of the analysis of Twitter samples can be used as a general indicator of how often security relevant messages are posted. A closer analysis would have to go in more detail and would go beyond the

[75] We included word combinations in all European languages. This excluded Asian languages like Chinese, Japanese, Thai, etc. as well as tweets in Arabic.

[76] A huge number of combinations with "social" had to be deleted since they were referring to social media consultancies, advertising their services to clients who wanted to push their commercial message on the Internet. A problem that would have to be considered for further analysis Is the increasing activity of web crawlers in the creation of traffic on the Internet, see http://www.thewire.com/technology/2012/03/non-humans-account-51-all-interent-traffic/49967/

resources available for this task. Nonetheless we hope to get more in-depth insights on Twitter data depending on the policy of the company and their providing free access to analytics and data. For the year 2015 we will be able to compute larger samples and use a machine-learning algorithm to select topics from the tweets harvested in our sample.

In the table above we identified relevant terms in a sample of Twitter messages over a limited period of time of 2 hrs. one day in March. Working with a targeted search function to identify security relevant content we use machine-learning algorithms to develop a larger set of words and phrases and other identifiers (e.g. hash tags) to investigate the dynamic of different types of security talk over time. [77]

### 3.2 Wikipedia

While a look at traffic on Twitter at this stage of our analysis gives a snapshot for a limited period of time, an analysis of Wikipedia hits for relevant terms can be used to produce a timeline over a whole year. Looking at the frequencies of hits for the key terms in our list for Wikipedia yields a number of different patterns.[78] The following is based on an analysis of English versions for some of the key concepts, relevant for societal security. While the frequencies of visits to some pages show a clear correlation with spectacular events, that made the headlines of national and international media, others display a more even distribution over the year 2014. Taking as an example the registered hits for the page for "human migration" there is a rather even distribution of hits across the twelve-month period from Jan to Dec 2014.




A similar pattern can be found for the Wikipedia entry of "data security". This topic is of continuing interest without producing any significant and obvious event-related spikes.

[77] See Conover Michael, D. et al, 2011, Predicting the Political Alignment of Twitter Users. *Privacy, Security and Trust IEEE Third International Conference on Social Computing* p. 192-199

[78] See the Appendix with all Wikipedia results at the end of this Deliverable




A different pattern emerges for those key words or concepts that received event related media coverage. Looking at the article about the Italian island of Lampedusa that became the symbol for the refugee suffering in the Mediterranean Sea, the spikes in January, February, March, May and October 2014 can be linked to media reports about high profile events related to this island.[79] Lampedusa hit the news and made headlines whenever a larger number of refugees drowned or were rescued by the Italian coast guard. The biggest spike beginning of October marks the first anniversary of the drowning of 360 refugees in Italian waters. This pattern can be interpreted as an expression of what could be called "cognitive concern", i.e. users start to visit the relevant page of Wikipedia to learn about an object, event, group or person they read or heard about in the media.




[79] 3rd January: 200 rescued by Italian Navy: http://www.channel4.com/news/immigration-lampedusa-italy-rescue-africa-migrants-sea
6th February: 1100 rescued by Italian Navy http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-07/italian-navy-rescues-1100-african-immigrants/5245248 /
19th March: 2000 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/lampedusa-und-sizilien-mehr-als-2000-einwanderer-innerhalb-von-zwei-tagen-12853596.html
12th May: Ship capsized http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article127929005/Neues-Fluechtlingsdrama-vor-der-Insel-Lampedusa.html
3rd October: 1 year anniversary of 360 people drowning http://derstandard.at/2000006403631/Lampedusa-gedenkt-Fluechtlingsdrama-Trauer-und-Proteste

Frontex, the European border control agency was also heavily involved in the Mediterranean refugee crisis, but displays a somewhat different pattern. While there is a slight increase in hit rates related to the "Lampedusa" events, the major spike here seems to be related to the release of its first quarterly report in 2014. No other media-hyped events relating to the agency could be identified to account for this short-lived increase at the end of January 2014.[80] All in all the absolute number of page visits for Frontex is lower compared to Lampedusa. This may be due to the fact that knowledge about this European agency is more limited to citizens who have become more involved with the issue of migration, refugees and the European reaction to this problem.




Single events also clearly are represented: interest and hit rates spike around the relevant date and then vanish again. The two Malaysian airline flights that crashed in 2014 are a good case to demonstrate this single event dynamic.




MH17 was the plane downed over Ukranian territory, an event that created high numbers of hits for a brief period of time. A somewhat different dynamic is created by the other event of the Malaysian airliner disappearing from air-control radar on the flight to Beijing. Since the plane never was found

[80] 31st January: Presentation of FREN Quarterly
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2013.pdf

and had disappeared under obviously rather mysterious circumstances, interest popped up over the year, whenever the authorities released new information.[81]




A third type of dynamic over the year could be identified in our sample, showing a continuous decline after a phase of high interest. Such patterns may represent a discourse that creates substantial arousal and then gradually fades away. We found this dynamic here for the page “climate change”. Since we focused our analysis on English speaking versions, we assume American users were producing this dynamic. A number of severe storms and floods hit the United States in early 2014 and it seems this has created an increased interest among the general public to learn something about climate change, which seems to be a contested issue in US-American public debate.




[81] It is important to validate spectacular spikes against media search for more general concepts, since not all oft hem have a clear relation to security. A good example is the spike fort he term „justice“ in October 2014. While a number of decisions of the US-Justice Department were published during this time, there also were two new Hollywood movies with the term Justice in their title, and hence may have created increased traffic on Wikipedia „justice“ pages.

Looking at the dynamic of arousal along the time line we can produce evidence how a media generated topic is received differentially at the level of public reaction. At the same time the data from Wikipedia also can be used to investigate whether security threats scoring high in policy discourse resonate with public interest. For example the European internal security strategy put organized crime high on the agenda as one of the important problems to be addressed. When looking at page counts this topic seems to generate only very moderate interest among users. While there is a spike in the beginning of January for which we could not identify a specific event in the public media, the hit rates remain steadily at low level.




A good case to demonstrate the link between media and public interest is the reaction to the Ebola virus story. While the media coverage was following the unfolding and spread of the disease in Africa, public interest seemed to be limited, when looking at the page count figures of Wikipedia. Looking at the hit rates for "Ebola Virus disease" and "Ebola West Africa" clearly demonstrates that interest spiked when the virus hit the European and US mainland, as demonstrated in the previous section. While there may be an abstract interest in the Ebola story, as long as it all happens in a remote region, more engagement can be observed, when the "dangerous virus" moves closer to home.[82] Interest vanishes after a brief period of arousal. Depending on the type of issue different dynamics can be expected.

[82] This distribution also can be found when analysing the data for Google trends. Interest in Ebola spikes after the disease reaches Europe and the United States.







The main value of this data source is that it provides an opportunity to validate and differentiate public reactions to media generated public discourse about security relevant topics. We assume that visiting a Wikipedia page to obtain more information about a specific topic making headlines or breaking news can be interpreted as an indictor of salience. Plotting all the key words we investigated into one chart demonstrates how public arousal developed over time in the year 2014.




A detailed list of the computations for all the items in our analysis is provided in the appendix. Plotting them against the media generated debates about security relevant topics reveals interesting variations. What we deem important here is the temporal distribution of public activity, i.e. the activity of the user community when exposed to a given news item. As opposed to survey results, giving an overview of attitudes at a certain point in time (or in the case of surveys at recurrent dates, e.g.

annually), the temporal distribution in the charts shown above demonstrates in much greater detail how public concern, as expressed in user behaviour, varies over time. Using these data it is possible to create a typology of different dynamics, from single events like in the Malaysian Airline crashes, to selective interest, like in the case of Lampedusa and Ebola to continuous floating interest like in the case of data security or migration. We assume that these dynamics to a large extent reflect the intensity of more or less dramatized media coverage of specific events. The case of Ebola is of particular interest in this context, since it demonstrates how user interest spiked when the virus was moving towards home territory. We assume to find more of such complex interrelations for other security relevant issues in the course of the coming reporting periods in the next years. Taken as anecdotal evidence this case supports the plausible hypothesis that security issues are taken more serious, when they can be perceived (or in this case probably fantasized) in the immediate neighbourhood. Putting this hypothesis in the broader context of studies on insecurity and fear of crime gives rise to an interesting relation between proximity and security. While respondents report higher feelings of perceived security in their immediate neighbourhood, they at the same time show stronger reactions of insecurity and concern when a security threat is identified in this proximate area. We will discuss such relations in the next section, where we present the first findings of our online survey.

## 4. First results form the SOURCE online-survey on societal security

A recurring element of the annual societal security report for WP3 is an online-survey addressing targeted audiences to collect their views on relevant issues. Since the resources for this part of the project do not allow to run a full European survey producing statistically significant results, we opted for an approach that addresses targeted audiences, while at the same time using questions and items comparable to most of the full-blown large scale surveys in the area of societal security. At present there are results from two major surveys, conducted in European research projects available that address similar issues as SOURCE.[83] Also there are other data sets, like the European Social Survey that can be used to compare and contextualize the preliminary findings of the SOURCE societal security online-survey.[84]

The rationale behind this type of data gathering applied in our societal security survey is simple and straightforward. We attempt to target specific kinds of respondents who are typically under represented in a broad statistical survey design: (academic and policy) experts for different fields of security and groups who are in different ways strongly exposed to security measures due to their social and/or professional situation. This second group entails members of marginalized social groups on the one hand and individuals who easily get into the focus of security services and law enforcement, like political activists, investigative journalists and other citizens who actively expose themselves in public debates and often take a critical stance with regard to security and surveillance policies on the other.[85] We also distributed the link to our online-survey through the SOURCE network, approaching security experts with different professional backgrounds. We designed the online-survey in a way that makes it comparable to the abovementioned studies by using similar items. This should provide us with an interesting sample of respondents filling a gap often existing in other surveys.

Developing an adequate sampling strategy for this approach though is a complex task. We attempt to combine two of the dominant strategies here, response-driven sampling and time-space probability sampling.[86] While response-driven sampling uses snowballing to harvest individuals from respondents' networks, time-space sampling strategies start with the identification of locations where specific groups congregate at certain times and then attempt to recruit a sample of this group as respondents for our survey. We approached NGOs and activist groups in the policy field of security studies and surveillance and asked them to distribute the web-link to our online-survey through their net-

[83] These two projects are PRISMS and PACT, both having run EU-27-surveys addressing security, trust and surveillance. Both consortia have made the results of their data analysis available for the SOURCE WP 3. A first comparison of results shows a number of similarities. As soon as we will have more responses from our own online-survey we will be able to elaborate more on the comparison between the three studies.

[84] Data sets of the ESS are available online (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/essresources/findings.html) and were used to compute some comparative findings for our on-line survey. For comparative calculations we used the ESS data for the year 2012

[85] For more details see SOURCE D3.3

[86] See the discussion in Agadjanian, Victor, Zotova, Natalya, 2012, Sampling and surveying hard-to-reach populations for demographic research: A study of female labor migrants in Moscow, Russia, *Demographic Research,* Vol. 26, Article 5, pp. 131-150, publ. 28 Feb. 2012. http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol26/5/

works. We also contacted a number of organisations active in the field of communal social work and editorial offices of street papers across Europe, asking them to sample the vendors of their papers who show up at these offices to collect copies to be sold in the streets, to answer our on-line survey in the office. Both of these strategies are very time-consuming, since they require personal engagement at the level of individual contacts. Nonetheless, we believe that it is worth the effort since it will produce a basis for further rounds of the online-survey.

At this stage the survey can be accessed via the webpages of SOURCE and VICESSE.[87] It is available in several languages, as represented in the SOURCE consortium (German, English, Spanish, French, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish). Translations into Farsi, Arabic and Turkish have been prepared and will be uploaded within the next weeks. Russian, Hungarian and Romanian language versions are in preparation. The selection of these additional languages should provide better access for members of different ethnic communities who in Western-European countries often are to be found at the lower ends of the social stratum. We had a pre-test and a technical test-run of the survey in January 2015 and the final version went online in February. The survey comprises 20 questions and takes between 15 to 25 minutes to complete. While we attempted to keep the wording in the questions asked as simple as possible, we received feedback from social workers, dealing with clients of low educational status and limited linguistic capacity, that some of the respondents they recruited to answer the survey still had problems to comprehend the wording of the items. Responding to questions in the linguistic and symbolic format of a survey questionnaire requires a basic familiarity with the cognitive culture of the modern bureaucratic state that sometimes is lacking among respondents. Face-to-face interviews, if possible in the native language of the respondent, are definitely a more valid form of eliciting information from individuals who are not familiar with the daily routines of a modern welfare state, exposing its citizens to survey type enquiries on a continuous basis.

Until March 8, 2015 we received 325 valid responses. These cases provide the basis of the first preliminary analysis presented below.[88] We envisage keeping the survey in its present form online for the first half of the year to collect further responses. Since all incoming completed surveys have a time stamp, we can control responses for specific periods in future analysis. A comprehensive overview of the data is provided in the Appendix. Given the comparatively small number of cases and the overall design of the survey we only present cumulative tabulation and a few cross tabs. More complex statistical calculations and models cannot be applied with this database at the moment.

We will start with some basic information about socio-demographic data, present cumulative results and then discuss some of the cross tabulations we calculated.

[87] Link: http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-en

[88] Responses keep coming in on a steady basis and we are expecting to have received 400 valid responses by the end of March. Due to the chosen sampling strategies the response rate depends to a large extent on our joint efforts to recruit targeted citizens to participate in this project.

### 4.1 Socio-demographic information

We collected a couple of standard socio-demographic data in our survey to control for the social composition of our sample. At this stage it is still heavily biased in some dimensions as can be seen in the tables below. This is due to the fact that we started to exploit our own networks (including the SOURCE consortium and expert database) first and hence the results from this first wave came in first and are considered in the analysis. But looking at the current returns we hope the bias will be levelled out to some extent over the next few months.

Looking at the age distribution of our respondents we received 282 valid responses and find a slight bias towards a younger population.[89]




The age bias probably reflects an over representation of students in the sample as it stands now. This interpretation is supported, when looking at the distribution of educational levels. Here we find a non-representative number of respondents with a university degree (BA, MA, PhD and beyond). Again this may be due to our approach in the very first weeks addressing the colleagues from the consortium and asking them to activate their professional networks for the distribution of the online-survey.

[89] This bias may be due to the fact that the survey was distributed heavily through academic and university networks, producing a high return rate from students at graduate and post-graduate level, confirming the old wisdom of academic empirical research that the graduate student is the most researched type of person in the world. We are working to correct this bias within the next few months by targeting specific groups with a more evenly distributed age composition.




The present sample shows an even gender balance, with half of the respondents being and male and the other half being female (see figures in the appendix).

As already mentioned above the sample at the present stage displays a geographical bias due to the fact that we started to exploit our own networks and the SOURCE consortium networks for a first round of recruiting respondents. The highest numbers of respondents come from German speaking countries (Austria, Germany) and the Netherlands and/or hold a passport from these countries.




The majority of our respondents live in an urban environment, with a fifth coming from smaller towns and rural areas, as can be seen in the chart below.




Ethnic minorities are definitely under represented in the sample as it stands now. This is a problem that typically haunts many survey based research projects. We hope to increase the number of respondents from ethnic minorities by providing the online-survey in more languages and by further pursuing a targeted recruiting strategy addressing this group.




Looking at the occupational status of the respondents in our sample the academic selection bias again can be seen. Respondents could provide information about their occupation also in free text format and we grouped them in the categories as listed in the chart below. There is stark over representation in the category “research”.




Looking at the socio-demographic for our sample as it stands now we find a number of biases due to the chosen sampling strategy. At the moment we are working to correct this sampling bias by selectively targeting the marginalized groups we envisaged in the original plan when designing this instrument.

### 4.2 Cumulative results for selected variables

We asked respondents to rank a number of items with regard to personal importance and societal relevance and also asked them to judge their own situation with regard to some of these items (such as physical health, financial situation, personal job situation, etc.)[90]

We will present some of the findings here and briefly discuss how they could be interpreted at this stage. The findings are preliminary and will be adapted over the course of the coming years. It should be noted though that numbers still are relatively small and the sample, as shown in the previous section, is biased. It should also be noted that survey data are constructed as snapshots and it is difficult to control for the impact of spectacular events. Evidence for such impacts with regard to public discourse and also public opinion was presented in the previous chapters and has to be taken into account.

We asked respondents to rank a number of policy fields with regard to their societal importance. Respondents were asked to act from the position of a head of government in their country of residence:

> Imagine that you are the head of government of the country you are currently living in and that you have to set priorities for your upcoming budget. Security has been a recurrent topic in the political debate. If you have to rank areas of spending in the next budget under these conditions, how would you order the policy domains listed below?

[90] We chose those items so they are comparable with other large-scale surveys addressing similar questions. A complete print version of all questionnaire items is provided in the Appendix „Survey“. The appendix also provides some comparative computations based on the ESS data for 2012.

| |
|---|
| Please order from your highest to your lowest priority. |
| Healthcare (e.g. increasing the budget for disease prevention) |
| Education (e.g. hiring more teachers and improving schools) |
| Housing (e.g. providing more affordable flats) |
| Environment protection (e.g. investing more in green energy) |
| Civil protection (e.g. investing in protective measures against floods, fires, earthquakes) |
| Public transport (e.g. extending the train and bus services) |
| Social security (e.g. improve pension system and unemployment benefits) |
| Crime prevention (e.g. hiring more police officers) |
| Terrorism prevention (e.g. stepping up surveillance and control) |
| Cyber Crime prevention (e.g. increasing Internet surveillance) |
| Other _____ (enter text) |

Priorities could be expressed using drag and drop, and pulling items into an adjacent window in hierarchical order.




A large majority of the respondents opted for what could be called a "civil" approach to tackle societal security problems, putting budget expenditures for education, social security and public infrastructure in the top ranks.

When looking at the personal level, physical health scores high on the list. This is mirrored in the interviews as well, where respondents spontaneously very often named serious health problems as one of their major concerns when asked what security means for them at the personal level.




Also the high rankings for happiness in life and friends resonates well with the first interview findings, where respondents referred to a functioning social network as one of the important factors for their feeling of security – or the other way round: loosing friends or having major conflicts with friends was considered as an event that could substantially affect personal feelings of security.

At the same time, only a small number of respondents were very satisfied with the performance of civil services in their countries, although taking the first two positive categories (very satisfied and moderately satisfied) together, all public services except for the Pension system, public authorities and the national government score above 50% positive responses. Also the educational system receives only moderate scores. We will have to go into a deeper analysis once we have broadened our database. At this stage we assume the low scores for these public services can be accounted for by the specific composition of the sample underlying the analysis. While the relative figures here point to a critical attitude towards these services, the positive responses are still higher, when compared to the results from the ESS (see appendix p. 81-85).




When looking at the ratings for trust, the political institutions (national government and political parties) score even worse. The same is true for media. Again this is more pessimistic an assessment when compared to the 2012 ESS data.




When looking at the responses relating to personal feelings of insecurity and concerns about future development in the European Union, we find on the one hand the typical distribution from fear of crime surveys, but on the other hand relatively high scores for (in-)security on the Internet (identity theft named as an example in the survey) and also for concerns relating privacy infringements by public and private predators. This again should be seen against the background of our sample where we at this stage most probably have a relatively high number of respondents who are familiar with, and aware of, the problematic of cyber-security, privacy infringement and data-protection.[91]

[91] Results for the distribution of feelings of (in-)security by gender and age display the well known patterns with male respondents feeling more secure than female and younger people feeling more secure than older. (see appendix)







Given the political situation at the time when we designed the survey and selected items for concern at the European level we included the Ukraine crisis. This item received high scores. We assume this is due to the fact that the events in this area since the beginning of 2015 received broad media coverage and this coverage presented the situation in very dramatizing terms.

### 4.3 Results from cross tabulations

Looking at the results from cross tabulations nicely demonstrates that perception or feeling of security is a complex socio-psychological construct. Respondents who are more satisfied with their personal situation in life tend to display lower insecurity. While these differences are only small, they are consistent (see appendix). The only remarkable exception here is the insecurity with regard to (online) identity theft combined with satisfaction regarding personal job situation.




This finding can be accounted for when looking at the workplace situation where the use of ICT by now is a standard in many offices. Those respondents who are either not employed at the moment or work in a position without high personal commitment probably care less about security levels, when using Internet or computers at their work place.[92]

In almost all other cases, high scores for satisfaction with personal situation are linked to higher scores with regard to feeling of security as the tables below nicely demonstrate.[93]







[92] Such tentative hypotheses of course have to be validated by running more calculations and cross tabulations as soon as the numbers of the survey allow for such analysis in a technically meaningful way.
[93] For a comprehensive overview on these relations see the appendix







This pattern is repeated across almost all security items: the greater the satisfaction at the personal level, the higher the feeling of security.

Some interesting findings emerge when looking at trust in public institution in combination with preferences and individual ranking of important issues at the societal level. Respondents conceiving of education as most important issue show different levels of trust compared to those respondents who opted for more "security measures" as the most pressing societal issue to increase societal security. Here we will work on a typology of different security models, such as state-centred vs. society centred or repression/surveillance vs. prevention/education.[94] However we will need higher numbers of respondents to develop these models.

[94] First cross tabulations are to be found in the Appendix under 3.2

## 5. First results from interviews

Interviews providing in-depth insights into the security problems and perceptions of citizens are an integral part of the SOURCE societal security survey. Interviews leave more room for complex accounts of social reality, they allow for a better and more precise mapping of a person's view, social context and embeddedness in a given culture and life world. Using interviews, single cases can be put in a wider social, political, and cultural perspective. They allow for the elicitation of past events in a narrative story format and so shed light on the multiple and unexpected ways individuals solve the problems they perceive or are exposed to. The downside of this approach is that it produces single individual case stories that are hard to synthesize when operating on the assumption of normal distributed general stable features as defining elements of social reality. But then on the other hand this assumption of a common shared social reality has been put into question for good reasons from different theoretical backgrounds.[95]

We chose a strategy for conducting the interviews that would allow us on the one hand to contact individuals who should be exposed to security problems (or policies) in the sense of living under increased surveillance and who at the same time suffer from high vulnerability, due to socio-economic circumstances they are exposed to. We also targeted non-expert lay respondents, individuals who are not working in one of the many security professions (from police officers to security researchers and surveillance systems designers). Soliciting insights from experts though is still on the agenda to collect information and perspectives from those who in their professional work are dealing with one of the many dimensions of societal security.[96] We also approached individuals who due to their civic and professional engagement can become the target of multiple surveillance and control measures, such as journalists or activists from non-governmental organisations. A detailed description of the underlying sampling strategy and choice of interview partners can be found in SOURCE Deliverable 3.3.

Conducting interviews requires a number of skills, linguistic, social, and cultural. We started interviewing in Austria and Germany, recruiting respondents in the targeted groups by using our own extensive personal networks. Interviews at this stage are also conducted in Slovakia and the Netherlands. We are still negotiating with colleagues in Norway, Belgium and the UK, who are competent to act as interviewers within the framework of our approach to conduct a series of interviews in their home countries. We carefully select our interviewers to make sure they have an understanding of the overall approach underlying this societal security survey and are experienced in conducting respondent driven (narrative) interviews. Interviewers are trained (in person or online) and continuously report about their field experiences.

[95] We will not embark on methodological or theoretical elaborations of such an approach, but it should be noted that complex action-theoretical foundations for such an approach can draw on such diverse sources like social systems theory, social phenomenology, anthropology or critical theory of society.

[96] Interviews with security experts from different domains relevant for societal security will be the focus fort he next annual societal security report.

At this stage we have almost 20 interviews available to make the case for this report.[97]

The interviews are organized along a general guideline, comprised of a number of general questions. These questions were selected from a larger pool in a series of test interviews and after discussions with graduate students from Vienna University who had no prior exposure to the relevant topics of security research. The idea behind this guideline is to provide a general frame to address security relevant topics in the broadest sense and not focussing the exchange a priori to a narrow understanding of security as fear of crime, natural disasters or other catastrophic or threatening events. This strategy allows respondents to develop their own individual notion of security and provides the basis to reconstruct a complex universe of what we call "mundane security". Respondents receive some basic information about the SOURCE project at the beginning of the interview and are presented the informed consent form (which sometimes is read to them and if required explained) which they are then asked to sign. The topics/questions listed in the guideline have not to be worked through in consecutive order. Interviewers are asked to leave room for respondents to let the exchange unfold in a respondent-driven manner and to solicit narratives following the preference of the interviewed subjects. This leaves room for stories about respondents' individual experiences of how they handle perceived or real security problems in their everyday lives. Nonetheless all topics and questions entailed in the guideline should be addressed in the course of the interview. An English version of the guideline is presented below.

**Intro:** We want to find out, what makes citizens feel secure and insecure in their everyday life. Assuming that citizens are the best experts when it comes to their personal security we would like to ask you a couple of questions about your experiences, feelings and attitudes towards security and what you think is important in this domain. This interview feeds into a large European research project, investigating security in a broad sense. Collecting views from citizens like you provides important input for this research. We will not use personal information from this interview and everything you say will be treated confidential. If you feel you want to quit the conversation you can do this any time.

1. What does security mean for you? Is there something that makes you feel secure in a general sense in your everyday life?

2. Is there someone or something that provides you with support to manage your everyday an/or professional challenges and live up to social aspirations?

3. Looking ahead towards your personal future, what is it that gives you the feeling of security? Is there anything you contribute actively to secure your own future?

4. Can you think of any circumstances or events that would jeopardize your personal future?

5. Are there any places / situations in your daily walks of life making you personally feel insecure?

6. Are there specific social or ethnic groups that make you feel insecure when encounter them? If so, what exactly do you think makes them a threat to your security?

7. Looking at the overall global political development, at wars and terrorist attacks, do you feel threatened by these attacks in your daily life?

[97] About 40 interviews have been conducted so far, but not all oft hem have been processed and/or translated into English or German.

| 8. What could state and government do, to improve and stabilize your personal situation, to make your life more secure? Can you think of any deficits in this regard? |
|---|

The interviews lasted between 30 and 80 minutes. Interviewers were asked to record them, given this was accepted by respondents and to collect some basic socio-demographic and ethnographic information from respondents.

The sample of interviews providing the basis for this report covers the age bracket from 17 to 72 years, the gender distribution is 7 female and 11 male, educational and occupational background range from university degree to unskilled labour and we managed to get a good mix of respondents who can be considered members of an ethnic minority in their respective countries.

Paraphrases for all interviews in English and/or German are produced, working along the topics of the guideline. All data are stored on HD and made available to the members of the research team. At this stage we are developing the heuristic concept of mundane security, analysing different security concerns across interviews to better understand how citizens perceive security and what their main concerns are. Individual concerns are identified in the interviews and interpreted against the overall context of the narrative.

Looking at the different ways respondents talk of and understand security, different perspectives emerge: young working class men from ethnic minorities name different security problems compared to female students and they suggest different types of solutions to their problems. Retired respondents name different security concerns when compared to young persons. But there are also a number of similarities across all interviews: a majority of our respondents touch upon the issue of social networks, the role of friends and family, when they elaborate their views of what security means for them.

### 5.1 Dimensions of mundane security

For the purpose of this analysis we distinguish between different types[98] of security discourses which we name public and media discourse, policy and expert discourse[99] and lay or mundane discourse. Each of these discourses or ways of talking and conceptualizing security has its own media, formats, speaker roles and topics and produces different effects on different scales. When looking at the level of mundane discourse we find elements of the other forms of talking about security as well. Simplified and politicized elements developed in policy and media discourse about security are referred to in different ways in mundane security discourse as it unfolds in the interviews with lay citizens. A good example to demonstrate this semantic or cognitive linkage of security discourses is the topic of migration. When asked about specific groups or individuals in the respondents' neighbourhood who might be perceived as a threat to personal security migrants or members from ethnic minorities are sometimes mentioned (mainly by male, lower class respondents) as source of security relevant concern or fear. This perception of migrants or ethnic minorities as a threat to perceived security reso-

[98] When talking about „types" we want to emphasize that many variations of each type exist that have to investigated and reconstructed. For analytical simplicity we operate on the level of a simple typology and go into deeper detail only at some points.

[99] The analysis of expert discourse will be the focus of WP 4 in the SOURCE project. A close cooperation with this WP is envisaged.

nates with policy and media discourse. (Illegal) migration ranks high on the agenda of the European Internal Security Policy. Media coverage of migration, addressing issues as diverse as crowded refugee ships in the Mediterranean and problems of social integration and school failure of children from migrant families living in European countries, provides a constant flow of information and interpretations for the general audience of readers, listeners and viewers. Populist parties in all European countries take up the rhetoric of migrants, ethnic minorities and refugees as a threat, destabilizing national cultural, social and economic order and this interpretation in some cases moulds the attitudes of citizens in search for a "scapegoat". When asked to elaborate on the statement that members of ethnic minorities pose a security threat, respondents in the majority of cases referred to media stories or events they knew from hearsay of the type "urban legend". None of the respondents could produce a story of a personal encounter or confrontation. What remains is a general feeling of insecurity in the presence of individuals of obviously non-native origin.

A number of insights can be derived from such accounts about migrants as security problem. First, they are rarely based on first-hand experience,[100] they originate in media and policy discourse, but they can be supported by evidence, since e.g. an encounter with a group of members from an ethnic minority can create real feelings of insecurity. Analytically this is a clear case of "ideology", i.e. a flawed interpretation of reality shaping individual (and collective) perception of the world.[101] Secondly, such interpretations can be embedded in the larger context of the overall interview and then become part of a syndrome, making them comprehendible as an element supporting a larger worldview. In the case of migrants or members of ethnic minorities perceived as security threat this worldview (which can be identified explicitly in some of the interviews) takes the decline of the ethnically homogeneous nation state as cultural frame of reference as a serious problem. This is true particularly for elder respondents who see the emerging of a more multi-cultural and colourful urban public life as a "contamination" of the good old times of an all-white society. A different interpretation can be developed for young male (native) respondents who perceive of migrants as a threat to their social status and position. Migrants are competitors on the battlefield of changing patterns of hegemonic masculinity.[102] With the economic and cultural decline of the working-class-based image of the male as superior in physical strength, feeding and protecting wife and children and drawing respect from his peers in typical male rituals of fight and drink, role models tend to lose their grip and leave (male) individuals in a state of personal and social insecurity. Under these conditions they are prone to take up the confrontation with other cultural groups still representing the image of the traditional male. On a different analytical plane this could be expanded into a gender-based comparison of male and female perceptions of security and security threats.[103]

[100] The same holds for other sources of perceived insecurity, such as the fear of crime.
[101] This point could easily be developed into a methodological critique of attitude research, but that is not the topic of this deliverable.
[102] For this concept see Connel, Raewyn, 1995, *Masculinities*, Cambridge UK, Polity Press. The fact that this concept was developed in a country like Australia nicely demonstrates the role of social theory as interpretive resource for the dominant problematics of a culture. Integrating (male) respondents with migration background into the sample is on the agenda, although access to the relevant communities has a high threshold.
[103] It is foreseen to expand the analysis along the tripartite line of cleavages of race, calls and gender as mutually reinforcing factors of social injustice.

In the following pages we will briefly describe some of the recurrent themes emerging in our interviews so far, to demonstrate the idea of mundane security. The different topics "friends and family", "economy", "public authorities and the state" and "ecological security" are at some points interlinked, but for analytical clarity discussed here separately. How they are linked will be briefly touched upon at the end of this chapter by discussing the relation of the realms of public and private for perceptions of security.

## 5.2 Friends and family

When asked for the meaning of security at the everyday level many of the respondents spontaneously referred to their partners, family members or close friends. Others, to who one is close, also are perceived as a source for support and backup in case of problems. This seems not only to hold for ontological security, but also in more pragmatic situations, where respondents pointed out how they could rely on partners, friends and family to overcome crisis situations or solve personal problems. This link between security and social capital in terms of reliable social networks emerged spontaneously in many interviews and seemed often the most important way to spell out the meaning of security at the personal level. It seems to be somewhat less important for elder people (we interviewed a couple of retired individuals) and the very young male (17 to 21 years). In these cases there was almost a reversal of the position as in the statement of a 75-year-old retiree who said that being independent of others would be an important element of his feeling of security. Also some of the young males we talked to were emphasizing their feeling of independence as important for their feeling of security. Putting these statements in context they can be understood against the social and biographical background of the respondents. Growing up as a young male with a working class background entails cutting ties from one's family and developing a social identity as self-contained, independent and strong man. Looking at other statements by the same individuals when asked, what could be sources of insecurity, they tend to focus on socially awkward situations, where they have to defend or negotiate their status as independent and competent male. They do not refer primarily to physical confrontations, but rather to social conflicts emerging in mundane situations.

When looking at the examples provided in the interviews it seems that partners, friends and family provide the feeling of security also because they seem to act as a kind of sounding board or discursive context, comprised of reliable individuals who could give advice and provide consolation in times of crisis.

## 5.3 Economy

Another recurring theme running through all interviews was the economic situation, at the individual as well as at the societal level. Economic security was spelled out differently depending on age. While younger respondents in their early career stages (or still at university) showed concern about their future prospects for their work life, the elder respondents pointed out, that having their pensions regularly adjusted and their personal savings secured would be important. A close link was made in many interviews between the social welfare state (which still exists) and the individual economic security. The risks of losing one's job or prospective unemployment were often introduced as sources for insecurity, while the options to receive compensation under the existing welfare regime seems to alleviate this burden. This may be due to the fact that the interviews we refer to at this stage were conducted with citizens living in a full-blown and comprehensive welfare society like Austria. The

perception of security also reveals a kind of implicit social contract: investing in good education is perceived as the basis for future employment security. Employment security also entails protective labour laws, which make it difficult for companies or employers to lay off staff. Two different interpretive frames emerged in the interviews so far: on the one hand we find respondents with the aspiration to establish themselves in a permanent position in the labour market (preferably with the state as employer). On the other hand, young unskilled males rarely point to their employment situation when talking about personal security. They rather describe themselves in terms of the entrepreneurial self, as self-contained, self-conscious individuals in a volatile labour market without any long-term perspectives. While they point out that money is important for their security, they do not link their financial situation to their individual educational or human capital.

A majority of the respondents named the financial crisis of the state or a general economic crisis as abstract problems but this seemed not to be closely linked to their own individual economic security. Particularly respondents with higher education levels still seem to believe in the idea of individual achievement. The idea of severe economic or financial crashes affecting one's own economic situation remained vague and abstract looming in a distant future and probably materializing in a far away land. There are two distinct threads running through the interviews here: on the one hand the idea of social solidarity among members of the in-group of partners, friends and family, where the idea of belonging seems to provide a feeling of security; on the other hand respondents pointed out that a competitive advantage (through education, professional skills and experience) in a market situation is an important source for personal security. The feeling of security seems to be rooted in both of these social universes of solidarity and competition. A breakdown of close social ties and a loss of job emerge as dominant security threats here.

### 5.4 Public authorities and the state

Public authorities and the state were frequently introduced as sources of security and insecurity. As mentioned above, the state is perceived as benevolent actor and welfare state, securing against existential economic risks encountered by the individual citizen. Relying on the provision of welfare state services gives individuals security.[104] Another framing to talk a bout the state and security that frequently was used in the interviews was the provision of security in the Hobbesian sense, where the state materializes as law enforcement, police and crime fight. Respondents had very explicit ideas about what state and public authorities could and should contribute to societal security. At the same time the capabilities of the political elites were frequently put into question. "They" (meaning the individuals in charge of the state, the politicians) should more actively address what the respondents perceive as pressing problems. The list of these problems is quite impressive across all interviews and – depending on the political leaning of the respondents – sometimes contradictory. It starts with more control, tougher laws, more police in the streets and a restrictive regime for migration into the country on the one end and ends with statements where the massive presence of uniformed police officers in public space is itself seen as a security threat. For some respondents the populist and racist rhetoric of political representatives from new right-wing conservative parties is perceived as a threat to societal peace.

[104] In terms of encounters with public authorities a gender difference has to be considered, since women more often interact with classical "welfare" institutions, whereas males, particularly from lower classes encounter the state via police and law enforcement.

Not getting involved in international conflicts was frequently mentioned as a good strategy to maintain a high level of security. A number of respondents voiced their concern that getting involved in missions against terrorist groups in the Middle East would make the country a target for terrorist attacks. Here the idea of the self-contained autonomous nation state was invoked as an imaginary object, providing security for its citizens. Some of the respondents, primarily young male from lower social strata, entertained the idea of a kind of "Fortress Austria" protecting citizens against the European Union and the world at large. Developing a strategy to handle a society with many different ethnic groups, was one of the frequently named tasks, the state should approach.

Increasing economic inequality, also along ethnic lines was mentioned as a pressing problem to be addressed by adequate political measures. While the interviews yielded a long list of problems falling within the realm of state and public authorities from the respondents' perspective, trust in these authorities and their capabilities was astonishingly low. Many of the interviewed citizens had serious doubts whether the political elites were willing and competent to tackle the problems that scored high on the political agenda. So while the state is perceived as a dominant provider of societal security in many different respects, many of the respondents questioned its capabilities.

### 5.5 Ecological security

We use the term ecological security not in the sense of environmental security, but rather to capture the complex and multi-dimensional feelings of security as they unfold as a consequence of material and symbolic properties of the immediate neighbourhood and the everyday life in the interviews. While almost all respondents developed a kind of ecology of fear, to borrow a term coined by Mike Davis,[105] they felt rather safe and secure in their daily walks of life. Only in few cases they reported about explicit, security-related strategies of avoidance. Such avoidance was referring to areas or places that had gained a bad reputation through media coverage as sites of crime or hangout of "dangerous" people. An extreme case was a young man who said that he felt safe only within in two districts of the city close to where he lived. These were the quarters where his buddies lived, where he went to school and spent his leisure time. But looking across all interviews it seems that feelings of insecurity to a considerable extent depend on the texture and feel of the socio-material environment. A deteriorating neighbourhood breeds feelings of insecurity;[106] so does using public transport in the late hours, or walking through a dimly lit city park at night. These are standard scenarios often described in the literature on fear of crime.

But at the same time we found many respondents developing feelings of insecurity when exposed to visible signs of social and economic inequality. Seeing an increasing number of beggars or homeless in the streets creates feelings of unease that can be exploited in different ways. While some opt for a strategy of sweeping the streets to return to the clean neighbourhood of former times – a task which is then again seen to be performed by public authorities; many others put these visible signs of economic decline in a broader context, probably seeing such individuals as a warning pointing to the risk of one's own economic failure. What can be seen here is the link between the "big" security prob-

[105] Davis, Mike, 1998, *Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster*, New York, Henry Holt and Company

[106] Whether this also lead to increasing crime rates as Kelling and Wilson in their famous broken window paper in the Atlantic from 1982 claim is not an issue here.

lems, as discussed in policy, expert and media discourse and the mundane feelings of insecurity, as encountered by citizens in their daily lives. Homeless people in the street may be linked to economic security; members of Islamic communities may be linked to the threat of terrorism and the presence of other ethnic groups points to the problems of (illegal) migration. A further investigation of such links, working from interview narratives to policy and media discourse can help to clarify the relation between public policy concerns and private feelings of security.

### 5.6 Public and private

There are sources of insecurity emerging in the interviews that are clearly linked to immediately perceived threats, such as encountering strange people at night in the street, using public transport or moving in public space in the middle of large crowds during rush hour. But there are also other types of sources for insecurity that at first glance seems rather abstract and unrelated to the everyday routines of mundane life. These forms of feelings of insecurity can be linked to a societal development that Zygmunt Bauman has described in his book Liquid Modernity.[107] Bauman exploits the metaphor of liquefaction to describe a process of de-traditionalization and acceleration in different domains and at different scales, from industrial production to personal relationships. The key point here is that any decision an individual takes at a given point in time, can have unpredictable (and negative) consequences in the future, but it is impossible to assess whether these consequences will materialize. Hence the question how to secure against future risks or which preventive measures should be taken in the present becomes a dominant problem – also at the level of everyday reasoning. Against this background a number of feelings of insecurity or security threats that seem unrelated, can be interpreted as emanating from a common basis of a generalized and probably increasing unpredictability of life trajectories. In the interviews, when asked about what could negatively affect their feelings of security, individuals develop future scenarios of events that might have a destructive impact on their lives. These events range from global wars, to financial and economic breakdown, loss of job, serious illness, terrorist attacks, serious crimes, breakdown of relationship with partner, destabilizing political situation. While all these threats may not have much in common, they share a potentially dystopian view of the future and at the same time the only remedial move is to look for emotional and social backup, find support among friends and family. So while there may be a hostile, volatile and risk-ridden outside world, producing security threats of different magnitude and on different scales, the option to retreat into a local, communal, familial social environment remains an option in the face of security threats.

[107] Bauman Zygmunt, 2000, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge UK, Polity Press

## Appendix

Twitter

Wikipedia

SOURCE online survey on societal security

Questionnaire

## Twitter

**Identified terms in Twitter Sample used for search:**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| terror | taxjustice | protections |
| terrorist | truthsjustice | data |
| terrorism | surveillance | database |
| terrorists | ebola | datar |
| terrorismo | ebolafree | datascience |
| terroristas | erebola | bigdataadvice |
| aterrorizan | tackleebola | bigdatadiscovery |
| terrorboat | crime | bigdatafighters |
| terrorizermir | crimes | bigdataforotech |
| terrorizing | cybercrime | dataanalytics |
| antiterrorista | crimewatch | databases |
| aterroriza | abortionisnotacrime | databreaches |
| blaterrorism | americancrime | datagoverance |
| eliminateterrorism | crimeautort | dataisbeautiful |
| terrorbedrohung | crimen | datamaskiner |
| terrorberedskab | crimewatchkzn | datan |
| terrorcontown | timescrime | datarack |
| terrore | truecrime | datas |
| terrorisme | social | datasources |
| terrorista | sociales | dataviz |
| terroristeh | sociale | fastdata |
| terrorizando | socials | personaldata |
| terrors | socialismo | scorewithdata |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| security | socialista | smartdata |
| cybersecurity | socialistas | stopdataretention |
| businesssecurity | socialisã | donetsk |
| homesecurity | socially | immigration |
| itsecurityguard | atsocialmedia | migration |
| lostinsecurity | csocialuco | immigrationdept |
| securityâ | delosocial | immigrationaction |
| statesecurityrs | gpsocialistaext | migrationwatch |
| websitesecurity | partisocialiste | refugees |
| justice | sociala | ukraine |
| justices | socialism | semkaukraine |
| spawnofjustice | socialistdawn | ukraineâ |
| coldjustice | socialiste | ostukraine |
| giveusjustice | socialistes | weareukraine |
| highjustice | socialite | financial |
| injustice | socialos | financialinclusion |
| justicecrew | socialtv | financialjuice |
| justiceforhenxx | socialâ | financialnews |
| justicejfk | privacy | crisis |
| justicemalala | protection | carcrisis |
| taxjustice | dataprotection | eurocrisis |
| truthsjustice | | |

## Wikipedia

Overview of Wikipedia page count analysis










National Security Agency
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Security
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Counter-terrorism
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Terrorism
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Terror
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Information privacy
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


WhatsApp
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Google
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Facebook
180000
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Data security
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Information security
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Privacy
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


European Court of Justice
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Justice
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Crime
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Organized crime
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Corruption
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


European Central Bank
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Euro
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Financial crisis
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


European debt crisis
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Social security
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Climate change
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Airport security
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Malaysia Airlines Flight 17
500000
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Malaysia Airlines Flight 370
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Ebola virus disease
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa
100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Donetsk
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Crimea
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


2014 Crimean crisis
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14

2014 Ukrainian revolution
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Ukraine
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


War in Donbass
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Vladimir Putin
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Kurds
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Peshmerga
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Iraq
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Syria
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Al-Qaeda
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
200000
180000
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Refugee
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Lampedusa
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Frontex
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14


Human migration
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1. Jan. 14
1. Feb. 14
1. Mrz. 14
1. Apr. 14
1. Mai. 14
1. Jun. 14
1. Jul. 14
1. Aug. 14
1. Sep. 14
1. Okt. 14
1. Nov. 14
1. Dez. 14

## Data overview SOURCE online Societal Security Survey

Link: http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-en

Languages: de, en, es, fr, sl, nl, no, sw (in preperation: ru, fa, ar, tu, (cz, hu, ro))

20 questions (see D2.1) /Status (March 8, 2015): 325 cases

The following tables give an overview over the data set as of beginning of March 2015. Where appropriate, tables, computed from the European Social Survey were added for comparison.

### 1. Sociodemographic information






SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=282. mean=40.7y; med=40; std=13.4y; min=17y; max=76y.




SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.




SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Country people hold passport from or reside in
Passport
Residency
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
25% 24%
2% 2%
1% 1%
24% 25%
0% 0%
5% 6%
6% 5%
7% 7%
1% 1%
4% 4%
13% 14%
1% 2%
10% 10%
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Ireland
Norway
Other
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
The Netherlands
United Kingdom
Missing
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Population size of village/city/town
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
8%
10%
3%
10%
18%
15%
26%
10%
< 10.000
10.000 - 50.000
50.000 - 100.000
100.000 - 250.000
250.000 - 500.000
500.000 - 1.000.000
> 1.000.000
Missing
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Ethnic background
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2%
5%
78%
15%
Ethnic minority
don't know
Ethnic majority
Missing
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Civil status
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
26%
51%
9%
2%
11%
single
married/living together
divorced/living separately
Other
Missing
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Occupation
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
4%
7%
3%
7%
6%
10%
4%
7%
26%
3%
2%
23%
Arts/Culture
Consulting/ Management
Engineering/ Technology
Public service
Social work
Student
Teacher
Manual labor
Research
Retired
Unemployed
Missing
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.

## 2. Cumulative results: all variables







How would you judge your current situation?
(Scale 1 to 4)
very satisfying
satisfying
less satisfying
not statisfying
don't know
missing
Relationship partner
Housing situation
Relationship children
Relationship friends
Physical health
Relationship other family
Job situation
Financial situation
Personal fulfilment
Relationship neighbours
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


ESS: Satisfaction with life as a whole
very dissatisfied
dissatisfied
satisfied
very satisfied
1
6.6
21.3
47.7
24.4
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


ESS: Subjective well being
Very good
Good
Fair
Bad
Very bad
1
22.7
40.6
27.6
7.6
1.5
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


ESS: Belong to ethnic minority
Yes
No
1
6.8
93.2
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


ESS: Satisfaction with household income
living comfortably
coping
difficult
very difficult
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1
23.7
42.8
22.5
11
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


ESS: Satisfaction with job
very dissatisfied
dissatisfied
satisfied
very satisfied
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1
2.8
13.9
51.7
31.4
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


How would you rate the performance of public services in your country?
(Scale 1 to 4)
very satisfying
moderately satisfying
slightly satisfying
not satisfying
don't know
missing
Healthcare system
15%
52%
22%
7%
0%
5%
Civil protection
12%
52%
14%
2%
10%
Public transport system
12%
48%
26%
0%
5%
Police
10%
44%
23%
14%
7%
Financial system
11%
40%
25%
17%
6%
Justice system
11%
40%
22%
18%
6%
Public authorities
5%
43%
29%
17%
1%
6%
Educational system
5%
38%
37%
15%
5%
Pension system
7%
26%
36%
21%
6%
National government
3%
27%
34%
29%
1%
6%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


ESS: Satisfaction with public services
fully satisfied
satisfied
unsatisfied
fully unsatisfied
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Healthcare system
8.4
39.7
33.4
18.6
Education system
9.1
44.6
34.2
12.2
State of the democracy
7.5
39.8
35.6
17
National government
2.8
27.2
38.9
31
State of the economy
3.7
26.6
39
30.7
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


How much do you trust these public institutions?
(Scale 1 to 4)
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
don't know
missing
Civil protection services
28%
61%
4%
2%
6%
GPs
20%
67%
6%
1%
5%
Public transport (metropolitan)
16%
65%
12%
1%
6%
Universities
17%
62%
14%
1%
6%
Public hospitals
12%
65%
14%
4%
5%
State schools
10%
64%
17%
2%
5%
Courts
14%
47%
20%
9%
3%
6%
Police
10%
47%
28%
8%
5%
Public transport (countryside)
7%
37%
28%
7%
9%
Media
2%
30%
40%
21%
2%
6%
National government
2%
36%
24%
2%
6%
Financial institutions
3%
24%
36%
29%
2%
5%
Political parties
1%
14%
51%
27%
2%
6%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


ESS: Trust in public institutions
fully distrusted
distrusted
trusted
fully trusted
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Politicians
42.2
38.7
17.8
1.2
Political parties
41.8
39.8
17.1
1.3
National Parliament
32.5
38.3
25.7
3.6
European Parliament
25.6
41.7
28.1
4.4
Legal system
24.6
34
33.2
8.2
Police
15.5
27.9
42.2
14.5
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


Feelings of (in-)security
(Scale 1 to 4)
very secure
secure
insecure
very insecure
missing
don't know
In general
Alone at home at night
Alone in public places
Using public transport
With regards to other ethnicities
Crowded public places
Alone on the street at night
With regards to burglary
With regards to robbery
Using public transport alone at night
When I see police
With regards to identity theft/internet crime
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


ESS: Feelings of (in-)security
Very safe
Safe
Unsafe
Very unsafe
Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark
25.4
49.7
19.8
5.1
European Social Survey 2012; VICESSE 2015; n=54 673.


Concern about future development in the EU
(Scale 1 to 4)
very concerned
concerned
hardly concerned
not concerned
don't know
missing
Ukraine crisis
Financial crisis
Rising inequalities
Climate change
Terror attacks by Islamic State
Privacy infringement (Social Media providers)
Privacy infringement (intelligence services)
Rising prices (energy)
Rising prices (food)
Refugees/Asylum seekers
EU member state drops out
Ebola outbreak
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.










## 3. Crosstabs

*3.1. Satisfaction with public services by what is seen as most important on a societal level*


Satisfaction with public services of peple who ranked EDUCATION as most important on societal level
positive
negative
Civil protection 82% 18%
Healthcare system 67% 33%
Police 64% 36%
Public transport system 60% 40%
Justice system 57% 43%
Financial system 55% 45%
Public authorities 51% 49%
Educational system 40% 60%
Pension system 35% 65%
National government 34% 66%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Satisfaction with public services of peple who ranked SOCIAL SECURITY as most important on societal level
positive
negative
Civil protection 71% 29%
Healthcare system 70% 30%
Police 59% 41%
Public transport system 69% 31%
Justice system 56% 44%
Financial system 58% 42%
Public authorities 53% 47%
Educational system 49% 51%
Pension system 34% 66%
National government 32% 68%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Satisfaction with public services of peple who ranked PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE as most important on societal level
positive
negative
Civil protection 95% 5%
Healthcare system 83% 17%
Police 58% 42%
Public transport system 65% 35%
Justice system 62% 38%
Financial system 58% 42%
Public authorities 57% 43%
Educational system 51% 49%
Pension system 43% 57%
National government 41% 59%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Satisfaction with public services of peple who ranked SECURITY MEASURES as most important on societal level
positive
negative
Civil protection 78% 22%
Healthcare system 70% 30%
Police 44% 56%
Public transport system 70% 30%
Justice system 33% 67%
Financial system 30% 70%
Public authorities 25% 75%
Educational system 50% 50%
Pension system 40% 60%
National government 33% 67%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.

*3.2 Feelings of (in-)security by satisfaction with personal situation*

- Indicators "Feelings of (in-)security": in general, in public transport alone at night, with regards to robbery, with regards to identity theft
- Indicators "Satisfaction with personal situation": personal health, personal financial situation, personal job situation, relationships to friends, housing situation

*Feelings of (in-)security in general*







Feeling of (in-) security in general by satisfaction with personal job situation
secure
insecure
satisfied
98%
2%
unsatisfied
98%
2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Feeling of (in-) security in general by satisfaction with relationships to friends
secure
insecure
satisfied
98%
2%
unsatisfied
95%
5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Feeling of (in-) security in general by satisfaction with personal housing situation
secure
insecure
satisfied
98%
2%
unsatisfied
95%
5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.

*Using the public transport alone at night*















*Insecurity with regards to burglary*




Insecurity with regards to burglary by satisfaction with personal financial situation
secure
insecure
satisfied
77%
23%
unsatisfied
68%
32%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Insecurity with regards to burglary by satisfaction with personal job situation
secure
insecure
satisfied
78%
22%
unsatisfied
68%
32%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Insecurity with regards to burglary by satisfaction with relationships to friends
secure
insecure
satisfied
76%
24%
unsatisfied
70%
30%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.




*Insecurity with regards to (online) identity theft*







Insecurity with regards to (online) identity theft by satisfaction with personal job situation
secure
insecure
satisfied
46%
54%
unsatisfied
55%
45%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Insecurity with regards to (online) identity theft by satisfaction with relationships to friends
secure
insecure
satisfied
50%
50%
unsatisfied
37%
63%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Insecurity with regards to (online) identity theft by satisfaction with housing situation
secure
insecure
satisfied
48%
52%
unsatisfied
50%
50%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.

*3.3. Trust in public institutions distinguished by which issue was rated as most important on a societal level*










Trust in universities by most important issue on societal level
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
Education
21%
63%
16%
0%
Social Security
18%
66%
15%
2%
Public infrastructure
16%
67%
14%
2%
Security measures
30%
60%
10%
0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Trust in public transport (metropolitan) by most important issue on societal level
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
Education
22%
61%
17%
0%
Social Security
18%
71%
11%
1%
Public infrastructure
11%
81%
6%
2%
Security measures
10%
60%
30%
0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Trust in public transport (countryside) by most important issue on societal level
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
Education
12%
42%
34%
12%
Social Security
9%
51%
33%
7%
Public infrastructure
3%
49%
46%
3%
Security measures
17%
50%
33%
0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Trust in political parties by most important issue on societal level
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
Education
16%
55%
29%
Social Security
11%
61%
28%
Public infrastructure
20%
61%
20%
Security measures
40%
20%
40%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Trust in police by most important issue on societal level
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
Education
13%
54%
25%
8%
Social Security
11%
48%
34%
8%
Public infrastructure
9%
57%
25%
9%
Security measures
20%
40%
20%
20%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Trust in civil protection services by most important issue on societal level
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
Education
38%
59%
3%
Social Security
29%
66%
5%
Public infrastructure
19%
81%
0%
Security measures
30%
50%
20%
0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Trust in courts by most important issue on societal level
fully trusted
trusted
distrusted
fully distrusted
Education
19%
52%
23%
5%
Social Security
12%
51%
23%
14%
Public infrastructure
13%
60%
16%
11%
Security measures
30%
30%
20%
20%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.

*3.4. Feelings of (in-)security by gender and age*

*Feelings of (in-)security by gender*










Insecurity with regards to robbery by gender
very secure
secure
insecure
very insecure
Female
15%
56%
23%
6%
Male
23%
55%
13%
9%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Insecurity with regards to (online) identity theft by gender
very secure
secure
insecure
very insecure
Female
11%
40%
35%
14%
Male
13%
34%
44%
10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.

*Feelings of (in-)security by age*










Insecurity with regards to robbery by age
very secure
secure
insecure
very insecure
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
18-27
15%
40%
30%
15%
28-37
23%
65%
9%
3%
38-47
19%
58%
16%
6%
48-57
20%
57%
18%
6%
58-67
21%
56%
15%
9%
68-77
57%
43%
0%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.


Insecurity with regards to (online) identity theft by age
very secure
secure
insecure
very insecure
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
18-27
27%
31%
24%
18%
28-37
15%
45%
37%
3%
38-47
8%
42%
37%
12%
48-57
12%
33%
41%
14%
58-67
29%
57%
14%
68-77
29%
71%
0%
SOURCE Societal Security Survey; VICESSE 2015; n=325.

## Questionnaire

**A - IMPORTANCE IN LIFE**

**1) What is important to you on a societal level?**

Imagine that you are the head of government of the country you are currently living in and that you have to set priorities for your upcoming budget. Security has been a recurrent topic in the political debate. If you have to rank areas of spending in the next budget under these conditions, how would you order the policy domains listed below?

Please order from your highest to your lowest priority.

- Healthcare (e.g. increasing the budget for disease prevention)
- Education (e.g. hiring more teachers and improving schools)
- Housing (e.g. providing more affordable flats)
- Environment protection (e.g. investing more in green energy)
- Civil protection (e.g. investing in protective measures against floods, fires, earthquakes)
- Public transport (e.g. extending the train and bus services)
- Social security (e.g. improve pension system and unemployment benefits)
- Crime prevention (e.g. hiring more police officers)
- Terrorism prevention (e.g. stepping up surveillance and control)
- Cyber Crime prevention (e.g. increasing Internet surveillance)
- Other _____ (enter text)

**2) What is important to you on a personal level?**

| | 1) Very Important | 2) Important | 3) Less important | 4) not important | 5) don't know | 99) N/A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1) Your physical health | | | | | | |
| 2.2) Your financial situation | | | | | | |
| 2.3) Your personal job situation (including unemployment) | | | | | | |
| 2.4) Your relationship with your partner, your children, your relatives | | | | | | |
| 2.5) Your relationship with your friends | | | | | | |
| 2.6) Your housing situation (including homelessness) | | | | | | |
| 2.7) Your pet | | | | | | |
| 2.8) Your educational achievements | | | | | | |
| 2.9) Your happiness in life | | | | | | |
| 2.10) Your hobbies | | | | | | |
| 2.11) Your personal fulfilment | | | | | | |
| 2.12) Safe and protected environment | | | | | | |
| 2.13) Your professional career | | | | | | |
| 2.14) Fun in life | | | | | | |
| 2.15) Your right to privacy | | | | | | |
| 2.16) Your options to participate in public life | | | | | | |
| 2.17) Other ____ (enter text) | | | | | | |

**B - PERSONAL ASPECTS OF YOUR EVERYDAY LIFE**

**3) How would you judge your current situation?**

| | 1) very satis-fying | 2) moderately satisfying | 3) slightly satisfying | 4) not satisfy-ing | 5) don't know | 99) N/A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1) Your physical health | | | | | | |
| 3.2) Your financial situation | | | | | | |
| 3.3) Your personal job situation | | | | | | |
| 3.4) Your relationship with your partner | | | | | | |
| 3.5) Your relationship with your children | | | | | | |
| 3.6) Your relationship with other family members | | | | | | |
| 3.7) Your relationship with your friends | | | | | | |
| 3.8) Your relationship with your neighbours | | | | | | |
| 3.9) Your current housing situation | | | | | | |
| 3.10) Your personal fulfilment | | | | | | |

**C - SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES ON A NATIONAL LEVEL**

**4.) How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?**

| | 1) very satisfying | 2) moderately satisfying | 3) slightly satisfying | 3) not satisfying | 5) don't know | 99) N/A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1) The healthcare system in general is… | | | | | | |
| 4.2) The educational system in general is… | | | | | | |
| 4.3) The financial situation in general is… | | | | | | |
| 4.4) The pension system in general is… | | | | | | |
| 4.5) The public transport system in general is … | | | | | | |
| 4.6) Civil protection in general is organised … | | | | | | |
| 4.7) The police in general is … | | | | | | |
| 4.8) The national government in general is … | | | | | | |
| 4.9) The public authorities in general are … | | | | | | |
| 4.10) The justice system in general is… | | | | | | |

**5) Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?**

| | 1) fully trusted | 2) trusted | 3) distrusted | 4) fully dis-trusted | 5) don't know | 99) N/A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1) Public Hospitals | | | | | | |
| 5.2) General Practitioners (in the healthcare sector) | | | | | | |
| 5.3) Public schools | | | | | | |
| 5.4) Universities | | | | | | |
| 5.5) Public Transport (in metropolitan areas) | | | | | | |
| 5.6) Public Transport (on the countryside) | | | | | | |
| 5.7) Financial Institutions | | | | | | |
| 5.8) Political parties | | | | | | |
| 5.9) Police | | | | | | |
| 5.10) Civil protection services (e.g. fire brigade, paramedics) | | | | | | |
| 5.11) Courts | | | | | | |
| 5.12) Media | | | | | | |
| 5.13) The Government | | | | | | |

**D – SOCIETAL SECURITY**

**6) Feelings of (in)security:**

| | 1) very secure | 2) secure | 3) insecure | 4) very insecure | 5) don't know | 99) N/A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1) In general I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.2) Alone at home at night I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.3) Alone on the street at night I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.4) Alone in public places I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.5) In very crowded public places I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.6) When I use public transport services I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.7) When I use public transport services alone at night I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.8) When I see a police officer or a police car, I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.9) With regards to burglary I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.10) With regards to robbery I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.11) With regards to identity theft on the internet I feel… | | | | | | |
| 6.12) In the presence of members of other ethnic groups I feel … | | | | | | |

**E – CHALLENGES FOR EUROPEAN SOCIETY**

**7) Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about …**

| | 1) very concerned | 2) concerned | 3) hardly concerned | 4) not concerned | 5) don't know | 99) N/A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1) The future development of the Ukraine crisis | | | | | | |
| 7.2) Terror attacks by the "Islamic State" on European soil | | | | | | |
| 7.3) The future development of the financial crisis in Europe | | | | | | |
| 7.4) Member states or your own country dropping out of the European Union | | | | | | |
| 7.5) The progressing climate change | | | | | | |
| 7.6) Refugees seeking asylum in the European Union | | | | | | |
| 7.7) Intelligence agencies infringing your privacy | | | | | | |
| 7.8) Global Social Media Service Providers (e.g. Google, Facebook, Twitter) collecting your personal data | | | | | | |
| 7.9) Rising prices for staple foods | | | | | | |
| 7.10) Rising energy prices | | | | | | |
| 7.11) An Ebola outbreak in Europe | | | | | | |
| 7.12) Rising social and economic inequalities across Europe | | | | | | |

**F – CULTURAL ATTITUDES*** [108]

People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below there are some of the goals listed which different people would give top priority.

Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?

And which would be the next most important? And which would be the third most important?[109]

Maintaining order in the nation

Giving people more say in important government decisions

Fighting rising prices

Protecting freedom of speech

Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? And what would be the next most important? And what would be the third most important? [110]

A stable economy

Progress toward a less impersonal and more human society

Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money

The fight against crime

[108] **Note: We've adopted the extended Inglehart Index[108] for this question as it was and still is used in the World Value Surveys. Comp. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp*
*PDF: WV5_Questionaire_RootVersion1.pdf* (Questions on p.6f)
[109] In the online-survey form the respondents will be able to choose the ranking by clicking on the items and shuffling the individual statements according to their preferred order.
[110] Ibid.

**G – SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

10.1) Age _____ (year of birth. e.g. 1984)

10.2) Gender [ ] male [ ] female [ ] other / N/A

10.3) Education

[ ] no certificate [ ] vocational certificate

[ ] secondary degree (10 ears) [ ] secondary degree (12 years)

[ ] University degree BA [ ] University degree MA

[ ] University degree PhD/equivalent [ ] N/A

10.4) No. of persons in household: ____ No. of children under 18: ____

10.5) You hold a passport of which country?

10.6) What is your current country of residence?

[List as follows: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, other _____ (please enter) ]

10.7a) Monthly household income after tax (approx. in Euro) [>>> convert to British Pound/Norway Crown]

[ ] under 450 [ ] 451 to 1500

[ ]1501 to 2500 [ ] 2501 to 4000

[ ] over 4000 [ ]N/A

10.7b) How do you assess your income (in comparison to the national average):

[] low income [] average

[] above average [] very high

10.8) Civil status

[ ] single

[ ] married/living together

[ ] divorced/living separately

[ ] widowed

[ ] other _____

10.9) Would you consider yourself belonging to

[ ] the major ethnic group in the country you are currently living in

[ ] an ethnic minority in the country you are currently living in

[ ] don't know

[ ] N/A

10.10) You are currently living in a village/town/city with[111]

[ ] less than 100.000 inhabitants

[ ] between 100.000 and 250.000 inhabitants

[ ] between 250.000 and 500.000 inhabitants

[ ] between 500.000 and 1.000.000 inhabitants

[ ] more than 1.000.000 inhabitants

10.11) What is your occupation? _____ (enter text)

10.12) How did you hear about this survey?

[ ] via a mailing list of an institution, organisation, NGO…

Which one? _____

[ ] visiting the website of an institution, organisation, NGO….

Which one? _____

[ ] via an advert in a newspaper/magazine

Which one? _____

[ ] via social media coverage (Twitter, Facebook etc.)

Which one? _____

[ ] other ___ (enter text)

[ ] don't know

[ ] N/A

Thank you very much for participating in this survey!

[111] see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Statistics_on_European_cities

**Consent Form (Disclaimer)**

Disclaimer: Online Survey - Project SOURCE (EC Grant Agreement No 313288)

Thank you for considering participation in this research.

The information you provide as part of this interview will be used as part of the EU FP7 funded research Project SOURCE (Virtual centre of excellence for research support and coordination on societal security). The output of this project includes research reports and peer-reviewed journal articles. Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify you from any publications.

If you have any questions about the project SOURCE or our data protection measures, do not hesitate to contact us (office@vicesse.eu)

**Declaration of consent**

I agree to participate in this online survey. I have read both the consent form as well as the introduction to this survey at http://www.societalsecurity.net/ and I understand what this research study involves. I have no further questions.

I understand my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw from this study at any time without giving a reason and without any penalties resulting from this withdrawal.

I understand any information collected during this study will be held confidentially and will be shared within the Project SOURCE consortium anonymously. I understand that the outcomes of this study may be published in academic journals, as well as project reports. I also understand that individuals participating in the study will not be identified in any of these reports.

I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Austrian Data Protection Authority (www.dsb.gv.at).

☐I agree to take part in this research.