



VIRTUAL CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR RESEARCH SUPPORT AND COORDINATION ON SOCIETAL SECURITY

D3.5 ANNUAL SOCIETAL SECURITY REPORT 2

This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 313288.



Societal
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01.01.2014
31.12.2018

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D3.5 Annual Societal Security Report 2

Abstract: This report presents data for security relevant topics, focussing on events covered in media discourse, citizens' perception of mundane everyday security and experts' assessment of security relevant developments in contemporary societies. Data from a variety of sources are used to cover a wide array of topics.

Contractual delivery date: M24

Actual delivery date: M24

Version: 1

Total Number of pages:

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Dissemination level: PU

Version Log

Issue Date	Rev. No.	Author	Change
20/12/2015	0.1	RK, KK, RvL, NL, MV	Draft version
22/12/2015	0.2	TH	Review
26/12/2015	0.3	RK, NL	Final version

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Security – a multi-layered concept

In last year's Deliverable of the SOURCE Annual Societal Security Report (D 3.4), the first in a five years series, we pointed out that security as an object of empirical and theoretical analysis is a complex concept, and is difficult to grasp. We presented evidence from a number of very different and heterogeneous data sources to demonstrate the wide array of security-related problems and topics we thought could be important for the SOURCE project. This piecemeal approach, more a bricolage than a comprehensive systematic analysis, was a response or reaction to two principal problems. One of these problems is of a prosaic nature: the budget available for this survey in the SOURCE project is limited and hence larger primary empirical studies of security at the European level are beyond limits for this Work Package. The second problem though is more serious and concerns theoretical integration: how can different definitions or interpretations of security be reconciled or synthesized? Is such an endeavour of synthesis desirable or is analytical grip and theoretical precision lost when moving up into thin air of high abstraction? Attempts to take the position of the all-seeing observer, capable of deciphering the signs of the present and covering the Gestalt of security in contemporary society as such come at a price. They tend to lose theoretical clarity and any supporting empirical evidence tends to become rather arbitrary. There is no easy way out of this dilemma.

We propose a solution that projects the problem onto the level of different disciplines and try to develop a sociologically informed understanding of security as the basis of the Societal Security Report. We will operate with a concept of security that has three analytical layers to capture the complexity of security discourses. For each of these three layers different types of empirical evidence will be presented. Each layer is linked to both of the others in multiple ways that have to be accounted for in an overarching framework. We termed these layers or domains

- Security in mundane everyday world contexts and
- Security in public media discourse,
- Infrastructural systems security

Each of these layers or domains has a distinct temporal order and logic. Each focuses on specific aspects of "security", taking a distinct perspective. We will elaborate on this model in more detail below.

A Sociological approach to security and the problem of methodological reflexivity

Choosing sociology as a frame of reference entails a number of commitments (or preferences). We briefly touched upon this problem in last year's D 3.4 under the heading "Some methodological caveats". First of all it is a commitment to methodological reflexivity. Empirical data have to be put in

context: They are products of more or less controlled and systematic activities of social actors, produced for a specific purpose and of limited or context specific value. This can easily be demonstrated when looking at statistical data, from crime statistics to socio-economic panel studies. Producing statistical data requires at a very basic level a cognitive culture providing the categories to be applied and moulding the social world in a way that makes these categories applicable for social research in a meaningful way. This starts with the bureaucratic definition of personhood, assigning a date of birth, a proper name and a citizenship to an individual. This may sound trivial, but the recent problems of Western European bureaucracies in managing the flow of migrants from the MENA countries, sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan clearly demonstrates the difficulties of our cognitive culture when exposed to individuals who present nothing but their naked, undocumented lives: where are they from? How old are they? What is their name? A refugee without a valid and accepted, state-backed passport is difficult to process for a Western border guard or refugee registration officer, relying on the reality principle of the institution or society s/he represents. The naked life has to be “squeezed” into the existing order for further processing.¹ A similar problem would haunt each social researcher trying to collect simple socio-demographic information from such a group.

While the case of the refugee *sans papiers* points to traditional problems of identity and personhood as the basis for social research there are challenges arising at the other end of the cultural spectrum with the spread of new technologies: who has the right to citizenship, who are the citizens in the digital age? (see de Moraes, Benvenuti de Andrade 2015). Humans are transformed into hybrid beings, comprised of physical and digital elements and new techno-social elements are injected into the definition of personhood.

Beyond such foundational categorical structures making the construction of data for social research possible there is a myriad of other problems to be addressed in a methodologically reflexive way for a sociologically inspired analysis of the social world. The abovementioned cases of crime statistics and socio-economic panel data provide textbook examples here. Both are considered to be relevant for an analysis of security investigating the development of crime and social inequality. The figures of crime statistics are the product of highly artificial processes of construction and they rely on a categorical order of criminal law superimposed on real world structures and processes. Rising crime figures may be an effect of more police activity or a change in citizens’ crime reporting behaviour. These figures are shaped through media, PR campaigns, and shifts in public sentiment. The criminological invention of a so-called dark figure, i.e. the realm where crime exists but goes unregistered does not solve the problem, since “crime” is not a natural kind (Hacking), but a legal concept, providing a model of action, assigning the reciprocal roles of victim and offender and defining a behaviour as either legal or illegal. But as ethnographic research shows, the roles of victim and offender superimpose an artificial order upon social conflicts and the idea of a crisp legal definition of crime as norm breaking behaviour entails an ascriptive judgement and is highly context

¹ This may have dramatic effects on individual lives, when e.g. for all unaccompanied minors the date of birth is fixed at January 1 of a year that seems plausible to the official registering the young refugee. Since according to the logic of national migration law, juveniles have a different (and more secure) status than adults, a whole artificial cohort of young refugees maybe confronted with new bureaucratic obstacles at the beginning of a new year.

dependent and finally it is at the discretion of the court to determine whether a crime has happened.² Similar critical objections can be brought forward against e.g. income statistics or socio-economic panel data. When asking to honestly disclose all sources of individual or family income, answering to a survey, the social researcher operates on the assumption that respondents provide him with realistic figures. The same is true in principle for all so-called fact-based information elicited in a survey. Why should a respondent say the “truth” and what qualifies as a true statement in this context? At the bottom of this approach is a kind of bureaucratic truth principle, i.e. the truth can be validated against information stored in institutional files and archives (like birth registers, tax declarations, etc.).³

Data generation as communicative process

These are just a few examples to demonstrate the idea of methodological reflexivity in social research from a sociological perspective. Another important aspect here is the consideration of the situated character of data production in social research. The production of data is a cooperative or communicative enterprise. Even when filling in a self-administered questionnaire in front of a computer screen a person responds to a request (“Please answer the question” or “List your preference” etc.). The very communicative and social character of data generating processes is often ignored or reduced to a model of stimulus and response emulating a presumably objective methodology of the natural sciences. Exposing respondents to a list of items construed to represent a theoretical construct like “attitude” or “value orientation” is a standard approach here. However it is beyond control of the researcher whether respondents share the same meaning of the presented items and the link between attitude and action is a topic of longstanding controversial debate. (Wallace et al, 2005). There also may be undetected framing effects, shaping responses to research questions in unexpected ways.

A classical case for such an effect in the context of security relevant topics is the seminal study of Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) on public support for the infamous “Three strikes law” in the U.S. that led to life long prison sentences for repeat offenders. Support for this repressive approach to crime declined significantly when the problem was presented in a different frame, focussing more on the social, economic and societal root causes of crime. What becomes obvious here is the close link between researcher (or research tool) and respondents (or responses). Such links should not be

² The problem of the constructive character of social reality, to be understood as a joint cooperative achievement has been discussed in philosophy, most prominently by authors like John Searle (2010). With regard to the field of crime and deviance the so-called labelling approach has rehearsed this idea since the 1950ies. Amazingly enough the “discovery” and introduction of this well-established idea in political science by Buzan et al (1998) in their concept of securitization was considered as a game changing approach to the problems of theorizing e.g. international relations in political science.

³ As Michel Foucault in a famous quote in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* wrote: “Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.”

eliminated following a problematic notion of objectivity but should be exploited for the production of communication-based data for social research, rooted in a theoretical understanding of communicative action. Social research and the production of empirical data always entail a joint, social and situated process linking a researcher and a subject. Using non-reactive methods of research the situation is different, since here the researcher is in the position to investigate “data” produced without his active involvement. In a very general sense, the “operation called verstehen”, to quote the famous phrase by Theodore F. Abel, is at the bottom line of all social and sociological research. And this operation entails communicative processes, hence the insistence on communication in this context. Communication is an important element also at the other end of the research process when asking who is the audience, who is targeted with the publication of research results? Does security research address the administrative political elites, producing “policy briefs” presented to the representatives of power providing them with new ideas for a better or more enlightened security policy or is research following the line of critical reasoning and/or political critique, making the existence of this very power structures and the elites addressed in policy briefs a topic for theory and research on security? This question points to what has been termed the meta-orientation of social research, as famously elaborated in the book on Knowledge and Human Interests by Jürgen Habermas (1972). As mentioned in the beginning of this section we opt for a sociological approach in this societal security report to investigate the multi-layered concept of societal security. This basic decision for a disciplinary choice may require some explicative remarks.⁴ A sociological approach provides the intellectual framework to combine theoretical reconstructive analysis with rich empirical (and historical) investigations to understand the emergence and developmental dynamic of social order – or modern societies, or parts of it: like the ramification of security discourses – as the product of meaningful social action. Reconstructing different trajectories in the developmental dynamic of modern societies entails the explication of standards of rationality embedded in everyday world settings and across different domains or “sub systems” of modern societies. When analysing a topic like security, having access to or keeping in mind the idea of rationality, as a yardstick for analysis is important. In historical perspective societies have produced different types of threats and vulnerabilities and have dealt with these in a variety of ways, drawing on religion, science and magic. Confronting security as a societal problem can happen in many different ways and developing an understanding of the different rationalities (or standards for rational re/action) underlying these reactions allows for a critical assessment of historical and contemporary security discourses. Taking a sociological perspective allows for a broad concept of rationality, combining different, interlinked spheres of societies in a historical reconstructive analysis of second-order differentiation.⁵ Whereas e.g. political science has its focus in the political system, investigating institutional mechanisms in a descriptive and/or empiricist manner or economics addresses society from the perspective of social integration regulated through market mechanisms, sociology provides the conceptual tool kit to target the realm of the social in a broader, more comprehensive manner. While political sciences are preoccupied with the problem of governance, economics focuses on the optimal allocation of scarce goods through markets and prices. Both

⁴ For the following see Habermas (1984) Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1, Introduction

⁵ The term second-order differentiation refers to the evolution of the conceptual apparatus or tool kit used in society by societal actors to come to a reflexive understanding about the world they inhabit.



disciplines fall short to address and understand questions of meaning and rationality at the level of social actors. Without a theoretically elaborated and comprehensive concept of social action they run into problems when attempting to link the domain-specific processes, analyzed in both disciplines, to wider notions of society and social rationality. Both disciplines have developed domain specific concepts of rational action or rationality but both are falling short to provide criteria beyond their disciplinary realm. Such an emphatic notion of rationality is required to take a critical position towards societal problems. And security can be perceived as such a societal problem in contemporary societies. A sociological approach allows for a complex theoretical architecture avoiding the bifurcation of a detached observer-researcher on the one hand and the object(s) of inquiry on the other.

Using a reconstructive, reflexive methodology applying what could be called a self-explicative strategy, a link between observer and object of observation can be established, engaging both in a process of inquiry leading to an increased understanding of pre-reflexive practices– or to use Immanuel Kant’s famous definition of enlightenment: to a liberation from self-inflicted immaturity via a discursive process.⁶ At the operational level this amounts to an analysis of claims about truth and efficacy brought forward in communicative acts of a speaker. The emphasis here is on *communicative*, i.e. any claim has to stand the test of being put into question by another person (or audience). The validity of such claims is rooted in either a shared consensus among participants or in the empirical proof of efficacy. In each case the validation of claims is projected back to communicative processes and social action. The very basic and simple model for a sociological analysis then is comprised of a number of competent and autonomous social actors and a (material) environment upon which these individuals act and which is transformed through their (coordinated, problem-solving) actions. This arrangement cannot be reduced to the constellation of solipsistic homunculi acting in isolation in an external environment, or to a community of interpretation comprised of actors construing the world in an arbitrary way. In formal terms this can be understood as a triadic, entangled constellation of Ego, Alter and object(s), maintained and reproduced through instrumental-cognitive and social-communicative forms of action alike, based on shared knowledge about the shared social and material and also virtual world.

Security and the everyday-world

Applying such a model to an analysis of security yields a number of non-trivial insights. Security can be reconstructed against the background of a communicative concept of the life world. Individuals share a common understanding of their material, symbolic, and social environment providing them with a feeling of security (or insecurity). Such feelings or social perceptions of security are the product of communicative exchanges among social actors, deliberating the stability, predictability

⁶ The basic format of a narrative interview displays this structure of explication, when respondents elaborate their stories and the interviewer asks for explicative examples or evidence.

and robustness of their shared everyday cosmos, i.e. the world within their reach to use a term coined by the sociologist Alfred Schütz.

A standard tool for the investigation of such feelings of security is a fear of crime survey (Hummelsheim et al 2011). In such surveys respondents are asked how secure they feel in their immediate neighbourhood (during day and night time). While these surveys are widely applied in criminology they perceive of their respondents as isolated individuals and typically put a focus on crime as a threat perceived by citizens ignoring not only the diversity of individual reactions of traumatization but also other dimensions or sources for insecurity. Addressing broader feelings and perceptions of (in)security is difficult when using standard survey methodology with fixed choice question and answer formats. The sources of insecurity are often hard to pin down and interlinked. Diffuse feelings of insecurity can be accounted for in a risk frame. Such a frame comprises several lines of mundane reasoning about future events, all focusing on the relation between present and future. The different “factors” considered in individual risk assessments can be weighed differently depending among other things on the level of generalized trust in the stability of one’s life world. Investigating the effects of such a cognitive frame requires an elaborate approach, eliciting reflexive interpretations from individuals, explicating their life situation. Manifest and clearly defined sources of threats like fear of crime can be identified more easily using standard methods like surveys. The perception and discourse of risk obviously is more complex, since it addresses unknown and often unpredictable elements in an individual’s life. What surveys also tend to ignore is the communicative dimension of (in)security. Perceptions, feelings, anxieties are often shared with others. Individuals tend to validate their perceptions in communicative social exchange with others who are close to them. This kind of mundane crisis communication can have different effects. It can reinforce or curb feelings and perceptions of insecurity. Such mundane crisis communication can happen in face-to-face encounters with friends and neighbours, but increasingly it also moves into the sphere of social media. As could be observed in the last months, urban legends about criminal acts, committed by members of the refugee community spread across Facebook and Twitter in a number of European countries. Stories about assaults, shoplifting or rapes went viral and the authorities had to issue press releases several times to correct these stories circulating in cyberspace. Another well-known case is the “witch hunt” in the wake of the Boston bombings (FBI 2013). Citizens started to search for presumable suspects using the platform Reddit sharing images from private mobile phones. What has to be considered here is the information made available via different channels and being processed at the level of individual reasoning about security. A well-known effect here is the over-reporting of events (Beckett, Sasson 2004). Violent crime is a news item that makes headlines more frequently than other social problems and so produces over exaggerated public fear and concern. While crime figures have been falling over the last decades in all Western countries, the general population still believes that crime rates are on the rise as national surveys regularly demonstrate. This biased perception is to a large extent based on media reporting about crime and be accounted for in different ways as framing, priming or agenda setting (see Scheufele 2016).

Security as a topic in the media

Beyond the micro cosmos of mundane perceptions of security another realm relevant for security discourses can be typified as the media-scape, populated by thrilling images, bringing threats and security relevant events from across the world into citizens' living rooms – increasingly in real time as breaking (security) news. This symbolic universe is inhabited by all sorts of threats, some apparently close and tangible others remote but nonetheless threatening. The structure, dynamic and logic of the media security universe can be analysed independently from the life world of citizens-consumers. Media compete for a share of voice and a limited audience of readers/viewers/hearers. A greater audience creates a higher return for the media company as a commercial enterprise. This situation creates a vicious circle, where all competitors in the market attempt to come up with the most interesting, most thrilling stories, attracting a large audience. Media discourse about security often is geared towards thrill and excitement, presenting unheard of threats and sometimes painting grim scenarios. Media security stories can address security threats and at the same time present as threatening the reactions designed to counter such threats. In either case fear and anxiety are the main psychological drivers. This double or antagonistic structure, with two conflicting views or position competing for their cause keeps security-related matters high on the agenda of public discourse.

Media tend to pinpoint the vulnerability of modern techno-culture and simultaneously report about the opportunities to increase surveillance using the tools and systems making up this culture. Along the political divide of this discourse a kind of preventive paranoia flourishes entertaining symmetrical fears of attacks and unconstrained surveillance. There are close links between the two domains of media and everyday day security discourse, since citizens receive most of the information about security relevant topics (however condensed, distorted or manipulated) from media sources. Information from these media sources can impact on citizens' feelings of security to different degrees. After highly publicized spectacular events, like e.g. a terrorist attack with a substantial number of fatalities in European heartland, citizens may be seriously concerned about terrorism as an imminent threat to their personal security. Such arousal may be short-lived and be forgotten, once media coverage wanes. Whether such events leave a permanent trace and have a lasting effect on citizens' security perception is hard to determine and requires a longer period of observation. Evidence for such temporary waves of arousals can be found in the data on page views for relevant entries in Wikipedia. Media help to reinforce and focus public concern. Web 2.0 applications allow for the creation of virtual social movements, however short-lived they may be. Rallying for a specific cause and drafting a petition distributed through different channels of social media can activate large numbers of concerned citizens in short time. Specialized platforms such as Avaaz (see Kavada 2012) have emerged over the last years to organize such large-scale collective activities. These platforms use Facebook, You Tube and other channels as well as their mailing lists to approach potential supporters and ask to share e.g. petitions via individual networks. Although they perform a gatekeeper function, i.e. not all issues make it onto the global platform of organisations like Avaaz, the issues posted there nonetheless can be interpreted as a sample of problems resonating with a global audience of the Internet. Some of these petitions go viral others, initiated often by local

activist groups, remain at the national, regional or local level, addressing topics of limited local or regional relevance. Online activism, sometimes also critically referred to as “clicktivism” or “slacktivism” is a low threshold, low cost type of protest or activism (Morozov 2011). In the context of our annual security survey, we look at such activities to understand what kinds of concerns make it to the public virtual forum and how much support they get. The analysis of such online activities yields non-reactive data on popular security relevant concerns. We have collected data here over the year 2015 and will present an exemplary selection of petitions addressing a broad range of potentially security relevant topics to demonstrate the scope of such internet-based activities of citizens in next year’s ASSR. Whether these new forms and formats have a positive impact on social activism and open up new venues for democratic and bottom-up activities remains an open question. We will not address these problems here (for an overview see Chadwick and Howard 2011). Established mainstream media with a large circulation like newspapers provide the vocabulary to talk about security threats and are relevant gatekeepers in the agenda setting process of public security discourse. For a threat or security problem to surface in public discourse wide media coverage is required. Some of the issues highlighted in media discourse are far removed from the mundane world, while others may impact the daily lives of the audience. Stories about conflicts in remote geographical areas may receive media coverage but do not immediately affect European citizens whereas e.g. news about the spread of malware on personal computers may have such tangible effects. As already pointed out in last years version (D 3.4) of the societal security survey, we will not investigate media effects and influence on the audience, but rather understand the coverage of security relevant topics in media discourse as a source where the vocabulary for public debate about security topics is reproduced. Following the reporting of different public media over the year of 2015 yields an overview over security concerns and debates that made headlines over the last twelve months.

Infrastructural Systems Security – the Experts’ View

As a third domain we analyse in this year’s survey for the first time is a domain that what we call infrastructural systems security. Under this heading we collect all those issues and problems that do not receive constantly ample media attention and do not resonate immediately with citizens’ perception in their daily lives. Infrastructural systems security is the domain of experts, working in specialized fields, relevant for security, from environment to epidemiology and finance. As opposed to security concerns at the level of citizens’ everyday world perception, the problems addressed in the discourse of different expert groups are based on academic research, scientific expertise and data. The assessment of security threats by domain experts displays a somewhat different picture as in the two other areas of everyday and media discourse. These experts produce a more detailed account of topics covered only in very general terms in the other discourses. We launched an online expert survey addressing different target groups to obtain an overview of the security topics considered as pressing and relevant in different expert circles. Asking for an assessment of policies to

prevent or mitigate the effects of incidents or detrimental long-term developments, we also received a more detailed list of activities and adaptations deemed necessary to handle security problems.

What makes the security relevant topics addressed by professionals and experts stand out from the other domains is primarily their time horizon. Environmental degradation, water supply, increasing frequency of extreme weather conditions, problems of food security, global supply chain security and pandemics are topics that make headlines only when severe conditions materialize for a brief catastrophic moment. The cycle of problematization following single events (from terrorism to Tsunamis) in media and policy security discourse tends to focus on quick-fix solutions, ignoring long-term perspectives. This stimulus-response approach to imminent security problems is due to the dynamic of public policy and media discourse, where the logic prevails that dramatic events require dramatic responses, with high symbolic value and public visibility.⁷

Analysing the view of experts is a complex task, since all academic disciplines have developed a security dimension over the last decades. Security has become a buzzword in academic circles and defining a problem as a security problem opens new venues leading to substantial research funds. Hence the overview of expert discourse presented in this deliverable is far from comprehensive. But what it demonstrates is the difference in conceiving and discussing security issues. It also points to a number of problems that tend to be overlooked in other discursive arenas. Some security problems may not be visible or go unnoticed in public media discourse and the perception of laypersons. Nonetheless they may harbour a significant threat potential and qualify as a security topic.

There is one discursive arena that is left out here: the domain of political activities as a self-contained and distinguishable field of discourse. We will not cover this domain in greater detail since it is addressed in other work packages of the SOURCE project. While political reactions and strategies are addressed in all of the three domains analyzed in this Deliverable, we will not explicitly investigate the field-specific logic of the political system and the processes of securitization that can be observed here.

Data sources and security domains – a brief overview

Dividing security for the purpose of this Deliverable in three analytical domains of everyday perceptions, public media presentations and expert discourse on security allows for a multi-dimensional and complex reconstruction of societal security. For each of these domains different data sources were utilized and targeted empirical research within the given limits of the project was conducted. Since the different domains are interlinked (e.g. everyday perceptions are fuelled by media discourse, media refer to expert discourse) and the types of data used for the different parts

⁷ This could be observed after the recent terrorist attacks in Paris. The government representatives declared a war on terrorism and a state of emergency, military and police force were called in and swamped the inner city area and potential targets of terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels.

of the analysis represent a wide array of different methodologies we will briefly touch upon the problem how these different data are connected to the different domains. Some of these data allow for the calculation of frequencies, others can be used to reconstruct cultural schemata or patterns of interpretation, some qualify as reactive (i.e. elicited for the purpose of this research) others are non-reactive (i.e. available in physical or electronic archives) data. The table below gives a schematic overview linking domains to data sources.

Table: Domains of security discourse

Data sources		Domains of security discourse		
		Everyday perception	Media discourse	Experts on infrastructure
	Interviews with citizens	X	X	
	Media coverage and headlines		X	X
	Wikipedia	X	X	
	Twitter	X	X	
	Societal security survey	X		
	Expert survey and interviews		X	X
	Proxy indicators	X	X	X

The main part of this deliverable is structured along the data sources, presenting findings from the year 2015. Except for the chapter on Twitter, and the expert survey, the presentation follows last years' D 3.4 from 2014. Reference is made to this document where appropriate. The general idea is to produce over the lifetime of the project a comprehensive account of changes and continuities of perceptions of societal security using comparable data sets of five years.

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Security in the Media – A selective *Chronique Scandaleuse* of 2015

In D 3.4 covering most of the year 2014 we sketched what we termed a *Chronique Scandaleuse*, i.e. a summary of events that made headlines in the media and could be considered security relevant. Such an overview demonstrates the breadth of events emerging in public discourse about societal security. It also reveals the dynamic of dramatization typical for security topics. Over the year, a series of problems or threats move up and down on the agenda, some re-appear after a time, others end up in oblivion. We tried to cover in very broad terms the discourse of the European public, i.e. we consider topics discussed in most European countries. This leaves out a number of events at national level. In doing this we admit to fall prey to a hegemonic reading of security to some extent. Events that are “closer to home” capture public attention more than stories from remote areas of the world. Some developments are considered as problematic while others are not, even if they seem to have a similar “threat potential”. A terror attack with several dozens of victims in a Middle Eastern country receives less media attention than a single terror victim in Europe. The fiscal crisis in a country like Ukraine creates less concern in media reporting compared to a country like Greece. Waves of arousal in media reporting always reflect the preference order of the hegemonic status quo. Such biases have to be considered for an in-depth analysis of media-based security discourse. The following selection does not attempt such an analysis. The purpose of the brief discussion of media-hyped events is to give an impression of some of the topics circulating in the European public sphere. The level of granularity is low, considering only the main points raised in news items of major newspapers or releases from international press agencies (such as Financial Times, The Guardian, etc.). The selection is limited to periodicals in English for pragmatic reasons.⁸

Also the focus is on the security aspects of the events, i.e. we look at the perceived or hypothesized threats to different dimensions European security emanating from the events discussed here. While the selection may seem arbitrary – a different or broader combination would have been possible – we deem this *Chronique Scandaleuse* to cover in a representative fashion some of the most widely discussed topics. The selection connects to last year’s sample of events, (refugees, Islamic extremism, terrorism in Europe, Ukraine, and Ebola). We added “Grexit”, the debate about Greece leaving the Euro zone as a new topic for 2015. While the economic crisis in this country has a longer history, the media coverage started to gain momentum in the second half of 2014 and took off this year to be for quite some time considered as one of the major threats to and crisis for the European Union. Most of the topics discussed below were in the media most of 2015. What changed over the year was their ranking. The headlines quoted here are drawn from a larger sample collected in 2015. We screened newspapers and TV channels on a daily basis to mark down “breaking news” or headlines for events on our watch list for the year 2015. Out of this sample some headlines are used in the following pages for illustrative purposes.

⁸ A more detailed analysis of media discourse is conducted in WP 8 of the SOURCE project, producing a mediawatch report and continuously screening security relevant publications beyond the level of headlines from major international newspapers.

Grexit

The term Grexit, combines the words Greece and Exit. It was coined in 2012 by Ebrahim Rahbari and Willem H. Buiter from Citigroup. The term did not spread immediately to a wider media public, since Greece leaving the Euro-Zone or even the European Union all together, was mainly discussed as a policy option in closed circles of policy and financial experts. The most prominent group became known later as the “Troika”. It consisted of representatives of the EU Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who devised a roadmap for Greece leaving the Euro, called “Plan Z”. The Financial Times uncovered this plan in 2014⁹.

May 14, 2014 6:30 pm

Inside Europe's Plan Z

By Peter Spiegel

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 Comments

How the euro was saved: In the second instalment of a series on the year that changed Europe, reveals how a secret strategy was developed to contain the firestorm from a Greek exit.

It was not the revelations in articles like the one above alone but over the course of the year, a Greek exit became an ever more viable option. By the end of 2014, the term Grexit was well established in public media and with it discussions on all levels about Greece leaving the Euro. Either on its own accord, forced by the other Euro-Countries or by accident, sometimes styled as “Graccident”. When the Hellenic Parliament failed to elect a new president after three rounds, a snap vote had to be held on January 25. SYRIZA, the Coalition of the Radical Left won these elections. Having an outspoken leftist government in a country facing severe financial and economic problems came as a shock to the establishment of the European Commission. Fears of a radical policy shift haunted the financial institutions and – at least at the rhetorical level – the announcements of the newly elected Greek government was considered as a fundamental attack on what critics had called the neoliberal consensus of the global finance system of governance.

After Alexi Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis took office as prime minister and minister of finances respectively, their first political move was an attempt to change the terms for financial aid received by Greece. An intermediate agreement was reached on February 20, which kept Greece afloat until early summer but did little to ease the austerity measures imposed. Following this agreement, a series of meetings took place between the Greek government, EU and IMF officials. But those

⁹ Spiegel, Peter: Inside Europe's Plan Z. In: Financial Times May 14, 2014 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0ac1306e-d508-11e3-9187-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz34GEE8FUj> [November 27, 2015]

involved could not come to an agreement and so on June 26, four days before the ECB would stop the emergency funding which prevented a Greek sovereign default, the situation escalated when Alexis Tsipras walked out of the meetings. The next day he announced a referendum on the terms of a Greek bail out set by the creditors.¹⁰



Greek parliament approved the referendum on June 28. To prevent the Greek people from withdrawing all their money, banks were closed and capital controls imposed on the same day.

It were these days when the headlines of major newspapers made a Greek exit seem ever more likely, and because the referendum was scheduled for the 5th July, the Greek government did not engage in further negotiations about an ECB bailout. This led to missing a payment to the IMF, due on June 30.

The referendum turned out in favour of refusing the creditors' terms. Following the referendum Yanis Varoufakis resigned as Minister of Finances on July 6. His successor Euclid Tsakalotos re-entered negotiations with the EU on 11th July but despite the results of the referendum Greek officials had to mostly agree to the creditors' terms. Which subsequently lead to a schism with parts of SYRIZA forming their own party for early elections, which were held on September 20. Alexis Tsipra's SYRIZA remained in power and further austerity laws passed on 19th November. But these events hardly made headlines, as fear if of a Grexit were put to rest when European Commission chief Jean-Claude Juncker stated: "There will not be a 'Grexit'",¹¹ after the negotiations on July 13.

What the so-called Grexit crisis nicely demonstrates is the mutual reinforcement of political and financial problems fuelling the perception of a complex security threat within Europe, while at the same time hijacking the national population of Greece to accept even stricter austerity laws. Media coverage of the financial problems of Greece was reduced in the second half of 2015 and reports about the social collateral damages (increased unemployment, rising suicide rates, etc.) went on but never reached the peaks of the Grexit debate.

¹⁰ Smith, Helena: Greek PM Alexis Tsipras calls referendum on bailout terms In: The Guardian June 27, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/greece-calls-referendum-on-bailout-terms-offered-by-creditors> [November 27, 2015]

¹¹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33515427> [November 27, 2015]

Refugees

Almost a million people are estimated to have come over the Mediterranean Sea in the year 2015. There are no exact figures available, because not every person, crossing the Mediterranean Sea is registered, when arriving on European shores. At the beginning of the year the so-called refugee problem seemed to affect only countries at the periphery of the Schengen area in Europe: countries like Greece and Italy, who felt they were largely left alone to deal with this crisis as European leaders (and the media) focused on the Greek debt crisis. Things began to change when a substantial number of refugees started moving through Europe. Now it became apparent, that countries in the centre of the European Union would be affected. With increasing numbers of migrants European governments had no strategy to handle this problem.

This changed public perception and awareness. The topic of a refugee crisis moved up in the ranking of breaking news. The first reports demonstrating this change were about the Hungarians building a fence towards Serbia. The dynamic and semantic shift in the reporting about the refugee crisis provides an interesting case to study the volatility and moral-political complexity of the topic in public debate. While there was little sympathy in the countries of central Europe for refugees at the time, the harsh Hungarian stance started to tip larger parts of the society in favour of the refugees, as long as they were from Syria and Iraq or to a lesser degree from Afghanistan. Refugees from other parts of the world were not seen as victims of harsh Hungarian policies, violating standards of humanitarian treatment. The new villain in the debate now was Victor Orban, prime minister of Hungary, while those who he tried to keep out of his country (and also the neighbouring countries further to the North and West) appeared as victims of Hungarian border regime politics. Public sentiment completely turned towards a positive humanitarian attitude towards refugees after two widely reported events. The first was the discovery of a lorry, parked on an Austrian freeway near the Hungarian border. The driver (obviously a member of a group of human traffickers) had left the lorry locked and the police found 71 refugees suffocated in the back of the locked cargo space of the lorry.¹² This event made headlines across Europe and triggered strong public reactions.



The screenshot shows the top navigation bar of The Guardian website with links for sign in, subscribe, and search. Below this is a secondary navigation bar with various topic categories like UK, world, sport, football, opinion, culture, business, lifestyle, fashion, environment, tech, and travel. A breadcrumb trail indicates the article is in the 'world' > 'europe' section. The main headline reads: 'Austria Hungarian police arrest driver of lorry that had 71 dead migrants inside'.

¹² <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/28/more-than-70-dead-austria-migrant-truck-tragedy>

The second event changing the tides of public sentiment was the picture of three-year-old Alan Kurdi,¹³ a young boy who had drowned after falling off a boat off the Turkish coast and lying face down on a beach in Turkey. The picture of this victim of illegal migration went viral around the world and silenced, at least for some time the voices asking for a strict policy along the lines of hardliners like Victor Orban.

The Washington Post

WorldViews

A dead baby becomes the most tragic symbol yet of the Mediterranean refugee crisis

While similar tragedies had happened before, these two news items tipped the balance towards a broadly carried consensus to welcome refugees and offer them shelter in European countries.

After Chancellor Angela Merkel on 31st August 2015 announced Germany would accept all Syrian refugees, this shift of sentiments towards refugees found political representation. In the following days displays of “Willkommenskultur”, German for culture of welcoming, could be seen at many places in Germany and to a lesser degree also in other European countries. However it was the Germans’ reaction that was reported the most.¹⁴

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Germany Germany greets refugees with help and kindness at Munich central station

Volunteers sort through piles of donations and police hand out bars of chocolate on the frontline of Europe's migration crisis

The interest in the German reaction is somewhat connected to the Greek debt crisis, when Germany emerged as the sole hegemon of Europe, instead of the French-German double leadership from previous crisis. Germans were criticized when asking for a joint European policy response to handle the refugees along the lines of Angela Merkel. Representatives of member states pointed to the rigid German position in the Greek debt crisis, and now saw this as an opportunity to not follow the

¹³ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/02/a-dead-baby-becomes-the-most-tragic-symbol-yet-of-the-mediterranean-refugee-crisis/>

¹⁴ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/germany-refugees-munich-central-station>

German lead. The debate about the distribution of refugees to European countries is still going on at the end of this year, with Germany taking an outspoken position without much support from the majority of the other member states. Also this topic fuels a longer trend of new nationalisms within the European Union, playing into the hands of the new Right and nationalist populist political parties across Europe. These parties successfully managed to securitize the policy domain of migration, starting an anxiety-ridden debate about ethnic purity, national identity and an ensuing crime wave in the wake of the wave of refugees.

Islamic Extremism

In Syria and Iraq, the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State continued from 2014. The media coverage mostly focused on larger battles and atrocities committed by ISIL. However, the reporting on battles changed in 2015. Starting with the liberation of Kobani in January, news about the swift victories ISIL had achieved became less and less as they began losing more and more ground in Syria and Iraq.¹⁵

The Washington Post

Middle East

Kurds say they have ejected Islamic State militants from large area in northern Iraq

A



86

These territorial losses did little to lessen the brutality with which the IS treats prisoners or those under their rule which fail to obey their archaic interpretation of Islam. The brutality of the executions is often captured on video and distributed through the Internet, often leading to dense reporting on these cases. A typical example is provided by the execution of a Jordanian Pilot who was downed, captured and later burned alive.¹⁶

¹⁵ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kurds-say-they-have-ejected-islamic-state-from-a-big-area-in-northern-iraq/2015/01/21/ac459372-a1c6-11e4-b146-577832eafcb4_story.html

¹⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/world/middleeast/arab-world-unites-in-anger-after-burning-of-jordanian-pilot.html>



The New York Times



ISIS Promise of Statehood
Falling Far Short,
Ex-Residents Say

New Peace Talks on Syria Could Be
Held This Month



Lebanon Exchanges
Prisoners With Qaeda
Affiliate in Syria



Young Palestinian Women
Join the West Bank
Turmoil

MIDDLE EAST

Militants' Killing of Jordanian Pilot Unites the Arab World in Anger

By ROD NORDLAND and ANNE BARNARD FEB. 4, 2015



While these videos are met with disgust by the media in Europa as well as other parts of the world, they seem to unfold a morbid fascination with the audience, who may very well be appalled but still shows interest in reading the news or even watching the video clips. What from the perspective of a European public has to be considered as an unintended and negative side effect of such videos is that the violence displayed in them is used as a venue of recruitment for the IS. These articles usually are published after a particularly gruesome video is released but despite their claim, they offer very little explanation beyond condemning such displays of violence and acknowledging their problematic effects on the general audience and individuals susceptible to the message of IS.¹⁷

HOME SEARCH

The New York Times

ED CONTRIBUTOR
e Real Problem With
lice Video



EDITORIAL
The Chicago Police
Scandal



FRANK BRUNI
Anyone but Ted Cruz



THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Putin's Syrian
Misadventure

The Opinion Pages | OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

The ISIS Theater of Cruelty

By HUSSEIN IBISH FEB. 18, 2015

Media attention towards Islamic extremism also increased after Russia began launching airstrikes in Syria. Similar to heightened interest when the American led airstrikes began or Turkey opened its bases for these strikes, media coverage increased when there is a closer connection to the audience as in the case of a former Super Power like Russia entering the battlefield.

Considerably less attention than the IS was paid to Boko Haram, the Nigerian Islamist terror organization. Moreover, in most cases this attention is in connection with Boko Haram's link to the

¹⁷ <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/the-isis-theater-of-cruelty.html>



Islamic State, such as when Boko Haram publicly declared loyalty to them or if ISIL is used as a comparison for Boko Haram.¹⁸



Boko Haram overtakes ISIS as world's deadliest terror group, report says

By Katie Pisa and Tim Hume, CNN

Updated 1330 GMT (2130 HKT) November 19, 2015



Their attacks spread to other parts of West Africa during 2015, which was reported on but didn't make headlines. Some attention though was given to the Baga massacre in January, but it was overshadowed by the Charlie Hebdo attacks three days later.

Terrorism in Europe

While the main battlegrounds of Islamic Extremism remained in the Greater Middle East and Africa, Europe also suffered the worst terror attacks in ten years. France was affected the most with two major attacks in Paris and a further three minor ones. In Denmark occurred one shooting and one stabbing was committed in Germany. Also while technically committed in the Middle East, the downing of Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 over the Sinai was an attack on Europeans and thus will be dealt within this section.

On January 7th two armed men stormed the office of French satire magazine Charlie Hebdo, who had printed cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. They were later identified as brothers and members of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. On the next day a kosher supermarket became the target of an attack, which also involved taking hostages. These two attacks were followed by a manhunt and shootout between police forces and the terrorists. While these attacks are sometimes called the January 2015 île-de-France attacks, the attack on Charlie Hebdo received the most attention and subsequently has been often adapted for the whole instance. This attention also stemmed from the slogan "Je suis Charlie" going viral after the attacks when people wanted to show their sympathy with the victims. The slogan was also featured on the cover of the first issue after the attacks.

¹⁸ <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/17/world/global-terror-report/>



The Copenhagen shootings took place on 14 and 15 February 2015. The first target was a discussion attended by Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who had drawn cartoons of the prophet in the past. The perpetrator was able to flee the scene and attacked his second target, the great synagogue just after midnight.¹⁹

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Copenhagen shootings: Police kill 'gunman' after two attacks

 15 February 2015 | [Europe](#)

¹⁹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31475803>

Like the attacks in France the targets were again cartoonists who had painted the prophet Mohammed and Jewish establishments. The attacks left two men dead, a filmmaker at the first site and a guard at the synagogue. While still widely reported, the Copenhagen shootings did not have the same impact in media as the attacks in Paris the month before.

On June 26 attacks in Tunisia, France, Kuwait, Somalia and Syria happened on the same day, allegedly orchestrated by the IS. As with many other attacks for which they claimed responsibility it is hard to say to which level the IS leadership in Raqqa was involved or even behind those attacks. While especially the attacks in Tunisia and France received a lot of media coverage, the attacks in Somalia and Syria were only seldom mentioned.²⁰



The screenshot shows the Guardian website's navigation bar with links for sign in, subscribe, and search. Below the navigation bar, the main headline reads: "Terror attacks: separate attacks in Tunisia, France and Kuwait leave more than 60 dead - as it happened". The sub-headline is "Middle East and North Africa".

While it has little to do with severance of the attacks, as only one man died in France, its geographical and cultural proximity prompted increased coverage of these two attacks. Like the shooting in Copenhagen, these attacks had an intensive but short lifespan in the media.

An attempted attack was made on the Thalys high-speed train, travelling from Amsterdam to Paris on August 21. The assailant was armed with an automatic rifle and a pistol. He later claimed the attack was not motivated by his belief but a robbery. Due to his connections to a radical mosque and a reported trip to Syria the authorities treated it as an Islamic terrorist attack. The event received particularly strong coverage in the United States, because three Americans, two of them members of the U.S. armed forces, were crucial in subduing the attacker and preventing any loss of life.²¹



The screenshot shows the New York Times website's header with the title "The New York Times". Below the header, there are several news snippets. The main headline is "2 American Service Members Foil Gunman in Train Attack". The byline is "By ADAM NOSSITER AUG. 21, 2015".

²⁰ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jun/26/tunisia-beach-resort-attack-multiple-deaths-live-updates>

²¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/world/europe/americans-foil-gunman-on-french-train-officials-say.html>

Unlike previous attacks, no terrorist organisation took responsibility for this attempt. If this is due to the fact of it being unsuccessful or if the attacker was indeed a “lone wolf” is open for debate.



Germany police shoot Berlin Islamist after knife attack

🕒 17 September 2015 | Europe

Rafik Yousef, an Iraqi native was shot by the police in Berlin on 17th September 2015. Yousef how had served a prison term after an attempted assassination of then Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, during a visit to Germany. He was released on probation in 2013 under the condition of wearing an ankle monitor. After he took of his monitor, police responded to a man armed with a knife threatening pedestrians. Yousef stabbed one police officer, which prompted her colleagues to shoot him. He reportedly had connections to Ansar al-Islam, a Kuridi-Sunni Islamic terrorist organisation in Iraq with connections to Al-Qaeda. Media coverage of the incident was mostly domestic with only limited international interest.²²

Shortly after taking off in Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt), Metrojet Flight 9268 bound for Saint Petersburg dropped from radar over the Sinai Peninsula. Shortly after the crash, the Sinai branch of ISIL claimed responsibility for downing the airplane. The 224 victims of the crash were mostly Russian natives; this led to linking the attack to the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war, which had started a month before.²³



²² <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34284044>

²³ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/31/russian-plane-crashes-in-sinai-egyptian-pm-says>

Following the crash, very different narratives emerged in the media, while western government and media took ISIL's claim serious and suspected a bombing, Russian media first refuted any connection between terrorism or the Russian intervention in Syria to the crash.²⁴

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Kremlin warns against linking A321 crash in Egypt with Russia's operation in Syria



Russian Politics & Diplomacy November 03, 12:45 UTC+3

It was only after the 17th November, when Russian investigators concluded a bomb was brought onto the plane by ISIL.

On the night of the 13th November, terrorists attacked six targets in Paris. At the "Stade de France" two suicide bombers killed themselves and a passer-by but were not able to get to their intended target the Stadium. At the time, the French and German national teams had a friendly football game attended by the French President and German Foreign Minister. Two explosions were audible inside the stadium and the television broadcast, which was widely reported. Four attacks including shootings and suicide bombings targeted restaurants and bars in the nightlife districts of Paris. The worst attack was carried out against the Bataclan concert hall, where American rock group "The Eagles of Death Metal" were playing a concert.²⁵

From the first bombing at the "Stade de France" until the police stormed the Bataclan, the attacks span over almost four hours. During this time information was scarce and at times contradicting news were reported. It was not until the next day, when the whole incident was grasped.

²⁴ <http://tass.ru/en/politics/833709>

²⁵ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11995246/Paris-shooting-What-we-know-so-far.html>



The Telegraph

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Paris terror attack: Everything we know on Saturday afternoon

With one suspected terrorist still on the loose, we recount everything we have learned about the ordeal so far

The attacks and the ensuing manhunt, which led to a lock down of Brussels dominated the headlines for days. Some controversy arose over Facebook's decision to activate a feature called "Safety Check", which was originally intended for natural disasters and not manmade attacks like the ones in Paris. As Facebook had not activated the same feature on the day before during an attack in Lebanon, the company was accused of bigotry. Also on Facebook a lot of people used a feature which overlaid their profile picture with the colours of the French flag. On Twitter the #prayforparis trended for people tweeting about the attacks.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack a week after the incident. The level of direct involvement from Syria remains unclear, however some of the Terrorists had spent time in the Middle East. In a move to discredit the terrorist organization, French President Hollande called them Daesh when he declared war on them during a speech in the aftermath of the attacks. While Daesh is an Arabic acronym for "al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham", meaning Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, it can also be understood as an insult. Since then French attacks on terrorist organization in Syria have increased.

The Attacks in Paris were followed by two minor incidents in London and in Marseille. The exact motive of the Leytonstone tube attack is not known, and maybe the result of drug abuse. The attack on a Jewish teacher in Marseille on November 19, seemed to have an Islamist background.²⁶

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
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Jewish teacher stabbed in Marseille street by trio praising Islamic State

²⁶ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/19/jewish-teacher-stabbed-in-marseille-street-by-trio-praising-islamic-state>

However it turned out that the victim had invented the attack. He was delivered to psychiatric hospital.

A summary of the terrorist events that made headlines in the media in the year 2015 is complied in the graphic below.



Ukraine

With Europe facing more pressing issues, the struggles in Eastern Ukraine took a back seat in media attention in 2015. Reporting focused on times when heavy fighting took place, peace talks were held and new information revolving around the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH 17 came up.

For example, when World Leaders met in Belarus's capital Minsk to try to solve the crisis. But since none of these meetings had any real success there media presence faded quickly.²⁷

²⁷ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/09/merkel-to-meet-obama-to-resolve-ukrainian-differences>



the guardian

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Ukraine Merkel to meet Obama amid growing US scepticism over Ukraine peace talks

Probably the most reported events was the crash report of MH17, conducted by investigators from the Netherlands. In this report, they identified a Russian build missile as the cause of the crash.²⁸

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Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Flight MH17 downed by Russian-built missile, Dutch investigators say

This conclusion received attention from European as well as American and Russian media, who reacted very different to these findings.²⁹

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BREAKING NEWS

GENEVA RAISES SECURITY ALERT, AUTHORITIES LOOKING FOR SUSPECTS LINKED

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'MH17 report: No clear answers, means there's no smoking gun evidence'

²⁸ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/mh17-crash-report-plane-partially-reconstructed-blames-buk-missile-strike>

²⁹ <https://www.rt.com/op-edge/318663-mh17-plane-report-buk/>

Ebola

Like the crisis in Ukraine Ebola received little attention compared to last year. At the beginning of 2015 news centred on the fact, that more and more countries in West Africa had successfully eliminated the spread of the virus.³⁰



Cases of European and American infected did also make the news, albeit on a much smaller scale. If the cases had some exceptional nature, such as the case of doctor who was twice cured of the disease after the virus had survived in his eye, international attention was paid.³¹ On less exceptional cases reporting was mostly local.



³⁰ <http://time.com/3673242/mali-ebola-free/>

³¹ http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/08/health/weeks-after-his-recovery-ebola-lurked-in-a-doctors-eye.html?smid=tw-nythealth&_r=1

Recently reports about new infections in countries previously declared free of Ebola cases emerged but due to other news dominating, did not receive a lot of attention.³²

The New York Times



Oscar Pistorius Granted
Bail Ahead of Sentencing

Chad Suspects Boko Haram in Island
Attacks



With Burundi's President
Sticking to Power, Violence
Is on the Rise



AFRICA

Ebola Cases in 3 Family Members Confirmed in Liberia

By CLAIR MacDOUGALL and HELENE COOPER NOV. 20, 2015

Looking at the security relevant events of the year 2015 a number of consecutive waves of media hype can be identified, starting with the Greek debt crisis, followed by the refugee “crisis” and the terrorist attacks. Links between these topics were made occasionally in European public discourse, often to support neo-nationalist positions. As could be seen in the semantic shifts in the debate about the refugees flowing into the Schengen area, public sentiments can change and develop in different directions. At the same time such problematic links can promote a toxic xenophobic mix of prejudice and populist rhetoric supporting the rising right-wing political parties across Europe. We will follow this development in the future to see, whether this trend prevails. A major problem arising here can be analyzed as a vicious feedback cycle. Populist movements blocking the implementation of a joint European position and strategy reinforce the impression of a European Union not capable to handle problems. Exploiting this image of a conflict-ridden, paralyzed European administration the populist parties at the national level gain support from citizens who see the European project as a failure and the European Union as a centre lacking any political power to design and implement measures to address a presumed crisis.

³² <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/world/africa/ebola-case-in-10-year-old-confirmed-in-liberia.html>

Security topics on the Internet

Wikipedia


As in last year's D 3.4 covering users' search activities related to the key words, linked to events that made headlines as security relevant news items, we will present a similar set of data, based on Wikipedia page visits for 2015. Whereas public news media can put events on the agenda and provide the general vocabulary for public discourse to talk about security, activities on Wikipedia can be used to test, whether these publicized events resonated with the general public's interest. Page views on Wikipedia can be interpreted as an activity triggered by news media: hearing / reading about an event may create interest to learn more or fill in missing contextual information. Wikipedia is a low-threshold medium, a source, where such information can be obtained. Plotting the page views for a number of key words over time, peaks can be identified in some cases and very often such peaks are related to events, where specific key words listed as entries in Wikipedia are relevant. It should be noted though that these "peaks" represent different quantitative scales and have to be interpreted against the absolute numbers of page visits, ranging from less one thousand to more than 200.000 / month. These differences may reflect the breadth of interest a specific key word receives among users, but we assume that even when looking at smaller numbers variations are not randomly, particularly when they can be linked to major events.

From an analytical perspective this activity (looking up key words in Wikipedia) can be located at the interface between media discourse and everyday world. While the action may be triggered by a media event, it is rooted in the everyday activities of citizens who may be interested, want to learn more or are concerned about what they learned from media sources.

We used for 2015 the same list of key words for the page count analysis as for 2014. The results for all key words are listed in the Appendix at the end of this Deliverable. In this section we will present only a few cases to demonstrate how major events are reflected in varying levels of traffic on Wikipedia. Calculating page visits is a very simple approach to analyse this medium. A more in-depth analysis would have to look at the history of the entries, and analyse the changes in the texts and wording of the articles over time. As an open source medium Wikipedia provides documentation of the changes made by contributors. The history of these changes and the debates going along with each adaptation reflect controversies over the adequate standards, interpretation of facts and events. It also would allow for a better geographical differentiation, identifying the location of user-authors. At the level of the present data analysis all page visits are counted. Since we used key words in English the page visits cannot be limited to European users, but also entail a substantial number of visits originating in non-European countries, presumably many of them from the United States. But since many of the problems addressed here are of a truly global nature, we do not consider this to be a problem. Also for European citizens a number of "transatlantic" topics are relevant (e.g. the


controversies about TTIP). Embarking on a more in-depth analysis, providing deeper insights into these data would be very time consuming and unfortunately is beyond the scope of this Deliverable.

The limited selection of key words presented below serves to demonstrate the breadth of different patterns over the year. While in some cases a clear link can be drawn to major events, others display a rather fuzzy picture.




Hit rates for Al-Qaeda range from 0 to 15,000 over the year. There are two clearly identifiable peaks between January and September 2015. These can be linked to the attacks on the French magazine Charlie Hebdo on January 7th 2015 and the media coverage of the anniversary of 9/11 around September 11th the same year. In between the page views keep on a lower level with a tendency of waning interest after the Paris attack to then rise up again in September.

A different picture emerges – within a similar quantitative bracket of page visits – for the term *corruption*. While interest seems to be continuously low over the whole period, a sudden spike emerges in February 2015. This spike most probably reflects the wide media coverage of the acquittal of two former members of Hosni Mubarak's government in Egypt.




A rather clear picture also emerges for the term European debt crisis. The spikes can be clearly related to major events concerning financial stability and security in the context of the Grexit debate.



On April 9th Greece is paying back a loan to IMF. This event made headlines across Europe and triggered debates about the future development. Then came a warning, issued by the same institution, that a Grexit still is still a viable option, published in the media May 28th 2015. Finally the Greek finance minister Varoufakis resigned on 6th July, again a headline.³³


Similar to the European debt crisis is the chart for the more general term *financial crisis* (though with lower overall page visits). Two clear, consecutive spikes can be identified, one linked to the G-7 summit in Germany beginning of June 2014 and another following a crash at the Shanghai stock exchange on August 24th, fuelling fears of a new global financial crisis.




When interpreting such spikes non-security related events in the media-scape have to be considered to control for other influences. A good example for this problem is provided by the term *crime*. While crime seems to be clearly linked to criminal activities or major events involving law enforcement activities, there may be other events leading to a sudden interest in this term. While there are some crime news that could be linked to the spike in May 2015³⁴ in the chart below it most probably was triggered by the announcement for the cast of the TV-show “American Crime” in the U.S.

³³ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11524082/Greece-prepares-to-pay-IMF-live.html>
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11636411/IMF-openly-warns-of-Grexit-as-judgment-day-approaches.html>

³⁴ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31605959>




Another problem that has to be dealt with, when working with Wikipedia page visits, to identify security relevant events and user reactions to these events emerges when the absolute numbers are low. The term Information privacy, producing page visits below 1000 is a typical example here.



A similar observation can be made for the chart for the page visits of the Wikipedia entry for European Court of Justice demonstrates. Variations over time most probably are random here. Relevant events may be identified, such as the decision of the ECJ about “Outright Monetary Transactions” by the European Central Bank to stabilize the European currency³⁵ and there were

³⁵ <http://uk.businessinsider.com/ecj-decision-on-omt-legal-2015-1?IR=T>


some international news items involving the ECJ in September 2015³⁶ concerning workers' rights and the Safe Harbour agreement between the U.S. and the European Union. Whether changing frequencies are triggered by security relevant events (such as employment regulation and transatlantic data protection) or are purely random is difficult to decide. (We will address this problem in the analysis of Twitter data).



An interesting dynamic is revealed when plotting the page visits for Homeland security over the year. With a single prominent event at the end of February the numbers gradually and constantly move up beginning in August 2015. Here we find a number of events, all related to Homeland security, keeping interest up and reinforcing public debate about this security institution in the U.S. Again this trend probably is primarily fuelled by users in the U.S., but since Homeland security has become a global household word, it also may reflect interest beyond national debates. The steep rise, starting middle of August reflects media coverage of an arrest of the owner and six employees of gay escort site rentboy.com based on prostitution charges by the Department of Homeland security, the debate about "sanctuary cities" which do not cooperate with federal immigration officials, following a shooting of an illegal immigrant woman in San Francisco, and a couple of other security relevant events linked to Homeland security.

³⁶

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3482f4d0-57cc-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3rqdv0tcD>
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/11884432/EUs-data-sharing-deal-with-US-is-invalid-European-Courts-Advocate-General-says.html>



These different dynamics can be mapped onto different logics of arousal. While the accumulated page visits for some key words reflect clear single issue and event-related security concerns, others seem to reflect a continuous concern (when page visits reach a high level) or a general lack of interest (when the figures for page visits are low). A list with all key words analysed for this Deliverable is attached in the Appendix. For each of the listed key words a number of events are identified, presumably accounting for variations (spikes) in interest over the course of 2015.

Twitter

Approach

In order to start including social media activity into the societal security report Twitter communications were collected and analysed over a period of three months. Here it was the aim to explore social media crawling as resource for observing trends considering and exploring the methodological challenges that come with it.


In comparison with a classical quantitative research design there are a number of differences to consider analysing online communications data of which a few shall be presented in the following.

Obviously the data is not developed within a specific research design (as in a classical questionnaire), but reflects online behaviour according to the technological options given. While this can be considered a methodological constraint for hypothesis testing approaches, this aspect has been regarded as opportunity of observing online behaviour, as it would occur instead of producing responses within a forced choice setting.

Another unknown factor with social media crawling (depending on the specific application considered) is the total population and active users per country. On the one hand, there is relative reliable data on country populations and Internet penetration per country; on the other hand there is very limited data available indicating:

- Active user accounts per country
- Number of tweet frequency per country

Figure: Population and Internet penetration by EU country 2014 (top 7)




Source: <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/> (2015-12-01)

Numerous reports indicate that social media usage associated with specific applications does not correspond with the overall Internet penetration, but significant cultural differences emerge in the acceptance of new social media technologies. (In Europe the high number of users in Portugal and Spain as well as the very low acceptance of Twitter in Germany is noted frequently.)³⁷ The numbers reported of twitter usage per country vary significantly due to different points of reference (social media usage in general, active twitter users, newly subscribed twitter users, number of tweets) as well as the specific time of observation, as social media usage has changed and keeps changing significantly over the last 10 years. Looking at samples collected in August 2015 where tweets were filtered by user location data, the following distribution emerges (again for top 7 EU countries):

³⁷ <http://www.countryranker.com/top-10-countries-with-most-twitter-users/>; Scheffler, A German Twitter Snapshot, http://www.lrec-conf.org/proceedings/lrec2014/pdf/1146_Paper.pdf; <http://blog.businesswire.com/2015/04/08/is-social-media-dying-in-germany/>; <http://www.forbes.com/sites/alisoncoleman/2014/07/10/what-germany-can-teach-the-rest-of-europe-about-twitter/>

Figure: Tweets by EU country for varying sample sizes (filtered by location metadata)



Source: VICESSE 2015. Collection of tweets via Facepager filtering API location.

What can be observed is a relative consistent distribution of tweets per country independent of sample size and time of day, which is relevant to consider. The most significant finding is the confirmation of low twitter usage in Germany compared to population and Internet penetration in general. Looking at tweets rather than the number of users, Twitter activity is even more prevalent in United Kingdom. 40 % of the tweets collected are sent from users in the UK, compared with its share of 20 % of the Internet population within the respective countries.

However, with only about 1 % of daily tweets associated with user enabled geo-location metadata³⁸, the data quality to compare the sample collected with population data is problematic respectively. According to this, focussing the collection on Europe (through location metadata via the API) would have reflected a significant bias in the sample.

The Twitter API (Twitter, 2013) offers several access methods to its data. The most commonly used access point used to be a random subset of tweets through the gardenhose stream (1% to 10% of

³⁸ <https://sysomos.com/inside-twitter/number-twitter-users-country>;

tweets). Since the sampling method Twitter used to reduce the stream is not entirely known, it is unclear whether corpora produced in this manner are inherently biased in some way.

In the web corpus construction community, sites for a particular language are often found using mid-frequency words as search terms (through a particular search API) (Baroni and Bernardini, 2004; Schäfer and Bildhauer, 2012). Here, we follow a similar approach, but using very high-frequency terms as keywords instead. Filtering by language settings in the API is associated with similar problems as for location metadata.

We collected the corpus using the Python package Facepager to access the Twitter Streaming API (Twitter, 2013). The API allows simultaneous tracking of up to 400 keywords. The targeted access points to the Twitter streaming API (such as keyword tracking) differ from the gardenhose access points in an important way: As long as the number of tweets that match the query don't exceed a certain rate limit (standardly this rate limit is given as about 1% of tweets (Twitter, 2013)), Twitter returns all matching tweets. If the rate limit is exceeded, the user is notified of the number of omitted tweets. We aimed at collecting a sample of 500.000 tweets per day between 10am and 6pm CET.

Given the constraints mentioned above, we collected data with consistent conditions of data sampling in order to achieve a self-referential corpus of tweets per day allowing for analysing the relative frequency of indicative search terms.

Tweets in April 2015

Overview:

- Collection of tweets on 20 of 30 days in April 2015
- Collection of 555.415 tweets on average per day (min: 407,256; max: 846,236)
- In sum 11.108.319 tweets were collected in April 2015

Table: Total Tweets per day

Date	Frequency
2015-04-07	864236
2015-04-09	576116
2015-04-10	514055
2015-04-11	507853
2015-04-12	841564
2015-04-13	523544
2015-04-14	556990
2015-04-15	574329

2015-04-16	521620
2015-04-17	673295
2015-04-20	572588
2015-04-21	407256
2015-04-22	500467
2015-04-23	500080
2015-04-25	427985
2015-04-26	500652
2015-04-27	500778
2015-04-28	512472
2015-04-29	517608
2015-04-30	514831
Statistics	
Sum	11108319
Average	555415
Min	407256
Max	864236

Table: Percentage of indicative keywords

	Keyword						
Apr-15	security	threat	terror	crime	crisis	justice	migration
2015-04-07	0,09257%	0,02303%	0,01608%	0,02036%	0,03020%	0,02592%	0,00266%
2015-04-09	0,05398%	0,02083%	0,01736%	0,02725%	0,02395%	0,02881%	0,00260%
2015-04-10	0,04688%	0,01284%	0,02120%	0,03113%	0,03288%	0,03618%	0,00642%
2015-04-11	0,04096%	0,01378%	0,01319%	0,01949%	0,03111%	0,03722%	0,00177%
2015-04-12	0,02091%	0,00499%	0,00558%	0,00915%	0,01224%	0,01058%	0,00083%
2015-04-13	0,05959%	0,01547%	0,01108%	0,02082%	0,03343%	0,04641%	0,00287%
2015-04-14	0,06607%	0,01382%	0,02065%	0,02567%	0,04201%	0,03232%	0,00413%
2015-04-15	0,05345%	0,01114%	0,01672%	0,02681%	0,03360%	0,03204%	0,00244%
2015-04-16	0,05943%	0,01630%	0,02147%	0,02799%	0,03508%	0,04831%	0,00364%
2015-04-17	0,05525%	0,01961%	0,01708%	0,02896%	0,03149%	0,04367%	0,00312%
2015-04-20	0,05606%	0,01607%	0,03231%	0,03231%	0,05100%	0,03493%	0,00943%
2015-04-21	0,04518%	0,02284%	0,01817%	0,02357%	0,05598%	0,02676%	0,00712%
2015-04-22	0,14906%	0,01539%	0,02118%	0,03077%	0,03737%	0,03477%	0,00939%
2015-04-23	0,05779%	0,01700%	0,02540%	0,03179%	0,05059%	0,02720%	0,00740%
2015-04-25	0,02827%	0,00654%	0,01005%	0,01449%	0,02710%	0,01706%	0,00234%
2015-04-26	0,01838%	0,00679%	0,01059%	0,01578%	0,01898%	0,01658%	0,00180%
2015-04-27	0,04633%	0,01637%	0,01498%	0,02496%	0,03774%	0,03075%	0,00300%
2015-04-28	0,05795%	0,01229%	0,01522%	0,04273%	0,04839%	0,06283%	0,00605%
2015-04-29	0,04463%	0,01546%	0,01352%	0,06298%	0,03825%	0,03903%	0,01546%
2015-04-30	0,04526%	0,01612%	0,02020%	0,03224%	0,03302%	0,03691%	0,00272%
Average	0,05490%	0,01483%	0,01710%	0,02746%	0,03522%	0,03341%	0,00476%

Figure: Percentage of indicative keywords over time




Table: Keyword Ranking (per cent avg)

Rank April	Keyword	Percentage avg
1	security	0,05490%
2	crisis	0,03522%
3	justice	0,03341%
4	crime	0,02746%
5	terror	0,01710%
6	threat	0,01483%
7	migration	0,00476%

The peaks:

On April 7, an increased percentage of tweets mentioning the keyword “security” can be registered. While a monthly average of 0,05 % is established for April for the occurrence of “security” within the sample, it is almost twice the monthly average on April 7. Reviewing the data shows that of the 800 tweets collected including this keyword, 322 (re-)tweets can be linked to one entry on the daily horoscope platform tarot.com shared via Twittascope:

Figure: Aquarius Horoscope of April 7, 2015

Aquarius Horoscope for April 7, 2015

Open Communication

Sometimes you can derive emotional security from what isn't said between friends, but you may reach your limit with keeping quiet today. You might feel pushed to speak your mind without concern for whatever follows, even if you haven't yet considered all the possible consequences. Nevertheless, don't worry if a simple discussion becomes heated and more complicated than you expected. Stick with it; the emotions should eventually settle back down, leaving the relationship better off because of your well-meaning efforts. Nothing ventured, nothing gained when it comes to matters of the heart.

Written by Rick Levine 



Source: <http://www.twittascope.com/?sign=11>

On April 22 the keyword “security” was found in 0,14 % of tweets that day (n=749), compared to a monthly average of 0,05 % (n=307,5). More than half of the tweets associated with the keyword (n=447) were again retweets to one single tweet. The originating tweet was by Luke Hemmings, singer of the Australian pop band “5 seconds of summer”. Arriving at the airport in London, he was informing his fans, that the band couldn’t come meet their fans on arrival, due to security concerns voiced by airport security. This single tweet received a total of 53.015 retweets and 105.357 likes (his account has a following of 6,7 million users).

Figure: Original tweet



Source: <https://twitter.com/luke5sos/status/590809686871519232>

- A relative consistency of percentages of keywords over time can be observed, ranging in a similar percentile as well as forming comparable monthly averages.
- Changes in sample sizes reveal no direct influence on outcome of the individual percentages when comparing the extremes: biggest samples (7/4 and 12/4) and smallest samples (21/4 and 25/4) show no clear bias either way.
- Peaks can happen immediately, are registered often within a single day only, but seem to have no lasting effect, which would be detectable over time (due to change of subject, hashtag, etc.).

Tweets in May 2015

Overview:

- Collection of tweets on 23 of 31 days in May 2015
- Collection of 555.440 tweets on average per day (min: 374.152; max: 934.019)
- In sum 12.775.126 tweets were collected in May 2015

Table: Total Tweets per day

Date	Frequency
2015-05-01	505348
2015-05-02	512747
2015-05-03	526211
2015-05-04	628720
2015-05-05	501335
2015-05-06	934019
2015-05-07	504662
2015-05-08	586350
2015-05-11	542450
2015-05-12	500050
2015-05-13	535047
2015-05-14	544856
2015-05-15	519987
2015-05-18	602789
2015-05-19	510824
2015-05-20	546052
2015-05-21	647656
2015-05-22	517005
2015-05-25	514536

2015-05-26	514276
2015-05-27	590664
2015-05-28	374152
2015-05-29	615390
Statistics	
Sum	12775126
Average	555440
Min	374152
Max	934019

Table: Percentage of indicative keywords

	Keywords						
May-15	security	threat	terror	crime	crisis	justice	migration
2015-05-01	0,03661%	0,01187%	0,01662%	0,04136%	0,02731%	0,16959%	0,00218%
2015-05-02	0,02282%	0,01599%	0,01697%	0,03023%	0,01989%	0,02672%	0,00234%
2015-05-03	0,01805%	0,01235%	0,01311%	0,01805%	0,02014%	0,02052%	0,00190%
2015-05-04	0,04072%	0,02942%	0,01591%	0,02449%	0,03213%	0,02831%	0,00207%
2015-05-05	0,04628%	0,01396%	0,01995%	0,02852%	0,02972%	0,02872%	0,00399%
2015-05-06	0,01724%	0,00675%	0,00578%	0,01445%	0,01156%	0,02045%	0,00128%
2015-05-07	0,01803%	0,00634%	0,00476%	0,01209%	0,01268%	0,01645%	0,00139%
2015-05-08	0,01808%	0,00836%	0,00614%	0,01398%	0,01484%	0,01893%	0,00102%
2015-05-11	0,01991%	0,00590%	0,00848%	0,00940%	0,01438%	0,03245%	0,00258%
2015-05-12	0,02600%	0,00800%	0,01280%	0,01200%	0,01460%	0,01400%	0,00320%
2015-05-13	0,02280%	0,00374%	0,01271%	0,01028%	0,01159%	0,02374%	0,00411%
2015-05-14	0,04809%	0,02001%	0,02625%	0,03212%	0,04552%	0,03469%	0,00312%
2015-05-15	0,04769%	0,01750%	0,02962%	0,02192%	0,03750%	0,02981%	0,00288%
2015-05-18	0,06138%	0,01228%	0,02837%	0,03301%	0,04181%	0,05143%	0,00382%
2015-05-19	0,06480%	0,01116%	0,02780%	0,03406%	0,05579%	0,03348%	0,00431%
2015-05-20	0,04963%	0,01941%	0,02271%	0,03443%	0,03736%	0,03113%	0,00458%
2015-05-21	0,05126%	0,01745%	0,03134%	0,03659%	0,04215%	0,02733%	0,02826%
2015-05-22	0,04797%	0,01103%	0,02824%	0,02379%	0,03404%	0,03656%	0,00503%
2015-05-25	0,04353%	0,01866%	0,03246%	0,02546%	0,03770%	0,02838%	0,00214%
2015-05-26	0,04356%	0,01731%	0,03267%	0,02528%	0,03325%	0,03150%	0,00486%
2015-05-27	0,05790%	0,01304%	0,03234%	0,02777%	0,02997%	0,05993%	0,00559%
2015-05-28	0,05345%	0,02058%	0,02325%	0,03074%	0,03902%	0,04009%	0,00321%
2015-05-29	0,05184%	0,03152%	0,02486%	0,02616%	0,03737%	0,03494%	0,00244%
Average	0,03946%	0,01446%	0,02057%	0,02462%	0,02958%	0,03648%	0,00419%

Figure: Percentage of indicative keywords over time




Table: Keyword Ranking (percent avg)

Rank May	Keyword	Percentage avg
1	security	0,03946%
2	justice	0,03648%
3	crisis	0,02958%
4	crime	0,02462%
5	terror	0,02057%
6	threat	0,01446%
7	migration	0,00419%

The peak:

One singular peak can be identified on May 1 for tweets relating to the keyword “justice”. In contrast to the peaks in April however, this increase was not related to one singular tweet, but hash tags (#justiceforfreddiegray) and mentions of “Justice for Freddie Gray”. While the monthly average of tweets including the keyword “justice” was registered 0,03 % it had spiked on May 1 to 0,17 % in the respective sample.

Background: On April 12, 2015, Freddie Carlos Gray, Jr., a 25-year-old African-American man, was arrested by the Baltimore Police Department. While being transported in a police van, Gray fell into a coma and was taken to a trauma centre. Gray died on April 19, 2015; his death was ascribed to injuries to his spinal cord. On May 1, 2015, the Baltimore City State's Attorney, Marilyn Mosby,

announced her office had filed charges against six police officers after the medical examiner's report ruled Gray's death a homicide, on the grounds that Gray had died as a result of a 'rough ride' - a form of police brutality in which a victim is helplessly thrown around by deliberately abrupt driving while unable to keep themselves safe due to use of restraints.³⁹

In contrast to the observed spikes in April, which were driven by a single source – either a popular platform, or a celebrity – the peak in May involved multiple actors, not only retweeting or sharing on tweet but actively using a hash tag and the slogan “Justice for Freddie Gray” which was used to describe this event.

Tweets in June 2015

Overview:

- Collection of tweets on 18 of 30 days in June 2015
- Collection of 583.139 tweets on average per day (min: 346.940; max: 1.008.432)
- In sum 10.496.495 tweets were collected in May 2015

Table: Total Tweets per day

Date	Frequency
2015-06-01	504292
2015-06-02	544563
2015-06-03	512560
2015-06-05	346940
2015-06-08	501861
2015-06-09	517864
2015-06-10	597116
2015-06-11	513860
2015-06-12	503098
2015-06-15	504414
2015-06-16	721924
2015-06-17	539539
2015-06-18	1008432
2015-06-19	486209
2015-06-25	514224
2015-06-26	830228
2015-06-29	686409
2015-06-30	662962

³⁹ http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/freddie-gray-autopsy-report-given-to-baltimore-prosecutors.html?_r=0

Statistics	
Sum	10496495
Average	583139
Min	346940
Max	1008432

Table: Percentage of indicative keywords

	Keyword						
Jun-15	security	threat	terror	crime	crisis	justice	migration
2015-06-01	0,05850%	0,01289%	0,01269%	0,02618%	0,03530%	0,03470%	0,00198%
2015-06-02	0,05784%	0,01396%	0,01267%	0,02167%	0,02956%	0,02516%	0,00349%
2015-06-03	0,05580%	0,01580%	0,01405%	0,02985%	0,04058%	0,03180%	0,00254%
2015-06-05	0,05966%	0,01758%	0,01211%	0,03286%	0,03257%	0,03171%	0,00346%
2015-06-08	0,08170%	0,01335%	0,01594%	0,02969%	0,03826%	0,03248%	0,00279%
2015-06-09	0,05967%	0,01487%	0,01699%	0,03321%	0,04016%	0,03379%	0,00193%
2015-06-10	0,06531%	0,01909%	0,02278%	0,02780%	0,03316%	0,03668%	0,00536%
2015-06-11	0,06617%	0,01382%	0,01732%	0,02316%	0,03055%	0,04301%	0,00272%
2015-06-12	0,06202%	0,01212%	0,02067%	0,02286%	0,04373%	0,03936%	0,00239%
2015-06-15	0,05353%	0,01110%	0,01249%	0,03073%	0,03053%	0,04639%	0,00377%
2015-06-16	0,05956%	0,01773%	0,01524%	0,03020%	0,03892%	0,03269%	0,00249%
2015-06-17	0,06116%	0,01409%	0,01316%	0,02465%	0,04337%	0,02576%	0,00297%
2015-06-18	0,05801%	0,01418%	0,02439%	0,08419%	0,05117%	0,03957%	0,00605%
2015-06-19	0,09646%	0,01111%	0,01604%	0,03682%	0,04895%	0,04381%	0,00740%
2015-06-25	0,05251%	0,01828%	0,01517%	0,02820%	0,04842%	0,03131%	0,00933%
2015-06-26	0,06227%	0,01578%	0,08058%	0,03132%	0,04372%	0,03312%	0,00602%
2015-06-29	0,06148%	0,01705%	0,03409%	0,02287%	0,11480%	0,03278%	0,00422%
2015-06-30	0,06034%	0,01659%	0,03394%	0,02851%	0,07527%	0,02972%	0,00362%
Average	0,06289%	0,01497%	0,02168%	0,03138%	0,04550%	0,03466%	0,00403%

Figure: Percentage of indicative keywords over time




Table: Keyword Ranking (percent avg)

Rank June	Keyword	Percentage avg
1	security	0,06289%
2	crisis	0,04550%
3	justice	0,03466%
4	crime	0,03138%
5	terror	0,02168%
6	threat	0,01497%
7	migration	0,00403%

The peaks:

On June 8 a peak can be observed for tweets mentioning “security”, which seem to stem disproportionately from retweets to a Instagram picture being shared via twitter by the celebrity Demi Lovato of her dog with the capture “Best security guard out there...”.

Figure: Original tweet June 8



Source: <https://twitter.com/ddlovato/status/607830298252984320>

On June 18 the keyword “crime” reaches a share above 0,08 % of all tweets that day (0,05 per cent points above its monthly average of 0,03 %) very strongly related to the Charleston church shooting that took place on the eve of June 17 in South Carolina. While there are number of different words attached to the tweets mentioning “crime” on the subject (such as Charleston, church, confederate, etc.) about half of the tweets registered mention “hate crime”. This gives an indication of how the discussion of the atrocity was framed in public debate (among the keywords which were considered; e.g. no surge for the word “terror” can be registered on the same level).

On June 19 a peak can be observed for the word “security”, which seem strongly associated with the headline “Samsung announces a keyboard security flaw” – less surprising, issues relating to the information technology and tech domain in general seem to be represented quite frequently on twitter.

Figure: Example tweet sharing the headline




Source: <https://twitter.com/mashable/status/611803481616318464>

On June 26 a peak of the keyword “terror” reaches over 0,08 %, an increase of 4 times its monthly average share of 0,02 %. The hash tag #terroristturkey can be found numerous within the sample and was reportedly a world wide trending topic that day.⁴⁰ The attack on the city of Kobane by ISIS was launched crossing the border of Turkey, which received an intense backlash – if short lived – that day. While in the case of peaks associated with individual celebrities, where one tweet can be identified as singular source receiving an immense number of retweets, events of a political kind are usually actively tweeted by a larger number of people using a similar wording or the same hash tag.

On June 29 the keyword “crisis” is almost reaching 3 times its monthly average of 0,04 with a share of 0,11 % of tweets that day. Reviewing the content of the tweets these are overwhelmingly associated with Greece in the combinations: Greek crisis, Euro crisis or Debt crisis. To a lesser extent the combination of crisis and refugees can be observed.

⁴⁰ <http://www.baghdadinvest.com/terroristturkey-becomes-number-1-worldwide-hashtag/>

Figure: Three-month overview



Results from the interviews

In last year's Annual Societal Security Report (ASSR) a first glimpse on the results from the interviews was presented.⁴¹ This provided already interesting insights and in-depth understanding of the security discourse of citizens. At the time of writing of the first ASSR, the qualitative approach was still in the phase of conducting the interviews with around 40 interviews conducted and around 20 transcribed or translated and thus ready for analysis. Already with the raw data available in last year's report, we had managed to describe the mundane security discourse, which differs from the media as well as from the political and expert discourse on security and identified several dimensions of mundane security which appeared to play an important role in the day to day life of European citizens.

One year later, the raw material has been greatly expanded. In total 92 in-depth semi-structured interviews have been conducted in six different countries across Europe: Austria, Germany, Norway, The Netherlands, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.⁴² A general guideline served as a structure for the interviews, however with very open questions, trying to address security in the widest possibility and in order to allow a broad analysis of the concept of mundane security without trying to influence the respondents in providing them with an already established – expert – concept of security.⁴³ Except a short introduction about what the Source project is about and the consent form the respondents had to sign, no further information was given. It was important to provide the interviewees the possibilities to tell *their* stories about security, what they experience, how they experience it and how they handle security in their everyday life, which is why the questions in the guideline did not needed to be asked in a consecutive order. The English version of the guideline is presented on the next page.

The interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, and were recorded if the participant accepted this. Some basic socio-demographic data was also collected. One of our goals of the interviews was also to cover a large range of citizens and trying to avoid a biased selection of participants. This is an often reoccurring problem in research projects with qualitative interviews. The participants for the interviews are often recruited within the social environment of the researchers and the interviewers and thus often skewed towards a high education, high income population. It was thus particularly stressed to try to cover different participants and to include also citizens that are often left out in other, similar researches – marginalised citizens such as homeless, addicts, sex workers, migrants, sans-papiers, homosexuals or inmates.

⁴¹ See Source Del 3.4: 48.

⁴² Interviews per country: Austria (AT) n=24; Germany (DE) n=17; Norway (NO) n=22; The Netherlands (NL) n=15; Slovakia (SK) n=7; The United Kingdom (UK) n=7.

⁴³ For further details on the development of the guideline see Source Del 3.4:48f.

English guideline for the semi-structured interviews:

Intro text to inform interview partners

We want to find out, what makes citizens feel secure and insecure in their everyday life. Assuming that citizens are the best experts when it comes to their personal security we would like to ask you a couple of questions about your experiences, feelings and attitudes towards security and what you think is important in this domain. This interview feeds into a large European research project, investigating security in a broad sense. Collecting views from citizens like you will provide an important input for this research. We will not use personal information from this interview and everything you say will be treated confidential. If you feel you want to quit the conversation you can do this any time.

Guiding questions for the interview

1. What does security mean for you? Is there something that makes you feel secure in a general sense in your everyday life?
2. Is there someone or something that provides you with support to manage your everyday an/or professional challenges and live up to social aspirations?
3. Looking ahead towards your personal future, what is it that gives you the feeling of security? Is there anything you contribute actively to secure your own future?
4. Can you think of any circumstances or events that would jeopardize your personal future?
5. Are there any places/situations in your daily walks of life making you personally feel insecure?
6. Are there specific social or ethnic groups that make you feel insecure when encounter them? If so, what exactly do you think makes them a threat to your security?
7. Looking at the overall global political development, at wars and terrorist attacks, do you feel threatened by these attacks in your daily life?
8. What could state and government do, to improve and stabilize your personal situation, to make your life more secure? Can you think of any deficits in this regard?

Short description of the respondents

We have managed to obtain a broad sample of respondents, ranging in age between 17 and 81 years. Gender-wise we have a small majority of male respondents in relation to female respondents (55 were male and 37 were female). One reason for this might be because for the selected marginalized citizens, particularly among homeless, addicts and non-registered refugees, a male

majority is often documented within research⁴⁴ which also reflects the reached population among these groups for our research. With this said, the aimed diversity, also among marginalised citizens was broad, but it was achieved to reach at least some respondents in each 'category'.

We thus have tried to establish a broad picture of our society in order to depict how security is expressed in each and every mundane discourse. As a result we have conducted interviews with:

	n
Addicts	4
Homosexuals	3
Inmates	3
Migrants	21
Respondents with disabilities	6
Retirees	5
Sans-papiers	3
Shelterless & unemployed	8
(Ex-)Sex Workers	6
Unemployed	11
No specific stigmatisation	35

Table 1: Distribution of respondents

Two notes regarding the selection and distribution of the respondents in the table above. First, these are no mutually exclusive categories, meaning that respondents can be in two categories. Especially within the category 'migrant', some of the respondents are also counted within other categories like 'unemployed', 'sex worker', or 'sans-papiers'. The rationale behind this approach is that each respondent might express his subjective feeling of security based on his different stigmatisations – while in one situation being a migrant from Nigeria might trigger situations of insecurity, in other situations it might be because of working as a sex worker on the streets. Second the categorisation done here is by no means judgemental. The aim behind this approach, as already mentioned, is to display, analyse and understand the mundane security discourse in all its facets.

Regarding the education of the respondents, we also have a broad distribution, ranging from respondents with a vocational degree (n=27), secondary degree (n=8), university degree (n=9), and still in education/students (n=12).

⁴⁴ A recent publication of the FEANTSA's European Observatory on Homelessness Comparative Research Series mentions that *"in most [European] countries the majority of homeless people are males, at about 75-85%, and females represent only about 15-25%"*, with some differences between countries (Busch-Geertsma, Volker, et al., 2014, EOH Comparative Studies on Homelessness, Brussels, December 2014). Also the recent numbers from Eurostat (May 2015) on asylum statistics indicate that around three quarters of asylum-applications in European member states were from male refugees (Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, 2015, Statistics explained. Asylum statistics. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics (Accessed: 17.12.2015).



On a last note regarding the description of the respondents, we have by no means tried to be representative in the actual distribution of the participants compared to the situations in the specific countries and in Europe. It is rather an attempt in including as many different aspects as possible in order to *“leave more room for complex accounts of social reality, [allowing] for a better and more precise mapping of a person’s view, social context and embeddedness in a given culture and life world.”*⁴⁵

Dimensions of mundane security

As described in the ASSR last year we distinguish between the public and media discourse, the expert and policy discourse and the lay or mundane discourse on security. The first two discourses are discussed extensively in separate chapters of this report, which is why we will focus here on the mundane security discourse resulting from the qualitative interviews. The interesting feature here is on the one hand where and how the discourse of lay citizens differs from the expert as well as from the media discourse and what we can learn about how lay citizens handle security. On the other hand it is possible to show here how diverse the mundane security discourse is, how many different facets are important for each and every individual and how certain similarities amongst groups are expressed.

There are certain recurring themes across the interviews, which can be seen as a common frame of mundane security but are experienced differently by individuals, based on their socio-economical, cultural, or biographical background. The dimensions of mundane security were partly introduced in the chapter on the first results from interviews in the ASSR 2014. In this year’s edition, we were able to refine these dimensions based on the extended data and provide more in-depth analysis of each of the dimensions. Although each dimension is treated in a separate chapter, it will be necessary to see them in their totality as shaping the mundane discourse. There will be references back and forth between the chapters, highlighting the interlinkage between the dimensions, however for analytical purposes and a better understanding, each dimension will be described separately. We will start with the role of “friends and family” in providing security. In chapter 2 we will analyse the importance of “economic security”, which is an omnipresent topic amongst the respondents. In chapter 3 we will show how citizens perceive the role of the “state and public authorities” in shaping security and insecurity. In chapter 4 the “ecological security” handles the topic of insecurities in regard to particular areas and situations that are encountered within the citizens’ daily walks of life. The last chapter describes the, sometimes abstract, recurrent types of scenarios of insecurity citizens develop when talking about their personal future.

⁴⁵ Source Del 3.4: 48.



Friends and family

The role of friends and family in reference to the significance of security on a day to day basis is manifold for the respondents of the interviews. This is of course related to the diverse socio-economical background of the interviewees and thus they relate differently to friends and family in terms of security. In general for many of the respondents, family, friends or social ties are an important factor in providing security in life. This is true in the sense of ontological security as the “constancy of the surrounding social (...) environments of action”⁴⁶, which is for respondents seen as a stabilising mechanism in their life. Family and friends, but also a partner, husband or wife, provides in many instances support by being someone to count on in any situation – or as one respondent answered, especially in situations when “I need advice or just fancy a chat” (Respondent UK.1, female, 18 y.o., student).

This relates to an abstract provision of security – where we can isolate the analysis from the security discourse used by the public or the media. Events of insecurity in the sense of friends, family and relationship seldom relate to the topics used in the public and media discourse. Instead of threats in forms of terrorist attacks or the refugee-crisis, as it is currently omnipresent in the media discourses, within the lay or mundane discourse specific threats to their personal future are perceived in forms of death or illness of a close relative or friend. Closely linked with the topic of economic security – which will be addressed in the next chapter – it is seen essential to establish a secure material and physical surrounding for oneself, but also for family and friends.

Friends, family or relationships fulfil however also another, tangible role for providing security. For many respondents, they are perceived as the primary contact point in situations of distress, in terms of financial security as well as in terms of health security. Having the possibility to draw on the help of family and friends when it is actually needed provides many respondents with a feeling of support in everyday life. The following quote sums this nicely up and could be attributed to many other respondents in different countries as well: “Definitely friends and family. If there is something that bothers me I can always count on my extensive group of friends. For both support and relaxation. The most difficult part is actually asking for help, but luckily I’m a person who asks for help really quickly” (Respondent NL.12, female, 48 y.o., facility manager).

As already discussed shortly in last year’s societal security report⁴⁷, the social and biographical background of the respondents can have an influence on how friends and family are perceived as contact point in case of insecurity. The broad empirical data gathered during the last year helps to elaborate on the peculiarities resulting from different social and biographical backgrounds. As discussed in last year’s report, age can have an influence the importance of friends and family for security – for example some of the elderly respondents often don’t want to rely on the help of others and don’t want to be perceived as a nuisance for their relatives: “My daughter suggested to move to

⁴⁶ Giddens, Anthony, 1990, *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford University Press, Stanford: 92.

⁴⁷ See Source Del 3.4: 54.

her place if I'll need assistance. But that's not possible! Where should I go there? There is no place and the kids also still live there." (Respondent DE.4, female, 80 y.o., retired).

But not only amongst elderly respondents, also younger respondents for example don't rely as much on family when requiring moral support or constancy within the social surrounding, but rather rely on peers – as they appear to be more central to the biographical episode of the respondents. Or as one young respondent from Austria said: *"Mainly my friends provide me with support, because they always understand me"* (Respondent AT.13, male, 17 y.o., migrant, student). Although family was mentioned by a lot of young respondents when referring to support in managing the everyday challenges, this then was often linked with the knowledge that they can rely on their parents or grand-parents in times of financial difficulties: *"Having the support of my family is also important to me, because I know that I can always move back home if I need to"* (Respondent UK.2, female, 19 y.o. student).

Also relationships appear to be more important for younger respondents than family – or at least one important aspect in the contribution to actively secure one's own future. The prospect of a steady relationship is closely linked with aims of becoming independent – financially and in terms of habitation, but also in a first step regarding having an own family: *"If I had a girlfriend, and we were together for a long time I would try to get independent, live with her. If we both worked, we could move in together (...) right now, I'm not willing to go live somewhere with ten more people. So I still live with my parents (...)"* (Respondent SK.1, male, 29 y.o. technician).

Moving further in terms of biographical episodes, having a family is expressed as an important asset in terms of providing security, it is at the same time perceived as something that needs active contribution in maintaining security, in some cases even as some kind of insecurity or as something at risk. Especially having children, but also starting a serious relationship, buying a house together or other big decisions in life are accompanied with doubts which are expressed by many respondents in such situations as feelings of insecurity. Here especially one quote stands out which again can be used as a representation of other respondents in similar situations as well: *"My partner is one of my most important sources of 'security', as he is the one I come home to every day. We recently married, which was important for me, as I have given up my own house in Amsterdam to live with him in Haarlem. If something was to happen to him, I would end up on the street – because I couldn't make any claim against his family as long as our relation isn't registered. Our civil marriage gives me an additional feeling of security"* (Respondent NL.10, female, 35 y.o., higher vocational certificate, recently unemployed). Similar quotes can be found, where the ambiguity of security and insecurity is attributed to children who are on the one hand a source of security and support – something to be proud of – but on the other hand an important source of insecurity for parents, worrying that something could happen to them physically or that their future prospects are insecure.

Going back to Giddens' concept of ontological security, an important aspect he relates to, is security as the balance between trust and risk, which seems to be what many respondents relate to. Without going too much into the details of the concept, a short clarification on the terminology is necessary. In the terms of Giddens, trust is defined *"as confidence in the reliability of a person or system,*

regarding a given set of outcomes or events”⁴⁸ while risk is seen a chance of an unwanted outcome of events.⁴⁹ If we take for example the quote we have just used, of the female respondent who recently married. While she has trust in terms of confidence in the reliability of her husband staying with her for the rest of her life, the risk of not marrying would lie in the unknown chance of an unwanted outcome (a break-up or an unexpected death of her partner), leaving her without a place to stay. The marriage reduces the risk (of being without housing) and serves as a security – balancing trust and risk.

As we have also conducted interviews with marginalised people, further interesting findings in regard to the role of friends and family on security can be found. Especially due to the biographical background of the interviewees, some findings differ largely in regard to non-marginalised respondents. One of the findings here is that many of the respondents perceive security as something they prefer to control themselves and thus not to rely on the help/support of others. Families play an insignificant role in terms of providing a subjective feeling of security, especially for respondents who are shelterless. But also sex-workers or prisoners seldom mention family as relevant for their security. In general family as a topic was only mentioned by a few of the marginalised respondents, often relating to the braking of contact between the respondent and the remaining family ties. It can be assumed that for many marginalised respondents, the role of families is not important simply due to an absence of family. As one of the interviewees responded to the question of what provides him support: *“Hm, good question, especially among us [homeless]... what provides us support? Family provides support, if one has a family. But as a homeless you don’t have that much support.”* (Respondent AT.24, male, 42 y.o., homeless). Also amongst refugees, family was not really mentioned as a provider of security, here probably due to the fact that in many cases families remain in the countries of origin or have fled to other countries.

Friends or other people in similar situations however, are often regarded as important for providing security amongst the respondents. Many respondents relate to them as a sort of community, refer to it in a similar way we have mentioned already in the beginning of the chapter, as having someone who lends an ear. But also in a more practical sense in order to ensure physical security. Especially shelterless respondents often rely on being on groups at night, in order to provide themselves with security – and not being exposed to threats when being alone on the street at night. For example one respondent used a metaphor of the war for being on the streets, with his friends, his ‘community’ as a comradeship: *“Security for me is to feel safe. Having good friends is something that is very important for me to feel safe. Close friends can protect you, just like when the military go to war. You need your buddies to be there.”* (Respondent NO.3, male, 46 y.o., in social housing, mental illness).

Furthermore, particularly for refugees, being part of a group of people with a similar biographical background, and forming a community of refugees seems to be helpful for dealing with the day-to-day struggles and threats they face while being in the process of asylum-seeking. It helps them in their specific situation, experiences can be shared and the community provides a sort of consistency within an else foreign and unknown environment. Referring to a group of asylum-seekers who have

⁴⁸ Giddens, Anthony, op. cit., 1990: 34.

⁴⁹ Giddens, Anthony, 1999, Risk and Responsibility, The Modern Law Review Volume 62, Issue 1, pages 1–10, January 1999.

formed an activist group in 2012 in the Netherlands, one respondent from Somalia replies to what provides him with support that *“I met really good people and they’re my family now or even more than family – since I don’t really have a real family anymore (...) these people were my brothers and sisters; we’re in the same situation.”* (Respondent NL.6, male, 32 y.o., refugee).

We have thus shown here how many different type of respondents refer to the role of friends, family and relationships in providing security, often in a form of a stabilising effect in a fast-living society, providing trust and keeping the balance of ontological security. This relates again closely with what Giddens describes with the environment of trust in which personal relationships as means of stabilising social ties play a crucial role in modern societies.⁵⁰ This chapter also nicely shows how diverse these can be expressed, especially in regard to the cultural, social and biographical background of the respondents. On a last remark it is further noticeable, that within the whole mundane discourse of security, religion seems to only play a minor role as an environment of trust and is seldom contributed as an important aspect in providing security. Or to conclude with Giddens on the meaning of religion for ontological security: *“most of the situations of modern social life are manifestly incompatible with religion as a pervasive influence upon day-to-day life. Religious cosmology is supplanted by reflexively organised knowledge, governed by empirical observation and logical thought, and focused upon material technology and socially applied codes.”*⁵¹

Economic security

Another dimension of mundane security which was highly emphasised by a majority of the respondents was on the topic of economic security. Economic security was expressed in a feeling of security as well as a feeling of insecurity. The analysis here will thus draw along this divide of security and insecurity regarding the economic situation of the respondents, and highlight the different reasoning behind the experiences as well as the expressed coping-strategies of the respondents in this regard.

As a starting point to the interviews the first question the interviewees were asked was what security meant for them. And as a first response from many respondents, financial security was mentioned as something that helps them to feel safe, to feel secure in their everyday life. Instead of primarily addressing physical security (or health in that sense), for a majority of the interviewees the individual economic situation was stressed as having a big influence on their own security. With economic security, most of the respondents did not (or seldom) mention wealth accumulation, independent of their income, but mainly addressed the importance of their economic situation for their future planning and as a form of stabilising effect in their lives; an insurance in the future: *“What I do is that*

⁵⁰ Giddens, Anthony, op. cit., 1990: 102.

⁵¹ Ibid., 109.

I go to a job, I earn money and pay taxes, I get my medical and social insurance.” (Respondent SK.1, male, 29 y.o., technician).

As the quote above already indicates, in terms of economic security having a job is seen as a crucial contribution in providing economic security. As the primary source of income, having a job or not is essential in regard to the divide of security and insecurity. Many of the respondents with a stable employment are therefore also more positive in terms of economic security, mainly due to their possibility of actively influencing their economic situation – being motivated, showing initiative, creating a network: *“It’s scary but it is in your own hands. As long as you do your best [in your job], come on time and just do it – it will work out”* (Respondent NL.5, male, 25 y.o., employee). Therefore it is also particularly amongst younger respondents, who are still in their education-phase significant to obtain a high educational degree, preferably a university degree, as they see here the highest opportunity to obtain an adequate job which will be able to provide them economic security. Education is experienced as creating security in their future.

Vice-versa, instable employments or a sudden unemployment is seen as a big threat to the economic security. Since the impact of a cut in income due to unemployment is linked with many other economic aspects – a mortgage, a loan, or simply providing enough food for the kids and family, for some of the respondents the possibility of an unemployment is expressed as almost life-threatening: *“If I lost this work, I would be completely screwed ... I wouldn’t have funds to pay for the accommodation. I would lose that.”* (Respondent SK.3, male, 33 y.o., street-paper vendor).

Here is also where a divide between the respondents can be observed. On the one hand between high and low income respondents. For the latter possible unemployment is experienced as having a way higher impact on life in general as for respondents with a higher income and fear the possible consequences in cases of a loss of work. Higher income respondents also perceive unemployment as something that is best to be avoided, they however also express that they are not really worried in losing their job, since they are skilled enough or have a ‘safety’ network, that would help in case of need (as we have seen already in the dimension of friends and family). On the other hand there is also a socio-cultural divide, which was observed among the interviews we have conducted. While in countries with a blown-up welfare state and high social expenditures (mainly in Austria, but also in Germany and in the Netherlands), most of the respondents also strongly trust the state in terms of economic security in times of distress, mainly regarding unemployment money, in other countries, where the social expenditures of the state is lower, unemployment is perceived as more threatening (largely in Slovakia).⁵²

Economic security and the welfare state are also an important aspect for elderly respondents, who rely on pensions as a source of income. While here similar observations can be made regarding ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ welfare states, another observation is the difference regarding men and women. Many of the elderly women apparently have to rely on a lower pension as a result of having been responsible for child care and household and not having been employed or only part-time. Consequently and particularly in regard to health issues, feelings of insecurity linked with the

⁵² The role of the state on (economic) security will be further analysed in the next chapter.



financial situation arise – with a certain anxiety of not being able to afford medical treatment. Although there are no real coping-strategies expressed by the respondents, it appears as if some of the elderly have pre-emptively addressed the issue of a low pension through contributing to a private pension systems – a strategy of course only possible for respondents with already a steady income.

As already mentioned for young respondents, education is seen as an important factor in the creation of economic security, however the unknown development of the financial situation, globally as well as on the nation state, creates a situation of uncertainty about their future – which is reinforced in countries where higher education already depends on big financial investments. Economic insecurity is therefor often expressed amongst younger respondents in terms of anxieties about the future. For many of them, it appears as if their future economic situation is at a constant risk and trust in social security systems are only occasionally expressed. It is also amongst young respondents talking about their future where the economic crisis in Europe is explicitly mentioned regarding a factor of insecurity. For example, especially young students in the UK often express the insecurity they experience, when thinking about finding a job after university – particularly if the crisis endures, as it will have a big impact on their future due to the high amount of debts they'll have to repay: *"I don't feel very optimistic about my future, when I come out of uni I will have over £50.000 in debt, that's really scary..."* (Respondent UK.6, female, 18 y.o., student).

Interestingly, there are not so many differences between marginalised and non-marginalised respondents regarding economic security, as the general topics are rather similar. The implications however are often much more severe when marginalised are affected. For shelterless respondents and asylum-seekers, the prospect of finding a job or the possibility to earn some extra money is a big contribution in order to increase economic security. The real life experience of living without money and being without shelter entails the risk of falling completely out of the social security system. Under such conditions having some kind of work, is experienced as literally lifesaving, and losing has existential implications for future situations. Furthermore employment is experienced as a possibility to break out of the cycle of living on the fringes of society – with the dilemma that many employers are often not willing to employ shelterless people: *"Of course I look for a job, but it isn't that easy at the moment... (...). But it isn't easy in the society; if you are homeless, you rarely obtain a job."* (Respondent AT.24, male, 42 y.o., homeless and without employment). This is also why for many of the marginalised respondents the future – in terms of economic as well as in terms of ontological security – is a very vague concept, as it is not really something they appear to be able to actively control.

As we have seen already in general in the previous chapter, one important coping strategy for the respondents is their social network, friends, family, a relationship, or a community – also in terms of economic insecurity. Many of the respondents rely on their surrounding and know that they can count on them in case of need. As we have also already seen, and which will be elaborated in the next chapter, one of the coping strategies is also to rely on the welfare state in case of economic distress of oneself.

There is however one development which has been observed increasingly in regard to economic insecurity – which is a rise in nationalist tendencies amongst some of the respondents. Mainly



respondents with a lower income, job insecurity, or with a low pension – thus those affected most by an economic insecurity. There is a certain fear or anxiety regarding the future economic development, and due to an allegedly large amount of migrants working in the same sector, or being eligible for the same kind of social welfare, the anxiety increases due the fear of missing out in case of direct need. Indirectly, it often appears to be a critique of their own situation and the way they are treated by the welfare state – or fear to be treated, which is reflected on “the others”: *“It’s impossible that one person [migrant worker] works [and pays taxes / health insurance] and the rest [migrant workers family] can come and suck out our social security system. I believe this is the biggest threat to safety in the Netherlands. (...) These populations think they can come to the Netherlands and use the social security system that is in place and upheld by the ‘hard work’ of Dutch people.”* (Respondent NL.2, male, 45 y.o., bus driver in Amsterdam). Although these perceptions are rather rare amongst the respondents, they are expressed by some and can also spill over into more dangerous situations, especially when enforced by unstable periods like the financial crisis and taken up by populist extremist parties, as is currently the case in many countries.

Public authorities and the state

Similarly as with the two previous chapters, the dimension of the public authorities and the state in mundane security discourses can also be both a source of security and insecurity. Especially in terms of the social welfare state, many respondents see in the state an important role in providing security. Mainly in countries with strong social security systems, the majority of the respondents there also believe that they will be able to benefit from it in case they require help. They have trust in the reliability of the system as it is and it serves as a provider of security. However the current developments on the international scale, mainly regarding the economic crisis also has chastened the trust for respondents. The situation on the labour market is mentioned by some of the respondents – amongst the younger, but also in general – as a sign that the role of the state has failed in this matter: *“The labour market situation in Austria has deteriorated drastically in the last years. There are almost 10.5% unemployed, almost 500.000 people, which is worrying and a sign that here the state is failing.”* (Respondent AT.9, male, 50 y.o., parole officer).

Although it is comprehensible that a rising unemployment rate is concerning for citizens, the quote above also shows the effect of media discourses on the mundane discourse. Compared to the other countries, the unemployment rate in Austria is among the lowest in Europe with currently 5.6%⁵³ and on a similar level as in the UK. However since the statistical methodology of the unemployment rate calculation differs greatly in Austria compared to the European method, the rate used in the Austrian media discourse is much higher with 8.4%⁵⁴. This can result in a slightly skewed perception of the actual situation, which in consequence can have an influence on ones feeling of security and on the

⁵³ Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, 2015, Unemployment - LFS adjusted series.

⁵⁴ News.Orf.at, 2015, Arbeitslosigkeit steigt weiter, <http://oesterreich.orf.at/stories/2729266/> (Accessed: 16.12.2015).



role of the state in contributing ontological and economic security. But respondents not only start to mistrust the welfare state in regard to the labour market in their own countries but also due to the situations in those countries hit the hardest by the economic crisis, like in Greece or Spain. Cuts in the social security system and deregulations are perceived as a threat that could also happen in other countries, or even their own country: *"I am more worried by the political evolution. What's happening in Greece could also happen here, or is already happening: debt cap, deregulation, eroding of the welfare state, hollowing out the social security system."* (Respondent DE.8, female, 40 y.o., doctorate student). Particularly low income respondents as well as those who are dependent on welfare benefits are rather sceptical regarding the stabilising role of the state in times of economic crisis and worry most about cuts in the welfare system.

Within the security discourse of the lay citizens, the dimension of the public authorities and the state is however not only limited to the social security system and the welfare state. Another big role is seen in the provision of security – in a more physical sense: law enforcement, crime fighting, terrorism prevention, or foreign policies. Here again, the statements of the respondents in this regard are very contradictory. While an increase in state force, law enforcement presence and 'law and order' policies are desired in some cases, or for some respondents, for others the same topics are experienced as a factor of insecurity. The reasons behind this contradiction are manifold and we will try to expound some of which can be observed amongst the interviewees.

One important factor are certainly socio-cultural differences between the analysed countries. Although among European countries many similarities exist, we have been able to observe also some differences in how the ideal role of the state in providing security is described. While in the UK, almost all respondents were in favour for an increase in police presence and especially an increase in CCTV surveillance at public places – with the only constraint that this would cost a lot of money – this rationale is almost absent in the other countries. The mundane discourse on video surveillance is in all the other countries almost non-existing or deprecating – only a few other respondents specifically state to experience an increased subjective feeling of security due to video surveillance. One of the main explanations here is the ubiquitous video surveillance in the UK and the associated habituation of having CCTV systems at every corner of the street, which is probably unique in Europe.

Another interesting example of socio-cultural differences could be observed only amongst respondents from Norway. Although the Norwegian police officers are normally unarmed when on patrol, on the background of increased terrorism threats, they were armed for a certain period of time in 2014 and throughout 2015.^{55,56} The arming of police officers has however created real insecurities amongst Norwegian respondents, who feel more threatened by the measure instead of feeling safer: *"The only thing I don't like is that the police are now allowed to carry weapons. I understand that it might help to catch some bad guys but it also creates a lot of fear. That's at least how I feel about it; I just feel more unsafe by seeing them carrying their huge guns. I just walked past*

⁵⁵ Euronews, 2014, Norway police carry guns amid heightened terror fears, <http://www.euronews.com/2014/11/26/norway-police-carry-guns-amid-heightened-terror-fears/> (Accessed, 16.12.2015).

⁵⁶ The Local No, 2015, Norwegian police to stay armed until February, <http://www.thelocal.no/20151209/norway-police-to-stay-armed-until-february> (Accessed, 16.12.2015).



the Nobel Peace Center today and there was some kind of VIP visit. The area was surrounded by policemen carrying weapons. Isn't that kind of ironic? That a festivity celebrating peace is demanding police carrying weapons? I respect that some people do feel safer when the police have guns. But I sure don't." (Respondent, NO.7, male, 56 y.o., unemployed & addict).

Apart from socio-cultural aspects, other reasons for the above described contradiction seem to result from biographical or socio-economic circumstances of the interviewees. This corresponds also with what has already been described in the previous chapter regarding the rise of nationalism in times of economic insecurity. Respondents with a lower income appear to be generally more insecure and as such perceive also subjectively more external, physical threats. Strict rulings and a strong police force are seen as a solution in order to decrease the risk of future threats to their lives: *"The state does already a lot – a lot of police inspections, this creates security. I have a lot of respect for the police. In Germany, they catch the terrorists before they can attempt a terrorist attack, so people don't have to die, which is a good protection of the citizens."* (Respondent DE.15, male, 40 y.o., migrant, temporary worker).

Although respondents with a high socio-economic background are also seldom sceptical of law enforcement agencies – and some also seem to endorse an increase in police presence in public space in order to strengthen the subjective feeling of security – they often appear to be more rational regarding future security threats and the possibilities of public authorities in preventing them. Instead of 'law and order' policy, they are primarily in favour of policies contributing to enhance the social welfare, as for example education, labour market improvements or health system improvements. This would advance the subjective security more than an increase in police force or an increase in terror-attack alert levels: *"Bluntly said, I think it was a bad idea of the government to say that people should be vigilant. Vigilant for what? Suspicious behaviour, without clarifying how 'suspicious behaviour' looks like. For a lot of people a headscarf is already suspicious. The same line of thought might be applied to the economic crisis. People should just normally spend their money and all this rhetoric about 'it's not over yet' isn't helping with that. (...) I believe what you give attention to grows. So when the government focusses more on positive stories this translates into a more positive atmosphere in society."* (Respondent NL.10, female, 35 y.o., higher vocational certificate, recently unemployed). This rationale was observable amongst several respondents with higher income and also higher educational levels – however only few of the respondents stated this as clearly as the quote above.

These respondents with a high educational level and a high income, expressed although also concerns in regard to the state – often due to political developments and the rise of right-wing parties, with which strong feelings of insecurity were expressed. Mainly in Austria and Germany and to a lesser degree also in the other countries, a lot of the respondents with a higher socio-economic background experience the nationalist and conservative tendencies in Europe as a manifest threat to security. On the one hand because law enforcement agencies and public authorities are seen as too tame in regard to right-wing motivated actions and on the other hand because the right-wing tendencies are also observable in the political system – by specific right-wing parties, but also by the adoption of right-wing topics in the political programs of moderate conservative parties.

Lastly the individual biographical background of the respondents is also contributing to how the security discourse in regard to public authorities and state is expressed. Negative encounters with law enforcement agencies create most of the time feelings of subjective insecurity when law enforcement officers are more visible. This was especially observable amongst many of the marginalised respondents – shelterless, refugees and sex-workers – who often have had negative experiences with the police on multiple instances, and thus don't trust them to act in their favour. One example from the interviews is from two sex-workers in Norway, both female, around 35 years old, one from Norway and one from Nigeria. While the first respondent claimed that she feels particularly secure when she sees the police in the streets because it is important for her to get help when she needs to, the latter respondent feels harassed by the police. She mentions several instances in which she had negative encounters with the police – leading furthermore to a fear of not being able to stay in Norway anymore and thus being expelled: *"It really makes me feel insecure and it ruins my confidence. So if there is anything the government should do, they should make the police stop harassing people."* (Respondent NO.15, female, 35 y.o., sex worker, migrant). Similar stories were told by shelterless respondents, who are chased away from certain areas by law enforcement officers. Or by asylum seekers, who in general have to go through a bureaucratic ordeal in a foreign country with a constant fear of being deported and for whom public authorities are no source of security.

Thus again within the mundane discourse on security, the dimension of public authorities and the state is very diverse, from the role of the state in terms of a social welfare state to the state as an active or passive contributor to (subjective) physical security – both times as a possible source of security and insecurity. On a last note it should be mentioned that whenever respondents talk about public authorities, governments and the like, they almost always seem to solely refer to (their) national authorities and governments – the role of a common European or international policy regarding the multiple dimensions of security was not mentioned.

Ecological security

The following analysis draws upon a concept that has already been introduced in the last year's Annual Societal Security Report 1 (ASSR) in order to capture a specific category of insecurities which can be inferred from narrative interviews with lay citizens conducted in the framework of SOURCE. The term "ecological security" is used in order to encompass *"the complex and multi-dimensional feelings of security as they unfold as a consequence of material and symbolic properties of the immediate neighbourhood and everyday life."*⁵⁷ Taking "security" as "a broader analytic category encompassing a variety of phenomena relating to cultural understandings of safety and disorder"⁵⁸ – as differentiated by Stampnitzky (2013) in contrast to *"security' as an explicit object of discourse and practice"* – the concept of "ecological security" refers to a subcategory of security concerns

⁵⁷ Source Del 3.4: 54.

⁵⁸ Stampnitzky, Lisa, 2013, Toward a Sociology of "Security". *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 631.



expressed by respondents that is primarily related to dimensions of insecurity that are embedded in and structured by – what phenomenological sociologists call – the “*world of daily life*”⁵⁹ (“world of everyday life”; “Alltagswelt”) of individuals. With that said, the notion of “ecological security”, as used for the present analysis, is not used in the sense of “environmental security”, referring to threats of encountering potential environmental hazards. It rather encompasses security considerations occurred in the interviews that can be systematized with regard to particular situations that are encountered within the citizens’ daily walks of life.

Drawing upon the concept of ontological security, as coined by Anthony Giddens, these feelings of insecurity as delineated within this section primarily derive from potential irritations or interruptions of mundane routines and threats of discontinuity. As already delineated at an earlier stage, ontological security, as brought forwards by Giddens (1990: 92), is described as “[...] *the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the surrounding social and material environments of actions.*”⁶⁰ The importance of continuity as a buildingblock of “*alltagsweltliche*” security can be illustrated by the following statement of a Dutch respondent: “*I think security is that if I go to my work in the morning, nothing happened till I got home at night, and that everything is still the same.*” (Respondent NL.9, male, 48 y.o., high school diploma, cook) Similarly, another respondent from the Netherlands further underlines the importance of continuity as major security factor of the personal future by stating: “*I just want to continue living the way I'm doing now.*” (Respondent NL.8, male, 58 y.o., gay, lawyer)

Taking security as a concept that is substantially structured by the so-called “world of everyday life” of individuals, it becomes obvious that manifestations of insecurity are - to a certain extent - context-based and relative in nature. As can be seen from the interviews, people from socially marginalized groups of population (such as e.g. homeless, addicts, sex workers, migrants, “sans-papiers”, homosexuals or inmates) do certainly emphasise different security concerns they have to cope with in mundane life than, for example, young university students usually do. While for the former groups social stigmatisation, discrimination and exclusion appear to be predominant factors of insecurity within their daily walks of life, fear of failure and pressure to succeed may constitute a comparatively more determinant dimension of security of the latter's everyday life.

Evidence for the prominent role of ecological security considerations can be found in the interviews, when looking through the responses given by the interview partners with regard to the question as to what security mean for their everyday lives. The major part of the interviewees have spontaneously indicated that it is particularly important for them to “feel safe” in their daily walks of life and in their close environment. As an illustrative example, one respondent pointed out in this context: “*The fact that I can go wherever I want to go without feeling I'm in danger, In this sense I feel safe in my environment; I can go from A to B without any problems.*” (Respondent NL.12, female, 48 y.o., vocational degree)

As exemplified by the above statement, a frequently recurrent motif that can be encountered throughout most of the interviews with people from different walks of lives is the ability to move

⁵⁹ Schütz, Alfred, 1945, On Multiple Realities. *Philosophy of Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 533.

⁶⁰ Giddens, Anthony, op. cit., 1990: 92.



freely and safely in the public space without fear of being confronted with unpleasant situations, such as verbal or physical assaults or property offences. One respondent came up with the notion of “*habitat freedom*” (Respondent NL.11, male, 31 y.o., higher vocational degree) in order to describe his understanding of security for his everyday life. With that said, ecological security can be considered as an umbrella term, which encompasses typical security considerations of individuals in their daily walks of life. This includes feelings of insecurity that are encountered in their personal living environment, and the immediate neighbourhood respectively, but also extends to routes of the daily life, such as, among others, the way home from work or the way to school of their children.

While the own trusted environment, including the home and the immediate neighbourhood, is almost commonly considered as safe and secure, respondents do indicate recurrent examples of areas or venues which trigger feelings of insecurity. When asking about particular places that may cause feelings of unease, typical examples of venues have occurred throughout the interviews as sources of ecological insecurity. Such venues mentioned by the respondents as places that make them feel insecure include, first and foremost, particular areas and districts that have been either personally experienced or commonly considered as “insecure” spots. These include places that are commonly known as alleged drug dealing and street crime hotspots (e.g. Frankfurt main station), particular sites of hangout of certain groups of people considered as “strange” or “dangerous” (e.g. intoxicated persons, juvenile delinquents, homeless, etc.) and also neighbourhoods with high a proportion of immigrant residents (e.g. Grønland Oslo). What strikes the eye when looking through the interviews is that in most cases the labels of “unsafe” or “risky” areas, as given by the respondents, are hardly based on first-hand experience. Such bad reputation of particular venues primarily stems from the hearsay or originates from media coverage. Typical statements that can be found in the interviews sound as follows: “*I have never experienced anything bad myself in these areas. I have only heard people talking about their experiences.*” (Respondent, NO.7, male, 56 y.o., unemployed & addict).

Further typical examples of situations or places that create feelings of unease referred to by many respondents (to a larger extent by female respondents) are less frequented or abandoned areas or streets at night (e.g. unlighted parks, forests, etc.) or public transport facilities in late hours (e.g. subway, train or bus stations). Unfamiliar settings, such as foreign countries or unknown places, have also been stressed by some respondents as a source of insecurity. Some extreme cases that can be found when looking through the interviews are drawing the picture according to which the own four walls and the immediate personal environment are considered as a kind of “safe harbour” within a unsafe and risky outside world. For example, one respondent stated that he felt safe only within two particular districts of the city close to where he lived.⁶¹ Another extreme example that can be cited in this context is a young woman from the Netherlands, who said that: “*My own trusted environment feels secure for me, also with my little daughter. Outside this environment everything is insecure.*” (Respondent NL.15, female, 25 y.o., autistic, mother of a 2 y.o. daughter, receives disability benefits)

Respondents from all walks of life seem to develop certain coping strategies in order to minimise the risk of being exposed to sources of ecological insecurity. Keeping a watchful eye for risky situations or

⁶¹ See Source Del 3.4: 54.



malevolent people and keeping away from areas and places that are considered as potentially unsafe especially at night are among the most common practices and techniques mentioned by the respondents. People tend to develop – as one respondent referred to it – a kind of “*radar for tensions*” (Respondent NL.12, female, 48 y.o., vocational degree) and potentially “dangerous” people, which seems to be partly based on own experiences and, to a larger extent, on generalisations and prejudices that are inferred from media coverage or the hearsay. This seems to be consistent with recurrent statements made by some respondents according to which people or situations that are considered as incalculable or unpredictable cause feelings of insecurity or unease. A prime example of such strategies of avoidance that can be highlighted in this respect is given by a young male from the Netherlands, who describes very accurately how to deal with risks that can be encountered as a homosexual person when walking in public: *“The first thing I'd consider is sex – for example, there is a group of men I would rather let loose than if it was a group of women. Another thing is the quantity of the group and third, there is ethnicity – although I have to admit I wouldn't recognize a Russian guy from distance as such, but people from whom I can clearly see that they've a very different culture...Let's say if someone is clearly a Muslim, I would adjust myself because I don't want to have problems.”* (Respondent NL.5, male, 25 y.o., higher vocational degree, employee)

As can already be seen from the above example, a general impression that can be gained when looking across the interviews is that respondents – to a varying extent probably depending on the degree of vulnerability (e.g. homeless persons) – seem to internalise situational practices of self-disciplining in order to cope with such sources of ecological insecurity. To some extent, this goes hand in hand with the recurrent belief that personal security is someone's own responsibility, while the state is often considered as unable – or to a rather limited extent able – to completely ensure personal security in mundane life. Apart from typical strategies of avoidance referred to above, frequent reference has been made to the need of adopting particular behavioural patterns in daily social interactions that are perceived as ways of avoiding or de-escalating situations of unease and conflicts in everyday life. Such behavioural practices may range from adopting a overall positive and de-escalating attitude towards someone's environment to practices of non-interference and adherence to perceived “social conventionality”. It seems that especially respondents from arguably more vulnerable societal groups (e.g. refugees, homosexuals, etc.) tend to cultivate such practices of self-adjustment and avoidance. By referring to xenophobic tendencies within the host society, one respondent, a refugee from Somalia, who lives in the Netherlands, provided a quite interesting statement in this respect: *“There is Freedom to Speech, but there is Freedom of not-listening too.”* (Respondent NL.6, male, 32 y.o., refugee)

Future scenarios of insecurity

Drawing upon the categorisation of sources of mundane insecurity already developed in the last year's ASSR on the then existing empirical basis⁶², a distinction can be made between immediate security threats and those, which are of a rather abstract nature. The former type primarily encompasses risks that can be encountered in mundane life, for which practical strategies of avoidance are developed in order to cope with them. Recurrent examples of such "immediately perceived threats"⁶³ include risks such as those delineated in the previous section on ecological security. This category encompasses risks ranging from being exposed to unpleasant situations or strange people, e.g. when using public transport or walking through dimly lighted parks or abandoned or "dangerous" areas at night, to more practical security considerations such as road safety, cyber-security or big masses of people.

As opposed to the above sources of insecurity, the second type of security concerns, which has been described as "rather abstract and unrelated to the everyday routines of mundane life"⁶⁴ in the previous ASSR, refer to sources of insecurity that are more related to events or situations that – if materialising – might have negative consequences for their personal future. As referred to already in the last year's report, apart from those immediate security considerations citizens have to cope with in their mundane lives, individuals tend to develop certain "future scenarios"⁶⁵ that might jeopardise their personal future. When looking through the interviews a quite broad range of such scenarios can be found, which are stressed by the respondents as particular sources of insecurity for their personal future. These scenarios vary strongly in terms of abstractness, ranging from more plausible considerations related to job security or health issues, to rather dystopian models, such as an outbreak of a third world war or nuclear threats. Building upon observations made already within the last year's report, what these insecurity scenarios may, nevertheless, have in common is that they seem to emanate "from a common basis of a generalized and probably increasing unpredictability of life trajectories."⁶⁶ As described in the last year's report, such an increase of unpredictability can be linked to – what Zygmund Bauman has described as – a "liquefaction" of contemporary societies.⁶⁷

In the following paragraphs we want to highlight some of the most recurrent examples of such future scenarios that can be encountered when looking across the interviews. To that end, particular emphasis will be put on three broader categories of future scenarios of insecurity, which in part build upon observation already made in the previous sections of the present chapter. In this context, we will elaborate on health-related scenarios of insecurity, economic scenarios of insecurity and political scenarios of insecurity. This allows for a first systematisation of this particular dimension of mundane security discourses. What can be inferred from the interviews is that such future scenarios

⁶² See Source Del 3.4: 50ff.

⁶³ Source Del 3.4: 55.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Source Del 3.4: 55.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Bauman, Zygmunt, 2000, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge UK, Polity Press.

are, however, not deliberately construed among individuals and therefore certainly not detached from the current public discourses on the political and economical situation. As already noticed in the previous report, a “semantic or cognitive linkage of security discourses”⁶⁸ can be observed, insofar as such individual scenarios of insecurity are fuelled by the current political and public debate. With that said, the development of scenarios of potential future security threats appear to be primarily influenced by both biographic circumstances of the respondents (e.g. advanced age, legal status, socio-economic situation) and by current political and public debates on particular security-related issues (e.g. Euro-crises, Ukraine conflict, terrorist-threats, refugee crisis).

Health-related scenarios

When asked about circumstances or events that would affect their personal future, one of the most common topics that can be found in the interviews can be brought together under the category of health-related concerns. This category of security threats relates to the health conditions of the respondents themselves or their close relatives and encompasses a broad range of concrete health-related scenarios developed by the respondents along the lines of their particular socio-economic and biographic circumstances. Such health-related scenarios range from life-threatening or chronic diseases, to lethal or severe accidents (e.g. plane crashes), serious medical interventions, permanent occupational disability, the need-for-care, or deaths of family members or closely associated persons. What strikes the eye is that such health-related security threats appear to be primarily interlinked with economic considerations, as made explicit by a one respondent as follows: *“Money and health go hand in hand: without a good health you don't get money and without money you cannot guarantee your health.”* (Respondent NO.5, male, 60 y.o., Moroccan, receives disability benefits) Consequently, many respondents consider a well-functioning health system and public health infrastructure as important security factors that play a decisive role to mitigate feelings of insecurity. Similarly to what has already been noticed with regard to economic security in general, the importance of the state becomes also evident with regard to health-related sources of insecurity. In its role as the main provider of a social-safety net, the state is explicitly highlighted by some respondents as stabilizing factor for their personal future.

Economic scenarios

A second category of scenarios developed by respondents when asked about potential sources of insecurity for their personal future relates to economic and financial conditions. It is, in particular, the loss of job or the refusal or withdrawal of social benefits and allowance schemes (e.g. disability

⁶⁸ Source Del 3.4: 50.

benefits or pension, elderly allowance) that appeared to be of most concern in this respect. As already detailed in chapter 7.2, job security and financial stability in general have almost commonly been brought forward, in some way or other, as a particularly decisive factor of security. More abstract scenarios stressed by some respondents refer to the risk of hyper-inflation, the total breakdown of financial markets and the (creeping) erosion of standards of social protection of welfare systems in the wake of the economic crisis. Especially among young university students, young professions or job-seekers, it is the rise of pressure of the employment markets, increasing difficulties to find a job and uncertainties with regard to the maintenance of the intergenerational contract that gives particularly grave cause for concern with regard to the personal future.

Political scenarios

Global political Developments as sources of insecurity

Further scenarios that can be encountered when looking across the interviews are more related to political developments, both at the global sphere as well as on the national level. With regard to global political developments in general, a preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from the interviews so far is that war and military conflicts do apparently not play a significant role for citizens' daily security considerations. As compared to the current global political environment, the overall perception among respondents appears to be thoroughly positive, insofar as the six countries, in which interview partners have been recruited, are generally regarded as peaceful and safe. A few respondents (especially from Slovakia), however, have indicated that the Ukraine conflict and the allegedly "expansionary" Russian foreign policy in this context, to certain degree, cause feelings of unease, rather than constituting a immediate source of insecurity. This might be partly explained by the temporal concurrence of some interviews and the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis on the one hand. On the other hand a general political mistrust in post-soviet countries (such as Slovakia) with Russian politics can, to some extent, be regarded as a reflection of socio-cultural specificities that stem from collective historical background experiences in these transition countries. In a few other cases, tendencies of global political destabilisation and intensification of military conflicts have been mentioned as something that might affect their personal future. In very few extreme cases, respondents have even stated that they are concerned about an potential outbreak of a third world war. However, when looking across all interviews one of the most common answers given by respondents when asked about the impact of global political developments on the individual perception of security is that they, albeit being informed about and aware of such events through the media, do not really think about it. Interestingly, respondents indicate recurrent explanations and strategies of how to cope with global politics as a potential source of insecurity. Avoid thinking about such events and not allowing oneself being worried about seem to be, in one way or other, a internalised mechanism of reducing complexity of the everyday life. Accordingly, one respondent stated: *"There are so many things going on around the world and it is too much for me to handle. It is enough to be concerned about the things happening in Norway. You cannot walk around and be*

worried about everything. I have chosen not to think about it." (Respondent, NO.7, male, 56 y.o., unemployed & addict) In explaining the relatively ease stance towards potential insecurities deriving from overall global political developments, some respondents have also referred to political disinterest and/or lack of information. While it can be concluded that global political developments in general does not seem to constitute a particular security concern for citizens in their daily walks of life, internal peace and the absence of armed conflicts has been explicitly referred to in some cases as an essential factor of security, especially among refugees from politically unstable regions (e.g. Somalia).

Terrorism

A slightly less clear picture must be drawn when it comes to terrorism and the question as to the extent to which terrorist attacks might have an impact on individual security considerations. Considering the above mentioned interdependence of public security discourses and private security considerations, it can be inferred from the interviews that "terrorism" as a potential source of insecurity constitutes a particularly illustrative example. Especially after events, such as those happened in Paris in November 2015 and the increased political and public attention on counter-terrorism activities in the aftermath of these events, "terrorist-threats" seems to reoccur as a prevailing security concern among respondents. Accordingly, especially in the few interviews⁶⁹ that have been conducted shortly after the terrorist attacks in Paris and certainly fuelled by the increased medial attention, the latent threat of Islamist-motivated terrorism is almost commonly referred to as a source of insecurity among the respondents. In this respect, however, it must be mentioned that the vast majority of interviews have been conducted before the most recent events. It is therefore hard to predict the extent to which the current debate concerning terrorist threat in Europa may have a lasting effect on the citizens' individual security considerations. However, given the fact that religiously (but also politically) motivated terrorism in Europe is not a new phenomenon but have been occurred repeatedly in irregular intervals in the last two decades⁷⁰, it might be safe to assume that the these later interviews may only provide a (non-representative) temporary atmospheric picture that strongly reflects the prevailing motifs of the current public security discourse.

To the extent to which this assumption is to be considered reasonable, it can be concluded that general impressions that can be gained on the basis of those interviews, which had been conducted before the unfold of the most recent public debate on the heightened terrorist threat in Europe, may draw a less biased and more accurate picture regarding the impact of terrorism on mundane security considerations of lay citizens. With that said, the general impressions that can be inferred when looking through the overall sample may, therefore, constitute a valid starting point for discussing the question as to the extent to which terrorism constitute a particular source of insecurity for citizens in their daily walks of life. Without offering empirical evidence for representative conclusions with regard to this question, a first general impression that can be gained is that in the vast majority of

⁶⁹ These include 7 qualitative interviews with UK citizens (primarily young University students).

⁷⁰ Recurrent reference has been made to a number of events that happened in the last two decades: "9/11", "London bombings" 2005, "Breivik" 2011, "Charlie Hebdo" 2015.

cases terrorism does usually not constitute a predominant aspect in mundane security discourses. A general conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the interviews conducted thus far is that most respondents do not consider terrorism as an immediate threat to perceived security. Although most of the respondents are certainly aware of the possibility that such terrorist attacks may happen “anywhere at anytime”, it seems, when looking across the interviews, that this does not have particular negative consequence for their daily routines of life. As one young respondent from the Netherlands stated, *“there is always a risk of being at the wrong place at the wrong time, but I do not have fear that I’ll be a victim of a terrorist attack.”* (Respondent NL.5, male, 25 y.o., higher vocational degree, employee) This seems to be a relatively widespread attitude among respondents. Similarly to what has been observed with regard to potential threats deriving from global political developments in general, recurrent explanations brought forward in this respect primarily build upon very practical considerations. In this respect, it has frequently been pointed out by respondents that “terrorism” constitutes a “too abstract” phenomenon or is “too unlikely” to be physically affected by. Furthermore, when it comes to security considerations related to global political developments, such as armed conflict and terrorism, “geographical proximity” appears to be a quite decisive and frequently referred to reference criterion. As regards the question as to the extent to which military conflicts and/or terrorism have an effect on the respondents' perceived security, a large number of respondents has indicated that such events are “too far away” and therefore plays only a minor role in everyday life. This can be illustrated with the following exemplary statement brought forward by one respondent: *“All these things happen in other countries. After Paris I was a bit scared because it is so close to England, but I feel like future attacks will happen in London and I don't really go there too often.”* (Respondent UK.1, female, 18 y.o., student) Accordingly, it may be assumed that potential sources of insecurity that stem from overall global political developments in general manifest themselves in the daily walks of life individuals only to the extent to which such events are considered as “close” enough in physical terms.

Typical coping strategies that can be encountered within the interviews when it comes to scenarios related the latent threat of terrorism, primarily stem from respondents' recognition of the own powerlessness, the limited influence over his/her destiny, and the lack of control over such happenings. In some cases (especially among Slovakian respondents), reference has also been made to the minor role the home country allegedly plays in the arena of world politics, which would make it arguably a less likely target for terrorist attacks.

What further strikes the eye is that even among those respondents that expressed particular concerns with regard to the latent threat of Islamist-motivated terrorism (especially in those interviews conducted shortly after the most recent events in Paris), such terrorism-related feelings of insecurity does seemingly not impose particularly negative (or at least only minor) consequences for the respondent's daily walks of life. Since these later interviews have primarily covered young university students from the UK, many of the respondents have stressed that, while they mostly feel secure at their usual environment, they primarily consider European metropolises (and London in particular) as potential targets of terrorist attacks. In the light of the most recent events, some of the interview partners stated that they consider it now more risky to go to London and are, therefore, trying to avoid crowded venues, such as train stations, airports or shopping malls. What might be



concluded is, that, although especially after events such as those happened in Paris, “terrorism” certainly reappeared as a dominant topic in mundane security discourses, this, however, seems to be of only temporary nature with having only minor consequences for the daily routines of individuals. With regard to previous islamist-motivated terrorist-attacks in Europe one respondent from the UK pointed out in this respect: *“If you remember the London bombings, sure, people feared going to London for a few weeks or months but after a while we just forget about this threat and get on with our everyday lives, the effect of fear leaves our minds and we just keep going.”* (Respondent UK.4, male, 48 y.o., employee)

Internal political developments

With regard to internal political developments, a number of recurrent scenarios of insecurity can be encountered in the interviews, which partly resonate with the prevailing topics of current policy and medial discourses. As already observed in the last years report⁷¹, a particular illustrative example of how a “semantic or cognitive linkage” of public security discourses and individual perceptions of mundane insecurity can be established, can be found when it comes to the topic of migration. The interviews reveal that “migration” seems to occur as source of insecurity in various ways, which to some extent reflect the current political and public debate on topics such as the “economic crisis”, the “refugee crisis” and the “threat of terrorism”. What can be observed when looking across the interviews is that there are basically two types of scenarios of insecurity that relate to aspects of migration. The first type of scenarios are closely linked to the above observations on terrorism-related scenarios of insecurity and primarily consists of concerns that derive from prejudices and generalisation made by the respondents with regard to incoming Muslim refugees and the alleged increase of terrorist threats. Very strikingly, this can be observed when looking through the few interviews that have taken place shortly after the islamist-motivated attacks in Paris, where the incoming refugees are almost commonly considered as a potential security threat. These interviews show very clearly how prevailing public and political discourses on “refugee crisis”, “Islamic State” or “increase of threat of terrorist attacks in Europe” are adopted in mundane security discourses of lay citizens.

A second bundle of recurrent concerns that can be found in the interviews relates to scenarios which primarily draw upon images of “excessive immigration” which threatens the cultural, social and economic order of the host country. The fear of a creeping cultural infiltration by Muslim immigrants and the displacement of the (liberal) value system of the host societies are explicitly or implicitly referred to in some cases as a source of insecurity. This is closely interlinked with assertions concerning failed integration process of certain ethnic minorities (e.g. Moroccans in the Netherlands) which has also been articulated in a few interviews. Apart from such perceived cultural discrepancies that have been stressed in some interviews as source of security relevant concern, migration has also occurred in some interviews as source of threats that are more related to economic and social aspects. In this respect, some respondents have expressed worries about the allegedly liberal

⁷¹ See Source Del 3.4: 50.



immigration policies and the perceived high inflow of refugees that might put the host country's economy and employment market under pressure.

When asked about particular ethnic groups that might create feelings of insecurity, a number of interviews can be found in which immigrants or a particular ethnic community are explicitly named as a source of insecurity. Concerns expressed in this respect manifest themselves in feelings of unease, mistrustful or rejectionist attitudes towards migrants and openly xenophobic and racist statements. Particular ethnic communities that have been recurrently referred to by these respondents include Muslims, immigrants of Moroccan origin, Eastern Europeans and especially roma people, migrants from Somalia or Africa in general. Considering the specificities of the composition of sample, it is hardly possible to identify a particular group of respondents that appears to be most or least rejectionist towards migrants. The interviews reveal, however, a clear tendency according to which rejectionist or hostile attitudes towards migrants in general or particular ethnic groups seem to be particularly pronounced where the general level of perceived mundane security appears to be comparatively low. In contrast, where the overall perception of individual security is rather high, resentments against particular ethnic groups seem to emerge to a significantly lesser extent. Furthermore, it seems that where close personal ties are established and maintained between people with different cultural or ethnic backgrounds, there tend to be less breeding ground for mistrust or xenophobic prejudices. This can be illustrated by the following example: *"I work with people from so many nations and cultures. There are many people that generalize and think that certain groups of people are just the same but that's wrong. You can't think that one Norwegian guy is representable for the whole group of Norwegians. All people are different from each other and if someone makes you feel insecure it rather depends of the specific person than the general group perception."* (Respondent NO.20, male, 30-35 y.o., inmate)

Further recurrent political scenarios that can be encountered in the interviews are related to the perceived creeping radicalisation of the political climate through right-wing extremism and the constant rise of right-wing populist parties (political rabble-rouser). While this threat appears to be particularly prominent among academically educated persons and students from both Germany and Austria, evidence can also be found when looking through the dutch interviews. To a lesser extent, mention has also be made of a certain rise of authoritarian tendencies and the expansion of the surveillance state as a potential source of insecurity with regard to the individual future. Interestingly, a few respondents have indicated that getting into problems with the police ("being arrested") or with judicial authorities without one's fault constitutes an event that would jeopardize their personal future. Fear for detention or deportation appeared to be a particular determinant factor for daily security considerations of especially unregistered refugees in the Netherlands or foreign sex workers in Norway.

Concluding remarks

It was the aim of the present section to provide some preliminary insights into the complex universe of “mundane security” discourses on the basis of the empirical material that has been gathered through 92 qualitative interviews conducted in six different European countries. The broad sample of respondents, including people from all ages with a particularly strong focus on marginalized groups (e.g. homeless, refugees, addicts, etc.), provided the basis to gain some valuable insights on how security is perceived and understood by lay citizens in their daily walks of life. On the basis of the empirical material obtained, we have systematized security considerations referred to in the interviews in order to identify prevailing dimensions of mundane security discourses. This allowed us not only to trace possible semantic interdependencies between public and private security discourses but also to draw certain demarcation lines in this respect.

As the above analysis has revealed, there are a number of prevailing topics of mundane security discourses that have almost commonly been occurred in the interviews in some way or the other. In this respect, particular mention is to be made of aspects of economic and financial security as well as health-related considerations of security. Alongside aspects that we have subsumed under the category of “ecological security”, economic as well as health-related issues appeared to be very prominent topics when asked about the concrete meaning of security for the daily lives of the respondents. It has further been illustrated in the above analysis that dimensions identified in the empirical material at hand may manifest themselves in both feelings of security as well as feelings of insecurity. For example, public authorities and the state have been referred to in the interviews as both a potential or actual source of insecurity as well as a major provider of security for the daily or future live. This, to some extent, may depend on socio-economical as well as biographic circumstances of individuals. A quite clear picture could be drawn when it comes to “family and friends” as a particular dimension of mundane security discourses. Here it has clearly been shown that family and, in more general terms, social networks are quite commonly considered as a key factor of stabilisation in mundane lives of the respondents and therefore play a decisive role in providing security. The above analysis has also revealed that mundane security discourses encompasses a wide range of concerns that draw upon both perceived immediate risks in daily walks of life and rather abstract sources of insecurity. Whereas the former group of concerns expressed by respondents throughout the interviews comprises typical security concerns individuals have to cope with in their daily walks of life, it is especially this second category of lay citizens' security.

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Societal Security Online Survey

Results from the online survey addressing societal security issues are integrated into the annual report now for the second time. The SSOS has been developed in autumn of 2014 including a pre test phase, which was used to adapt the structure and wording for the targeted audiences. While this quantitative survey is not aiming at an adequate representation of European citizens, which the limited resources of this project do not allow for, it is targeting specific groups that are of particular concern. (See SOURCE D3.4.). Distribution of the survey started in January 2015 and has been continuously active since. The distribution was launched via the project's and partners' websites, associated websites and blogs, e-mail lists and social media (Table). While there was an initial peak in the first two months after launching the survey, the responses have since come in steadily each month (Table). After starting out with 5 languages in the initial phase, within the first months more translations could be secured resulting in 11 languages available since (Table). Survey structure and topics. The survey comprises of 20 questions and takes between 15 to 25 minutes to complete.

Methodology

- Targeted audiences approach (experts, NGOs, marginalised groups)
- Covering issues of personal, societal importance and satisfaction, satisfaction and trust in public services, future outlook of EU, safety and security feelings, national goals for the future
- Until December 2015: n=424 responses
- Comprehensive overview of all survey data analysed can be found in the appendix

Table: Responses per month

<i>Month 2015</i>	<i>Total</i>
01	9
02	211
03	166
04	4
05	4
06	5
07	8
08	5
09	7
10	4
12	1
Total	424

Table: Available languages (URL):

<i>Language</i>	<i>URL</i>
English	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-en
Arabic	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-ar
Dutch	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-nl
French	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-fr
German	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-de
Norwegian	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-nn
Persian	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-fa
Slovak	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-sk
Spanish	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-es
Swedish	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-sv
Turkish	http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/211226/lang-tr


Table: Dissemination strategy

<i>Media</i>	<i>Frequently mentioned</i>
Project website	societal-security.net ;
Partner website	VICESSE; PRIO; TNO; other University
Associated website/blog	criminologia.de ; jurablogs.de ; securepartn.eu ; surveillance-studies.org ; armutskonferenz.at ; biss.at ; CEPS; pronachbar.at
Social media	Twitter, Facebook
E-mail (list or direct)	COST Liss; ENW; SSN

Socio-demographic information


We collected a couple of standard socio-demographic data in our survey to control for the social composition of our sample. At this stage it is still biased in some dimensions as can be seen in the tables below (most significantly Education and Nationality, while Gender and Age could secure a reasonable diversity). This is due to the fact that we started with exploit our own networks (including the Source consortium and expert database) first and hence the results from this first wave came in first and are considered in the analysis. But looking at the current returns the bias needs to be further addressed in the next survey dissemination phase.

Figure: Gender




Source: SOURCE SSOS. VICESSE 2015. n=424.

The present sample shows an even gender balance, with half of the respondents being and male and female respectively (see figures in the appendix).



The age bias that we interpret as over representation of students in the sample as it stands now is reflected in the distribution of educational levels. Here we find a non-representative number of respondents with a university degree (BA, MA, PhD and beyond). Again this may be due to our


approach in the very first weeks addressing the colleagues from the consortium and asking them to activate their professional networks for the distribution of the online survey.



As already mentioned above the sample at the present stage displays a geographical bias due to the fact that we started to exploit our own networks and the SOURCE consortium networks for a first round of recruiting respondents. The highest numbers of respondents come from German speaking countries (Austria, Germany) and the Netherlands and/or hold a passport from these countries.


Education

- University degree (MA)
- University degree (BA)
- Vocational certificate
- No certificate
- University degree (PhD) and equivalent
- Secondary degree (12y)
- Secondary degree (10y)




Civil status

- single
- married/living together
- divorced/living separately
- widowed



Country of residence


- Austria
- Germany
- The Netherlands
- Slovakia
- Norway
- Sweden
- United Kingdom
- Belgium
- France
- Ireland
- Spain



The majority of our respondents live in an urban environment, with a fifth coming from smaller towns and rural areas as can be seen in the chart below.

Size of residential area


- between 50.000 and 100.000 inhabitants
- between 100.000 and 250.000 inhabitants
- between 250.000 and 500.000 inhabitants
- between 500.000 and 1.000.000 inhabitants
- more than 1.000.000 inhabitants
- between 10.000 and 50.000 inhabitants
- less than 10.000 inhabitants




Societal Security

We asked respondents to rank a number of items with regard to personal importance and societal relevance and also asked them to judge their own situation with regard to some of these items (such as physical health, financial situation, personal job situation, etc.)

A large majority of the respondents opted for what could be called a “civil” approach to tackle societal security problems, putting budget expenditures for education, social security and public infrastructure in the top ranks.




It should be noted though that numbers still are relatively small and the sample, as shown in the previous section, is biased. It should also be noted that survey data are constructed as snapshots and it is difficult to control for the impact of spectacular events. Evidence for such impacts with regard to public discourse and also public opinion was presented in the previous chapters and has to be taken into account. Aiming at stable attitudes and latent patterns as explanatory level as much of survey research entails the risk of producing trivial abstract concept with little discursive or ecological validity.



Also the high rankings for happiness in life and friends resonates well with the first interview findings, where respondents referred to a functioning social network as one of the important factors for their feeling of security – or the other way round: losing friends or having major conflicts with friends was considered as an event that could substantially affect personal feelings of security.


At the same time, only a small number of respondents were very satisfied with the performance of civil services in their countries, although taking the first two positive categories (very satisfied and moderately satisfied) together, all public services except for the Pension system, public authorities and the national government score above 50% positive responses. Also the educational system receives only moderate scores. We will have to go into a deeper analysis once we have broadened

our database. At this stage we assume the low scores for these public services can be accounted for by the specific composition of the sample underlying the analysis.



When looking at the ratings for trust, the political institutions (national government and political parties) score even worse. The same is true for media.


When looking at the responses relating to personal feelings of insecurity and concerns about future development in the European Union, we find on the one hand the typical distribution from fear of crime surveys, but on the other hand relatively high scores for (in-)security on the Internet (identity theft named as an example in the survey) and also for concerns relating privacy infringements by public and private predators. This again should be seen against the background of our sample where we at this stage most probably have a relatively high number of respondents who are familiar with, and aware of, the problematic of cyber-security, privacy infringement and data-protection.



Given the political situation at the time when we designed the survey and selected items for concern at the European level we included the Ukraine crisis. This item received high scores. We assume this is due to the fact that the events in this area since the beginning of 2015 received broad media coverage and this coverage presented the situation in very dramatizing terms.

Given the developments this year within the EU (see media coverage) the survey proves not the best instrument to address the changing issues. While items like “socio-economical inequalities” or “financial crisis” do still apply currently, it is a weakness in respect to addressing the evolving issues of the day, while others might seem increasingly outdated. But this is itself a hint on the short lived cycle of some of the macro-issues and larger-than life threats of the day.

Concerns about future developments in the EU



Security Expert Online Survey

In this year's societal security survey we added security experts as a new group to collect a perspective not considered last year. The idea behind this extension was to get an idea about the array of security problems that are not fit for breaking media news (except in cases of catastrophic events). Some of these problems rarely catch the attention of a general public because they are either of an invisible nature, as e.g. attacks on cyber infrastructures or produce effects only in long time scales, such as e.g. environmental or socio-cultural problems.

To collect experts' opinions in different fields we developed a survey sent out by e-mail to 980 individuals in October 2015. The survey was made available in German, French and English. The text of the survey is attached in the appendix.

The sample of experts was compiled from different sources such as webpages of relevant institutions and commercial companies or publicly available lists of security experts (e.g. the list of reviewers for the European security research programme). These experts came from different disciplines, covering a wide array of security relevant fields. The categories in the table below are based on the self-description available on webpages from 622 individuals addressed.

Environment	81
Finance	50
Socioeconomic	21
Logistics	18
Energy	12
Physical Infrastructure	19
Food	92
Cyber	36
Health	135
Policy	82
Press	2
Energy Policy	10
Energy	2
Economics, Energy and Environment	4
Economics	34
Economics	4
Finance	1
Health	1
Security	13
Health and Food	1
Beverage	1
Industry	2
Global Safety and Security	1

We received about 50 written responses to the survey from across Europe and 3 from non-European countries. Complementing the written responses a small number (n=10) of explorative interviews was conducted.⁷² Given the small numbers of responses we refrain from a detailed statistical analysis of the data received in this survey and provide a narrative account of the results. The over 70 security problems addressed by the experts can be put in different categories such as threats relating to

- ICT-systems and cyber infrastructure
- Ecological and environmental problems
- Problems of governance
- Health problems
- Problems to handle violent conflicts
- Others (including problems of financial systems)

Experts were asked to name security relevant events and future security threats and to assess the adequacy of reactions, policies for mitigation and prevention from their professional point of view. We also asked them to assess the level of public awareness in general and with a specific focus on the relevant policy actors, responsible for running and maintaining vulnerable systems (including “socio-cultural systems” like urban conglomerates).

There was a general agreement among the experts that most present-day security problems are of a global nature, even in those cases where they produce immediate effects only locally. The global dimension is a consequence of the interconnectedness of critical infrastructures (such as energy, communication or industrial production with extended global supply chains) or global mobility (such as migration from the Global South to Europe). Given this global dimension, adequate reactions require cooperation across national borders and jurisdictions. It is important to distinguish between proximate strategies and global policies. While local or national authorities or system providers may develop adequate strategies to react to ensuing threats and vulnerabilities, in most cases they cannot address what experts identify as the “root causes” of the problems.

Many of the experts pointed to the underlying problem of governance in this context: although national institutions may have the power to design policies in their jurisdiction, there is a lack of global (trans-national, inter-continental) governance structures to effectively address global security problems. This was exemplified for cases like urban riots and ethnic conflicts in local neighbourhoods

⁷² These interviews were conducted by partners TNO and VICESSE with experts based in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands

but also for climate change and energy supply, producing local effects in a global context. While social worker in a mixed-ethnic urban neighbourhood may launch strategies to appease social conflicts among different groups, they will neither be able to address underlying economic inequalities, nor will they be in the position to change global push and pull factors fuelling migration. Against this background, the idea of resilience was introduced as the proper strategy to tackle security problems. When root causes of a global nature cannot be tackled then the second-best option is to strengthen the capabilities of local systems to “bounce back” in case of a security situation.

A rather critical position was taken by many of the respondents towards the institutional and organisational capacity of relevant actors to address security threats. This critique was spelled out in a number of dimensions. Profit-oriented organisations consider security problems as a cost category to be weighed against other types of costs. A typical case is security in large public transport systems. Here one of the main problems on a daily basis is to keep the system running and maintain a high level of usability for a large number of passengers, especially during rush hour. Introducing security measures can interfere with smooth operation and usability and hence such measures often are considered lower ranking by management.

Linked to this organisational ignorance towards security problems is the prevailing incentive structure in many corporations. Security measures and policies are considered as unproductive, creating no added value, while they are targeted at low probability events and situations that may occur some time in a distant future. An option to change such an incentive structure is seen by experts in adapting the legal framework, i.e. to make security procedures not only a legal requirement but also to change litigation law to raise the costs for corporations when they have to compensate for damage caused by a security relevant event.

The bigger an organisation, the harder it is to integrate and implement policies targeting security threats. This organisational immobility is seen as a major problem of large public bureaucracies operating in a legalistic formal framework. Here the problem, that Ulrich Beck famously termed “organized irresponsibility” prevails.

Last not least many organisations lack the cognitive capacity and/or awareness to understand the dynamics of cascading effects triggered by local events. Here many experts were very critical about the inter-organisational cooperation among different types of so-called first responders involved in security relevant events. What also often seems to be lacking is a willingness to seriously engage in foresight activities. Many of the current security problems emerge out of new techno-social-cultural and environmental global constellations. These new threats often require new strategies of reaction and cannot be addressed with entrenched routines. They also have to be seen within a longer time horizon to understand the dynamics of complex systems (i.e. systems running smoothly over a long time until one parameter reaches a certain threshold leading to a collapse of the system).

Another problem frequently mentioned by experts from different domains is the discrepancy between abstract emergency planning and operational capacities of organisations. While all relevant organisations have drafted comprehensive written manuals to deal with hazards, attacks or

accidents, there is considerable doubt whether the technical requirements in the scenarios envisaged in these manuals can be met. Technical equipment or adequate human resources (including training of personnel) may be lacking and contingency plans may not live up to the requirements in real time situations.

When looking at the experts' assessment of the adequacy of reactions during or after prior security relevant events (attacks, malfunctions, accidents, etc.) a majority of the responses was rather critical. Only 25 % of respondents rated the reaction of relevant institutions/actors after a crisis situation as strong and. One half of the respondents saw no or only a very limited reactions following an incident. While security relevant events seem to substantially raise the awareness for future crises and problems, policies, technologies and regulations are in many cases not adjusted after the event. The situation seems to be the same across all domains (from cyber to public health security). As detailed in the interviews very often a security relevant event can trigger hectic activities but this is rarely transposed into a long-term sustainable change of operational procedures. Although such events would provide opportunities for organizational learning (through thorough evaluation and post-hoc assessment of reactions) such opportunities are seldom taken. Reactions frequently remain at the "symbolic" level, demonstrating activity and assuring the relevant public that something is done.

This points to the problem of organizational accountability. Some of the events described by the experts could have been managed without major damage if intervention had taken place at an early stage. Accidents, attacks and malfunctions often unfold as time-critical and path-dependent processes, i.e. intervention at $t(n)$ could prevent greater damage at $t(n+x)$. However, an early preventative activity often involves intervention into a running system (e.g. shutting down an Underground line of a metropolitan transport system after early albeit ambiguous warning signs of a poison gas attack are recorded in the control centre). Taking such a decision is the task of high-level management, while relevant data and information are processed at the level of field operatives. This may create problems since organization members at lower ranks pass the decision on to higher levels to follow formal procedures of internal decision-making. Assessing the hazardousness of a hazard always involves decisions under uncertainty and uncertainty is the *horror vacui* of any organization. Experts here referred to an underdeveloped risk culture of organizations.

The problem of path dependency not only haunts organisations operating closely connected techno-social systems, it also applies to many other policy fields. A recent example is provided by the so-called "refugee crisis". A number of precautions could have been taken (and were suggested by a wide array of experts repeatedly) to prevent mass migration from the Global South and other crisis regions. These warning voices went unheard leading to the present situation where ad-hoc uncoordinated emergency measures have to be taken to handle the problems of managing huge numbers of migrants. Taking a look at the recent – and previous – financial crises a similar situation can be found. Early warning signs, some weak, other strong, had been pointed out, but no reactions by institutions in charge of managing the global financial system were taken.

Last not least many experts pointed to the need for further research across the different domains of security problems. While some of these problems are known, obvious and strategies to handle them are available (although not always properly implemented for a number of reasons), others are not

very well understood and require more research. Two frequently mentioned domains where increased research would be needed are the domain of cyber-security, where protective measures are under-developed and the problems of implementation of security policies, i.e. the problem of getting good ideas to work effectively on ground level.

The overall assessment of experts shows a mixed picture. In the face of a myriad of present and future security problems in different domains the evaluation of institutional reactions or preparedness receives very mixed results. Traditional physical security problems (from flooding to pandemics) are addressed and understood but the more threats become virtual, intangible and global, creating detrimental effects over a longer period of time, preparedness and understanding are lacking. Relating the results of the expert survey to the other security discourses covered in this deliverable it becomes obvious that a large number of threats go unnoticed in media discourse and public perception. At the same time the experts' assessment demonstrates that some of the security threats, scoring high in public debate are overrated with regard to their threat potential, while others are completely ignored. Balancing these discursive arenas is a challenge and requires efforts at different levels.

Appendix

Twitter

Table: Frequency of indicative keywords

	Keyword						
Apr-15	security	threat	terror	crime	crisis	justice	migration
2015-04-07	800	199	139	176	261	224	23
2015-04-09	311	120	100	157	138	166	15
2015-04-10	241	66	109	160	169	186	33
2015-04-11	208	70	67	99	158	189	9
2015-04-12	176	42	47	77	103	89	7
2015-04-13	312	81	58	109	175	243	15
2015-04-14	368	77	115	143	234	180	23
2015-04-15	307	64	96	154	193	184	14
2015-04-16	310	85	112	146	183	252	19
2015-04-17	372	132	115	195	212	294	21
2015-04-20	321	92	185	185	292	200	54
2015-04-21	184	93	74	96	228	109	29
2015-04-22	746	77	106	154	187	174	47
2015-04-23	289	85	127	159	253	136	37
2015-04-25	121	28	43	62	116	73	10
2015-04-26	92	34	53	79	95	83	9
2015-04-27	232	82	75	125	189	154	15
2015-04-28	297	63	78	219	248	322	31
2015-04-29	231	80	70	326	198	202	80
2015-04-30	233	83	104	166	170	190	14
Total	6151	1653	1873	2987	3802	3650	505

Table: Frequency of indicative keywords

	Keywords						
May-15	security	threat	terror	crime	crisis	justice	migration
2015-05-01	185	60	84	209	138	857	11
2015-05-02	117	82	87	155	102	137	12
2015-05-03	95	65	69	95	106	108	10
2015-05-04	256	185	100	154	202	178	13
2015-05-05	232	70	100	143	149	144	20
2015-05-06	161	63	54	135	108	191	12
2015-05-07	91	32	24	61	64	83	7
2015-05-08	106	49	36	82	87	111	6
2015-05-11	108	32	46	51	78	176	14
2015-05-12	130	40	64	60	73	70	16

2015-05-13	122	20	68	55	62	127	22
2015-05-14	262	109	143	175	248	189	17
2015-05-15	248	91	154	114	195	155	15
2015-05-18	370	74	171	199	252	310	23
2015-05-19	331	57	142	174	285	171	22
2015-05-20	271	106	124	188	204	170	25
2015-05-21	332	113	203	237	273	177	183
2015-05-22	248	57	146	123	176	189	26
2015-05-25	224	96	167	131	194	146	11
2015-05-26	224	89	168	130	171	162	25
2015-05-27	342	77	191	164	177	354	33
2015-05-28	200	77	87	115	146	150	12
2015-05-29	319	194	153	161	230	215	15
Total	4974	1838	2581	3111	3720	4570	550

Table: Frequency of indicative keywords

	Keyword						
Jun-15	security	threat	terror	crime	crisis	justice	migration
2015-06-01	295	65	64	132	178	175	10
2015-06-02	315	76	69	118	161	137	19
2015-06-03	286	81	72	153	208	163	13
2015-06-05	207	61	42	114	113	110	12
2015-06-08	410	67	80	149	192	163	14
2015-06-09	309	77	88	172	208	175	10
2015-06-10	390	114	136	166	198	219	32
2015-06-11	340	71	89	119	157	221	14
2015-06-12	312	61	104	115	220	198	12
2015-06-15	270	56	63	155	154	234	19
2015-06-16	430	128	110	218	281	236	18
2015-06-17	330	76	71	133	234	139	16
2015-06-18	585	143	246	849	516	399	61
2015-06-19	469	54	78	179	238	213	36
2015-06-25	270	94	78	145	249	161	48
2015-06-26	517	131	669	260	363	275	50
2015-06-29	422	117	234	157	788	225	29
2015-06-30	400	110	225	189	499	197	24
Total	6557	1582	2518	3523	4957	3640	437

R analysis code

```
require(slam)
require(tm)

dataPath <- "data"
corpusFolder <- "corpa"
fnames <- dir(dataPath)
```



```

readData <- function(fname, fpath) {
  dat <- read.csv2(file.path(fpath, fname),
stringsAsFactors=FALSE)
  dat <- dat[nchar(dat$text) > 0, ]
  colsTxt <- "text"
  colsMeta <- names(dat)[colsTxt %in% names(dat)]
  corp <- Corpus(VectorSource(dat[,colsTxt]))
  for (cname in colsMeta){
    meta(corp, cname) <- dat[,cname]
  }
  corp
}

rmWords <- function(x) removeWords(x, stopwords())
asciiFy <- function(x) iconv(x, "utf8","ASCII//TRANSLIT")
letterFy <- function(x, replacement=' ')
gsub("[^[:alpha:][:space:]]", replacement, x)

b <- gsub(".csv$", "", fnames) %in% gsub(".rds$", "",
dir(corpusFolder))
todo <- fnames[!b]

for ( fname in todo ) {
  corp <- readData(fname, dataPath)

  clean <- list(content_transformer(tolower),
                stripWhitespace,
                rmWords,
                removePunctuation,
                removeNumbers)

  corp <- tm_map(corp, FUN = tm_reduce, tmFuns = clean)

  corpusName <- sprintf("%s/%s.rds", corpusFolder,
gsub("\\.csv$", "", fname))
  cat(corpusName, "\n")
  saveRDS(corp, file=corpusName)
}
require(slam)
require(tm)
require(stringi)

corpusFolder <- "corpa"
dtmFolder <- "dtms"
corpaNames <- dir(corpusFolder)

b <- gsub(".rds$$", "", corpaNames) %in% gsub("(^dtm_|.rds$$)",
"", dir(dtmFolder))
todo <- corpaNames[!b]

for (corpus in todo){
  corp <- readRDS(file=file.path(corpusFolder, corpus))
  ## create document term matrix

```



```
dtm <- DocumentTermMatrix(corp)
rownames(dtm) <- paste(substr(corpus, 1, 10), 1:dim(dtm)[1],
sep="_")
saveRDS(dtm, file.path(dtmFolder, sprintf("dtm_%s",
corpus)))
}
require(slam)
require(tm)
ls("package:tm")
require(stringi)

dtmFolder <- "dtms"
dtmNames <- dir(dtmFolder)
dtmPaths <- file.path(dtmFolder, dtmNames)

dtmBig <- readRDS(dtmPaths[1])
for (dtmName in dtmPaths[-1]){
  dtmBig <- c(dtmBig, readRDS(dtmName))
}

dim(dtm)
dim(dtmBig)
rm(dtm); gc()

saveRDS(dtmBig, file="bigDTM.rds")

require(slam)
require(tm)
require(stringi)

dtmPath <- "dtms"

dtm <- readRDS("bigDTM.rds")


## find frequent terms
findFreqTerms(dtm, lowfreq = 1000, highfreq = Inf)

## find associations
findAssocs(dtm, "security", 0.8)

## find keywords
keywords <- c("security", "threat", "...")
tmp <- dtm[row_sums(dtm[, keywords]) > 0, keywords]
head(as.matrix(tmp))
```

Wikipedia

For each key word a list of events and/or news items are identified accounting for the dynamic of the page visits. When reading the charts the difference in absolute numbers has to be taken into account.



28th February (Peak on 3rd, 9th, 11th, 16th March) Anniversary of annexation of Crimea, hence more articles, hence heightened interest.



6th January No single event identifiable

23rd January No single event identifiable

11th February Peace talks in Minsk come to a solution and ceasefire
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31435812>

18th February Ceasefire broken. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/us-accuses-russia-of-breaching-ukraine-ceasefire>


25th February Possibly, because Russian plans to split Ukraine predating the crisis emerged but also a number of other events. <http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-considered-to-split-ukraine-pre-revolution-2015-2?IR=T>



6th January Machete wielding man attacks security at New Orleans Airport
<http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/21/police-shoot-man-machete-new-orleans-international-airport>


21st March Security breach UK/TSA www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-32396803 /
<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/20/travel/airport-workers-security-screening/>

9th June TSA improvements <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/tsa-can-improve-airport-security-effectiveness/>




7th January Charlie Hebdo attacks

11th September 9/11 anniversary




No Single Event identifiable



21st January US Senate: Climate change is real and not a hoax.
<http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-senate-climate-hoax-20150121-story.html>


12th March http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/12/rick-scott-climate-change_n_6855006.html
Florida's Gov. Rick Scott bans using the words "climate change" and "global warming" in all official communications.



2nd February Probably a false positive due to sharing of the same name to an event by Central China Television


22nd May Probably because of footage of a cyclist dragging along a toddler in a hit and run.

13th August Probably because of footage of a man attacking a shopkeeper with a sword in Mumbai.




24th February Egypt Mubarak-era ministers Adly and Nazif acquitted for corruption

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31605959>




17th May Shootout between biker gangs in Texas or the announcement for the cast of TV-show American crime.

<http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/rival-motorcycle-gangs-behind-shooting-texas-restaurant-article-1.2225691>



26th January Federal Trade Commission warns of security issues with Internet of things.

<http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/f-t-c-calls-for-strong-data-and-privacy-protection-with-connected-devices/>




19th-22nd January Increased fighting in Donetsk <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30878406> ;
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30929344>

2nd August Football team Shakhtar Donetsk played in the UEFA League

1st September Maybe the denial of having plans to hold a referendum on joining the Russian federation by rebel leaders but there was also some fighting, and such rumors had been denied before with no heightened interest.

<http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/self-proclaimed-donetsk-republic-head-denies-plans-to-hold-referendum-on-joining-russia-396974.html>



20th / 21st January WHO declares West Africa to be Ebola free.

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/01/21/ebola-west-africa-outbreak/22100563/>


26th January Trials of a vaccine in West Africa.

<http://news.yahoo.com/liberia-ebola-vaccine-trial-challenging-cases-tumble-080236431--finance.html>

1st February News about the Trials in West Africa probably in conjunction with the recovery of Scottish nurse Pauline Cafferkey.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31087727>

<http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/local-news/ebola-nurse-pauline-cafferkey-praises-5066019>



Beginning of January: Two cases of Ebola in the UK and news about nurse Pauline Cafferkey, who had been infected with Ebola in West Africa.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/health-30657485>

<http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/latest-news/top-stories/two-patients-tested-for-deadly-ebola-at-leeds-hospital-1-7033983>

11th May Liberia declared Ebola free by WHO. (Despite all of West Africa declared free in January???)


<http://www.foxnews.com/health/2015/05/11/liberia-declared-ebola-free-but-outbreak-continues-over-border.html>

17th June Articles on studies about Ebola's genetic codes and Ebola survivors.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/ebola-genetic-code-analysed-evolution-worst-outbreak>

<http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/blood-sweat-tears-study-watch-ebola-survivors-n377256>

24th August Sierra Leone discharges last Ebola patient <http://www.bbc.com/news/health-34043795>



22nd January European Central Bank Stimulus Calls for 60 Billion Euros in Monthly Bond-Buying.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/business/european-central-bank-bond-buying.html>

18th March Protest at ECB HQ in Frankfurt.

<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/18/anti-capitalist-protesters-clash-police-ecb-frankfurt-hq>


6th July The Greeks had refused the bailout terms in a referendum the day before.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/06/world/europe/greek-referendum-debt-crisis-vote.html>

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/greek-bailout-referendum-ecb-says-no-new-emergency-funds-for-greek-banks-1.3139370>

9th September Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission delivered his state of the union, focusing on the refugee crisis but also mentioning the ECB among other things.

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm



Beginning of January up to 14th Leading up to a decision of the ECJ about the legality of “Outright Monetary Transactions” by the ECB to stabilize the Euro caused many articles, cumulating on the 14th with the news about the ECJ declaring such transaction legal.

<http://uk.businessinsider.com/ecj-decision-on-omt-legal-2015-1?IR=T>

24th April No single event identifiable


27th April No single event identifiable

10th September EJC decided workers without fixed offices should be paid for the journey time to and from their first and last customers.

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3482f4d0-57cc-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3rqdv0tcD>

23rd September An advisor of the EJC said the “Safe Harbour agreement” between the US and EU is invalid because of US surveillance.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/11884432/EUs-data-sharing-deal-with-US-is-invalid-European-Courts-Advocate-General-says.html>



Up until 25th February Discussions between Euro partners and Greece, leading to an agreement on for postponing debts for four months on the 25th.

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/72f18370-bd09-11e4-b523-00144feab7de.html#axzz3rqdv0tcD>

9th April Greece pays back a loan to the IMF.


<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11524082/Greece-prepares-to-pay-IMF-live.html>

28th May IMF considers Grexit a possibility.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11636411/IMF-openly-warns-of-Grexit-as-judgment-day-approaches.html>

6th July Varoufakis resigns

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33406001>



1st January Lithuania joins euro. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30635826>

Up until 25th February The Euro crisis in general, the weak Euro compared to Dollar, Pound and Yen, Postponing debts for four months on the 25th. Maybe also unveiling the new 20 € note.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11425594/Eurozone-crisis-Greece-at-point-of-being-asked-to-leave.html>

<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/grexistential-threat-euro-crisis-going-wire-1488357>

<http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/feb/16/greek-bailout-eurozone-ministers-hold-crunch-talks-live-updates>

1st March Dollar-Euro-rate reaches 11 year high.

<http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/01/dollar-near-11-yr-high-after-chinese-rate-cut-eyes-on-ecb.html>

16th March Heated discussion about Greece leaving the Euro.

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-15/germans-tired-of-greek-demands-want-country-to-exit-euro>


4th May No single event identifiable

20th May Further Euro drop against the USD.

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/euro-continues-to-fall-european-bonds-stocks-broadly-steady-1432108988>

6th July Varoufakis resigns

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33406001>



27th January Facebook went offline <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30996928>

6th May David Goldberg, husband of Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg dies in an accident.


<http://www.techtimes.com/articles/51008/20150506/facebook-coo-sheryl-sandberg-pays-emotional-tribute-to-late-husband.htm>

11th June Facebook announces the final version of the Oculus Rift Virtual Reality Headset and a cooperation with Microsoft, who will provide the controllers for the VR-Headset from their X-Box gaming console.

<http://uk.businessinsider.com/oculus-rift-launch-2015-6?r=US&IR=T>

18th June Facebook moments will not come to Europe because of facial recognition feature.

<http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/18/facial-recognition-concerns-keep-facebook-moments-from-europe/>



29th May No clear single event but likely news in connection with G-7 growth talks

<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/28/uk-g7-summit-idUKKBN00D18920150528>


8th June G-7 summit took place between 7th and 8th of June in Germany. Financial Crisis and Greece were important topic. Also, Iceland lifted restrictions on capital controls, imposed since 2008.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/iceland-to-lift-capital-controls-to-help-boost-economy>

<http://www.npr.org/2015/06/07/412633550/as-g7-begins-greek-bailout-tops-agenda-and-isolation-fears-grip-greece>

24th August After a crash of the Shanghai exchange, fear of a new financial crisis arose.

<http://time.com/4008762/stock-market/>



7th January Google announced the end of GoogleTV.

<http://www.techradar.com/news/television/hdtv/google-tv-officially-retired-as-android-tv-rises-from-its-ashes-1279421>

8th January Google lost 4% market share in its core business as search engine.

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2015/01/08/why-googles-search-market-share-loss-to-yahoo-means-pretty-much-nothing/>

6th March Possibly the launch of a car insurance comparison by Google or reports on Google wireless connections will only be available to users of Google's own Nexus-Smartphones.

<http://techcrunch.com/2015/03/05/google-compare-car-insurance-us/#.hxozmoh:eexr>

<http://fortune.com/2015/03/06/google-wireless-nexus/>

22nd June Google facing an anti-trust investigation by the EU or banning "revenge porn" from its search results. However, both seem unlikely to cause such high interest.


<http://www.pcworld.com/article/2939332/getty-images-a-party-in-european-antitrust-investigation-into-google.html>

<http://nypost.com/2015/06/21/google-cracks-down-on-revenge-porn/>

11th August Google forms a new holding "Alphabet" of which Google will be the most important asset.

<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/google-alphabet-parent-company>

2nd September Google changed its logo. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34126251>



27th/28th February Senate taking steps to avoid shutdown of Homeland security.

<http://thehill.com/homenews/house/234113-house-senate-race-to-prevent-shutdown-of-homeland-security>

25th August till end of September Owner and six employees of gay escort site rentboy.com were arrested on prostitution charges by the Department of Homeland security.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/opinion/homeland-securitys-peculiar-prosecution-of-rentboy.html?_r=1

After the shooting of a woman in San Francisco, a debate on “sanctuary cities”, which do not cooperate with federal immigration officials, sparks a debate about illegal immigrants.

<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/09/15/homeland-security-secretary-jeh-johnson-blasts-san-francisco-sanctuary-policy/>

Pope visit

<http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Pope-Francis-Homeland-Security-Threats-Philadelphia-New-York-DC-327218881.html>

Members of the Somali community face no-fly issues with the TSA

<http://www.fox9.com/news/19674216-story>

Public library takes a stand for using the TOR-Network against the department of homeland security's wishes. <http://fortune.com/2015/09/16/library-tor-network-vote/>

Raytheon signs 1 Billion deal for 5 years for the protection of government websites.

<http://www.engadget.com/2015/09/29/raytheon-homeland-security-contract/>


Congress committee finds DHS fails to stop people from joining ISIS

<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-us-fails-to-stop-most-people-trying-to-join-isis/>

Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson compares terrorism concerns to red scare.


<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/16/politics/jeh-johnson-terrorism-communism/>

All of these events took place within four weeks after the arrest of rentboy.com owner and employees, which stayed in the news the whole time. It seems likely this story was driven by a media savvy minority, holding interest in the DHS high leading to increased interest in any news about DHS.



12th January Following a number of security breaches, Obama called for stricter laws for user data. <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30779848>

19th – 21st January US Gov. health care website quietly sends consumers' personal data to private companies that specialize in advertising and analysing Internet data for performance and marketing. <https://www.yahoo.com/tech/s/privacy-concerns-over-governments-health-082334975.html?nf=1>




9th March Point-of-sale system (=Registrierkassen) vendor NEXTEP had a security breach.

<http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/nextep-a-7996/op-1>

1st July Office of Personnel Management (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Office_of_Personnel_Management) hacked. [...]hackers accessed not only personnel records of current and former employees but also extensive information about friends, relatives and others listed as references in applications for security clearances for some of the most sensitive jobs in government.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/>

14th September No single event identifiable



14th January US lead air strikes on IS and Oscar nominations for Clint Eastwood's American Sniper

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/14/us-mideast-crisis-airstrikes-idUSKBN0KN1AG20150114#7hMW8Vhqs7ia64GO.97>

<http://www.charlotteobserver.com/entertainment/movies-news-reviews/article9258905.html>

5th February After IS killed a Jordan pilot, its Airforce increased attacks. Also in response to this killing a rescue craft was moved in to Northern Iraq by the US.

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/02/05/jordan-king-harsh-war/22911337/>

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-moves-rescue-craft-to-northern-iraq-1423172108>

1st April Iraqi city of Tikrit was freed from IS by government troops.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32153836>

7th April Mass grave of Iraqi soldiers found in Tikrit

<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraq-exhuming-mass-graves-1700-soldiers-slaughtered-by-isis-tikrit-graphic-images-1495233>

28th April Probably wildly reported news about Iraqi security forces struggle to take back the Anbar province ISIS had captured last year. As a single event, it does not seem very significant in the overall fight against IS.


<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/04/28/Iraq-faces-huge-challenges-dislodging-Islamic-State-in-Anbar.html>

18th May ISIS retook the city of Ramadi in the Anbar

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-is-winning-in-iraq-1431990072>

31st July Iraqi Kurds caught in the conflict between PKK and Turkey.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/31/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-idUSKCN0Q52OH20150731#cQI516p3jxdqBwBx.97>



4th February After ISIS burned a downed Jordan pilot alive and released a video of the act, it caused sharp reactions from the Middle East as well as Europe and the US.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11387756/Jordanian-pilot-burned-alive-in-new-Isil-video.html>

16th February ISIS in Libya beheaded 21 Egyptian Christians.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50097#.Vk3XW79LFdc>

17th February In response to the killings of 21 citizens, Egypt launched attacks against ISIS in Libya. In Iraq ISIS captures a town (al-Baghdadi) and killed 45 people.

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/02/17/Egypt-Libya-drawn-into-Islamic-State-conflict/6841424185801/

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31502863>

23rd February Debate about UK teen girls joining ISIS, Turkey evacuating a site in Syria and heavy fights between Syrian Kurds and ISIS along the border of Turkey.

<http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1721990/britain-debating-how-stop-teenage-girls-joining-islamic-state>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-tomb-isis.html>

<http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/02/23/heavy-clashes-between-kurds-islamic-state-in-northeastern-syria/23896875/>

14th May ISIS approaching the ancient town of Palmyra

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/05/14/Islamic-State-approaches-Palmyra-Syria/2721431619423/

18th & 19th May Iraqi counter attack on the city of Ramadi

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11612298/Islamic-State-entrenches-in-Ramadi-before-promised-counter-attack.html>

26th June One attempted attack in Lyon, 25 killed in suicide bombing attack on a mosque in Kuwait and 37 killed in Tunisia (each on 26th June)


https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/three-attacks-deepen-fears-about-islamic-states-reach/2015/06/27/04b82dd2-1c1d-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html

25th August ISIS destroyed Palmyra. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34051870>

Late September Build-up of Russian forces and beginning of Russian air strikes.

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/22/putin-russia-syria-assad-iran-islamic-state/>

<http://www.newsweek.com/france-curious-russian-strikes-syria-not-against-islamic-state-378343>




24th March After a woman was killed by a mob on false allegations in Afghanistan, people took to the streets to demand justice.

<http://www.latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-afghanistan-womans-killing-protest-20150324-story.html>

23rd September US Department of Justice spending 23 Mio on bodycams for 74 law enforcement agencies.

<http://www.techtimes.com/articles/87084/20150923/justice-department-grants-23-million-in-funding-to-spread-use-of-body-cameras-among-law-enforcers.htm>



22nd January – 1st February Kurdish victory at the battle of Kobane.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kurds-say-they-have-ejected-islamic-state-from-a-big-area-in-northern-iraq/2015/01/21/ac459372-a1c6-11e4-b146-577832eafcb4_story.html

<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/after-kobani-victory-kurds-expand-fight-against-isis/>

<http://news.yahoo.com/kurds-isis-victory-dance-video-170028740.html>

8th June Kurdish electoral victory in the general elections on 7th June, gaining 13% for HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party / Halkların Demokratik Partisi)

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/turkey-election-2015-kurdish-obama-is-the-countrys-bright-new-star>


28th July Following an attack (20th July in Suruc) by ISIS on Turkish soil relation between Turks and Kurds deteriorated, leading to renewed fighting between Turkish military and the PKK, but also other Kurdish groups battling ISIS.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33675760>

4th September Donald Trump confusing the terms Quds and Kurds during an interview and a news about two US veterans fighting with Kurds.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34135543>

<http://www.wsj.com/video/americans-volunteer-to-fight-isis-in-syria/8F19E548-E8A9-4AF4-8939-3DE774C050F9.html>



2nd January In wake of the Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 crash on 28th December 2014, mentions of MA 17 returned and thus interest heightened.

<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/the-latest-air-disaster-has-highlighted-safety-fears-and-questions-on-how-planes-in-the-modern-age-can-simply-disappear/news-story/f8edc5c20fe8f7ed49187876597dc9e8>

11th January Flight recorder of AirAsia flight recovered, again with mentions of MA 17.

<http://www.voanews.com/content/investigators-intensity-search-for-airasia-black-boxes/2593755.html>

26th March After the Germanwings Flight 9525 crash, mentions of MA 17

<http://time.com/3760210/germanwings-plane-crash-andreas-lubitz-liability/>

27th April According to a report in the Süddeutsche Zeitung (<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/mh-bundesregierung-warnte-airlines-nicht-vor-abschuss-gefahr-1.2453333>) German authorities were aware of the risks for flight over Ukrainian territory but failed to warn Malaysian Airlines <http://time.com/3836615/mh17-german-government/>

19th May No single event identifiable

3rd June Russian Manufacturer of the BUK-Missile claims Ukrainians shot down MA 17.

<http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/06/02/russian-missile-maker-mh17-shot-down-by-ukraine/28343381/>

17th July On the anniversary of the crash a video was released, showing rebels walking among the wreckage coming to the realisation they downed a commercial jet.


http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/world/europe/video-purports-to-show-pro-russia-rebels-in-ukraine-amid-wreckage-of-malaysia-airlines-flight-17.html?_r=0

30th July Russia blocks an UN investigation into the crash.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/30/world/mh17-ukraine-un-tribunal/>

11th August Missile part found

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/world/europe/malaysia-airlines-crash-mh17-ukraine-missile.html>



Beginning of January Also Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 crash.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-air-asia-search-20150102-story.html>

29th January Declared an accident by the Malaysian Government

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysia-declares-malaysia-airlines-flight-370-disappearance-an-accident-1422529603>

19th February No single event identifiable

8th March One year anniversary / The Malaysian Ministry of Transport publishes an interim report.

<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-disappearance-of-malaysia-flight-370-one-year-later>

<http://mh370.mot.gov.my/download/FactualInformation.pdf>

20th March CNN “expert” blames Russia for the disappearance of flight MH370, but gives no reason as to why Russia would want this flight to disappear. While this seems hardly news worthy and in fact only second rate outlets reported on it, it seems a likely story to spark interest on the internet for its love of conspiracy theories.

<http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1289379-writer-claims-malaysia-airlines-flight-370-hijacked-by-russians-says-one-sitting-near-electronics-bay/>

24th – 26th March Germanwings crash

<http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fi-germanwings-crash-defies-world-airline-safety-trends-20150324-story.html>

7th April After an U.N. agency’s warning about airline safety in Thailand, many Asian and some Western news outlets reported about problems in Asian aviation, citing the disappearance of MH370.


<http://www.seattletimes.com/life/travel/fast-growing-asian-aviation-confronts-safety-challenges/>

29th July Debris of MH 370 found

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/world/asia/malaysia-airlines-flight-370-search.html>

5th August Malaysian Prime Minister confirmed the debris is from MH370.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/05/world/mh370-investigation/>



13th January As trial begins for Former C.I.A. Official Accused of Breaching National Security, President Obama unveils cybersecurity proposals.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/us/politics/trial-begins-for-former-cia-official-accused-of-breaching-national-security.html>

<http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/obama-cybersecurity-bill-privacy-campaigners-warning>

3rd March Gunshot at NSA HQ

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/03/gunfire-hits-nsa-building/24340081/>

5th May BND (German Intelligence Service) and NSA spying scandal.

<http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-05/germany-really-really-likes-spying>

19th May Senate to vote on restrictions on surveillance.


<http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/19/senate-nsa-reform-usa-freedom-patriot-act>

6th June Millions of US government personnel files were hacked.

<http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/06/06/after-hacking-government-workers-warned-of-potential-fraud.html>

24th June France summoned US-ambassador after NSA spying on French presidents.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/24/europe/france-wikileaks-nsa-spying-claims/>



22nd-25th March Big drug bust in Canada and Pope Francis speaking out against the Mafia in Naples.

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/organized-crime-killing-people-with-fentanyl-police-say-1.3009003>

<http://jezebel.com/popemobile-pizza-swarms-of-adoring-nuns-the-popes-ha-1693118664>


24th April Pictures of new Johnny Depp movie about Irish mobster surface.

<http://www.cinemablend.com/new/Johnny-Depp-Looks-Terrifying-Whitey-Bulger-Black-Mass-71051.html>

18th May Shootout between bikers in Texas. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32783541>

4th September Mobster trial in NYC

<http://nypost.com/2015/09/04/ex-son-in-law-of-john-gotti-pleads-not-guilty-in-stolen-car-scam/>



22nd January – 1st February Kurdish victory at the battle of Kobane.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kurds-say-they-have-ejected-islamic-state-from-a-big-area-in-northern-iraq/2015/01/21/ac459372-a1c6-11e4-b146-577832eafcb4_story.html

<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/after-kobani-victory-kurds-expand-fight-against-isis/>

<http://news.yahoo.com/kurds-isis-victory-dance-video-170028740.html>

4th February Western fighters among the Peshmerga.

<http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/02/04/westerners-join-kurds-fighting-islamic-state-group-in-iraq.html>

23rd February Video of caged Peshmerga fighters emerged.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/22/middleeast/isis-crisis/>

10th March Body of Canadian soldier who died in a friendly fire accident in Iraq returned.

<http://canadaam.ctvnews.ca/friendly-fire-death-highlights-communication-problems-on-iraq-frontline-expert-says-1.2272480>


10th June President Obama sends 450 additional troops to train forces fighting ISIS, among them the Peshmerga.

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/10/obama-ashton-carter-iraq-islamic-state/71007408/>

1st July No single event identifiable

27th July Syrian Kurds captured the strategically important town of Sarrin

<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/27/uk-mideast-crisis-kurds-town-idUKKCN0Q10U920150727>



16th-19th January President Obama pushes for better privacy protection for students.

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/33562/obamas-cybersecurity-plan-explained>


16th-25th March Three stories seem to contribute to this spike. The debate over a new Barbie toy with cloud-based speech recognition, “Sharenting” portmanteau of sharing and parenting and a survey that indicates over a third of Americans have changed their internet privacy settings in light of government surveillance.

It seems noteworthy that three out of four issues deal with the invasion of privacy of children. Towards the question, if this is arousal (look at all these bad parents) or genuine fear for one’s children privacy is hard to tell from these stories, and it might very well be both. Maybe the “Democracy and dialogue on Twitter: Can the Internet provide a forum for rational political debate?” Article could be interesting in this case. (<https://heltonlevy.wordpress.com/democracy-and-dialogue-on-twitter-can-the-internet-provide-a-forum-for-rational-political-debate/>)

<http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/mattel-barbie-raises-concern-children-privacy-article-1.2151019>

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2015/03/16/will-the-rise-of-over-sharenting-mean-the-end-of-privacy-for-our-children/>

<http://www.engadget.com/2015/03/16/americans-improving-privacy/>



28th January Angelina Jolie visits refugee camp.

<http://time.com/3685634/angelina-jolie-nyt-syria-iraq-refugee/>

13th April Kenyan official ask for closing of a Somali refugee camp after the terrorist attack on a university in Garissa, which left 148 dead.

<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/13/somali-refugees-decry-kenya-demand-that-the-un-relocate-their-camp.html>

24th April Angelina Jolie speaks before the UN about refugee crisis in Syria.

<http://www.theguardian.com/film/2015/apr/24/angelina-jolie-un-security-council-syria-refugees>

1st June France and Germany seek a lower quote in EU refugee distribution plan.

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/countries-other-than-france-and-germany-could-be-asked-to-take-more-asylum-seekers-by-the-eu-10289814.html>

15th June Amnesty International accuses world leaders of failure in handling the refugee crisis.


<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/worst-refugee-crisis-since-second-world-war-report-middle-east-africa-syria>

End of August to Mid-September (Spike 7th September) Refugee “crisis” in Europe takes on shape as a media event.

<http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/thousands-refugees-arrive-germany-after-journey-hungary-n422596>

15th September Hungary seals border for refugees.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/refugees-scramble-fortress-europe-hungary-seals-borders>



16th 19th January Debate over Homeland Security funding threatened by republicans.


<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/01/16/homeland-security-chief-blasts-gop-threat-to-defund-department/>

17th-24th March Three issues, data of 11 Million customers of Premera Blue Cross (health insurance) exposes. Settlement offer by Target (retail stores) for a security breach in 2013. Man shot at New Orleans Airport after attacking with a machete and wasp spray.

<http://www.cnet.com/news/hack-on-premera-blue-cross-exposes-11m-customer-records/>


<https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/03/19/target-agrees-to-pay-10-million-to-settle-data-breach-lawsuit/>

<http://www.independent.ie/world-news/americas/man-63-cuts-security-guard-with-machete-and-sprays-others-with-wasp-spray-at-new-orleans-airport-31084046.html>



Hacker stole the data of 5.6 Million government employees, including fingerprints and social security numbers.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now-says-more-than-five-million-fingerprints-compromised-in-breaches/>



9th January Reports about Al-Qaeda in Syria planning attack on the West.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2015/01/09/UK-Qaeda-in-Syria-planning-mass-attacks-on-West-.html>

4th-6th February Jordanian pilot downed and killed by ISIS

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/world/middleeast/arab-world-unites-in-anger-after-burning-of-jordanian-pilot.html>

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/02/05/jordan-king-harsh-war/22911337/>


<http://news.yahoo.com/jordan-planes-strike-pilot-murder-130353644.html>

21st May Palmyra seized by ISIS

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32837336>

Beginning-Mid September Refugee crisis in Europe. Spiked when the Image of Alan Kurdi, the drowned Syrian boy became public.

<http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/abdullah-kurdi-buries-family-in-syria-will-stay-now-1.2547805>



2nd January Kenya court suspends key parts of draconian security law.

<http://news.yahoo.com/kenya-high-court-suspends-parts-controversial-security-law-093812205.html>



9th-14th January Charlie Hebdo attacks, however it should be noted with a bit over 8.000 views on 14th January interest was about the same as for 23rd February.

<http://www.euronews.com/2015/01/09/france-s-president-hollande-calls-for-vigilance-and-unity-in-the-face-of-/>

23rd February Palestinian Authority and PLO found liable for terrorist attacks.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/nyregion/damages-awarded-in-terror-case-against-palestinian-groups.html>

Mid-May There is no real event or debate going on for that period which could explain a spike surpassing the Charlie Hebdo attacks. In comparison they are odd or seem insignificant at best.

Plot to kill Prince Charles by a right wing fanatic, who wanted a red haired King. (This is the story with the most traction on Google for 12th May.)

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11599423/Ginger-haired-fanatic-wanted-to-kill-Prince-Charles-in-hope-Prince-Harry-became-King.html>

After terrorist attacks on Sinai Peninsula, Egyptian president Al-Sisi strengthens ties to the US-administration.

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/egypts-leader-reinvents-himself-as-bulwark-against-terrorism-1431941401>

Two Russian soldiers face terrorism trials in Ukraine.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11614128/Captured-Russian-soldiers-in-Ukraine-face-terrorism-trial.html>

Macedonian raid on Albanian minority leaves 22 dead.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/11/macedonia-violence-nikola-gruevski-government>

New counter-terrorism bill in the UK.

www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/13/counter-terrorism-bill-extremism-disruption-orders-david-cameron

Boston Marathon bomber sentenced to death.

<http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/05/16/boston-marathon-bomber-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-could-be-1st-terrorist-executed-in-us/>

8th August

President Obama admits the Nuclear Deal with Iran will not stop it from funding terrorist organisations.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/11786027/Barack-Obama-admits-Iran-nuclear-deal-will-mean-more-money-for-terror-groups.html>

Terror

The article for terror on Wikipedia was discontinued. A search for this term now leads to the article about fear.




23rd January Rebels reject truce talks / most deadly period

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30949527>

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11366001/Ukraine-conflict-enters-most-deadly-period-UN-warns.html>

12th February Ceasefire agreement.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31435812>



28th February Opposition politician Boris Nemtsov gunned down.


<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/28/boris-nemtsov-death-fear-for-the-future-of-russians>

17th March Putin reappears after 10 days of absence.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/16/us-russia-crisis-putin-idUSKBN0MC10920150316>

30th September In wake of Russian airstrikes in Syria and Putin's appearance at the UN the article about him spiked.


<http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/putin-returns-to-the-u-n>



End-January to End-February There is no single event and it is not possible to tell what leads to the interest as the topic is riddled with fake news, conspiracy theories, etc. What can be said is that there occurred fighting, heavy at times but which event or issue was most interesting cannot be established.

4th June Ceasefire breached.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/04/escalation-fighting-east-ukraine-leaves-ceasefire-tatters-russian-forces>



7th January WhatsApp growth continues with 700m users sending 30bn daily messages

<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/07/whatsapp-growth-700m-users-facebook>

14th January David Cameron talking about plans to ban instant messaging services, which cannot be accessed by British intelligence.

<http://time.com/3665270/david-cameron-snapchat-whatsapp-terror/>

22nd January Browser based app for WhatsApp allowing to use Computer instead of Smartphone.

<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/22/whatsapp-messenger-makes-move-to-the-web>

21st March New Voice-over-IP feature introduced.

<http://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/>

27th August Rude emoji introduced.

http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/08/27/whatsapp-android-update-new-rude-emoji-unveiled_n_8047032.html

Societal Security Online Survey

Data Overview SOURCE online Societal Security Survey (2014-2015)

Important societal issues

[Rank 1] What is important to you on a societal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Healthcare (e.g. increasing the budget for disease prevention)	81	19.1	20.8	20.8
	Cyber Crime prevention (e.g. increasing Internet surveillance)	5	1.2	1.3	22.1
	Other (enter text below)	12	2.8	3.1	25.1
	Education (e.g. hiring more teachers and improving schools)	144	34.0	36.9	62.1
	Housing (e.g. providing more affordable flats)	39	9.2	10.0	72.1
	Environment protection (e.g. investing more in green energy)	21	5.0	5.4	77.4
	Civil protection (e.g. investing in protective measures against floods, fires, earthquakes)	7	1.7	1.8	79.2
	Public transport (e.g. extending the train and bus services)	5	1.2	1.3	80.5
	Social security (e.g. improve pension system and unemployment benefits)	62	14.6	15.9	96.4
	Crime prevention (e.g. hiring more police officers)	7	1.7	1.8	98.2
	Terrorism prevention (e.g. stepping up surveillance and control)	7	1.7	1.8	100.0
	Total	390	92.0	100.0	
Missing		34	8.0		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 2] What is important to you on a societal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Healthcare (e.g. increasing the budget for disease prevention)	100	23.6	25.8	25.8
	Cyber Crime prevention (e.g. increasing Internet surveillance)	5	1.2	1.3	27.1
	Other (enter text below)	8	1.9	2.1	29.2
	Education (e.g. hiring more teachers and improving schools)	70	16.5	18.1	47.3
	Housing (e.g. providing more affordable flats)	60	14.2	15.5	62.8
	Environment protection (e.g. investing more in green energy)	35	8.3	9.0	71.8
	Civil protection (e.g. investing in protective measures against floods, fires, earthquakes)	8	1.9	2.1	73.9
	Public transport (e.g. extending the train and bus services)	15	3.5	3.9	77.8
	Social security (e.g. improve pension system and unemployment benefits)	64	15.1	16.5	94.3
	Crime prevention (e.g. hiring more police officers)	14	3.3	3.6	97.9
	Terrorism prevention (e.g. stepping up surveillance and control)	8	1.9	2.1	100.0
	Total	387	91.3	100.0	
Missing		37	8.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 3] What is important to you on a societal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Healthcare (e.g. increasing the budget for disease prevention)	59	13.9	15.5	15.5
	Cyber Crime prevention (e.g. increasing Internet surveillance)	7	1.7	1.8	17.3
	Other (enter text below)	3	.7	.8	18.1

Education (e.g. hiring more teachers and improving schools)	72	17.0	18.9	37.0
Housing (e.g. providing more affordable flats)	55	13.0	14.4	51.4
Environment protection (e.g. investing more in green energy)	44	10.4	11.5	63.0
Civil protection (e.g. investing in protective measures against floods, fires, earthquakes)	20	4.7	5.2	68.2
Public transport (e.g. extending the train and bus services)	28	6.6	7.3	75.6
Social security (e.g. improve pension system and unemployment benefits)	70	16.5	18.4	94.0
Crime prevention (e.g. hiring more police officers)	13	3.1	3.4	97.4
Terrorism prevention (e.g. stepping up surveillance and control)	10	2.4	2.6	100.0
Total	381	89.9	100.0	
Missing	43	10.1		
Total	424	100.0		

[Rank 4] What is important to you on a societal level?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Healthcare (e.g. increasing the budget for disease prevention)	60	14.2	15.8	15.8
Cyber Crime prevention (e.g. increasing Internet surveillance)	11	2.6	2.9	18.7
Other (enter text below)	8	1.9	2.1	20.8
Education (e.g. hiring more teachers and improving schools)	40	9.4	10.6	31.4
Housing (e.g. providing more affordable flats)	58	13.7	15.3	46.7
Environment protection (e.g. investing more in green energy)	44	10.4	11.6	58.3
Civil protection (e.g. investing in protective measures against floods, fires, earthquakes)	26	6.1	6.9	65.2

	Public transport (e.g. extending the train and bus services)	44	10.4	11.6	76.8
	Social security (e.g. improve pension system and unemployment benefits)	54	12.7	14.2	91.0
	Crime prevention (e.g. hiring more police officers)	17	4.0	4.5	95.5
	Terrorism prevention (e.g. stepping up surveillance and control)	17	4.0	4.5	100.0
	Total	379	89.4	100.0	
Missing		45	10.6		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 5] What is important to you on a societal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Healthcare (e.g. increasing the budget for disease prevention)	42	9.9	11.2	11.2
	Cyber Crime prevention (e.g. increasing Internet surveillance)	12	2.8	3.2	14.4
	Other (enter text below)	3	.7	.8	15.2
	Education (e.g. hiring more teachers and improving schools)	27	6.4	7.2	22.3
	Housing (e.g. providing more affordable flats)	45	10.6	12.0	34.3
	Environment protection (e.g. investing more in green energy)	68	16.0	18.1	52.4
	Civil protection (e.g. investing in protective measures against floods, fires, earthquakes)	29	6.8	7.7	60.1
	Public transport (e.g. extending the train and bus services)	61	14.4	16.2	76.3
	Social security (e.g. improve pension system and unemployment benefits)	44	10.4	11.7	88.0
	Crime prevention (e.g. hiring more police officers)	33	7.8	8.8	96.8
	Terrorism prevention (e.g. stepping up surveillance and control)	12	2.8	3.2	100.0
	Total	376	88.7	100.0	

Missing	48	11.3		
Total	424	100.0		

Other important domain on a societal level

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Missing	351	82.8	82.8	82.8
	Arts & Culture	6	1.4	1.4	84.2
	Ecological sustainability	6	1.4	1.4	85.6
	Economic development	10	2.4	2.4	88.0
	Increasing national defense	5	1.2	1.2	89.2
	Legal reform	7	1.7	1.7	90.8
	Research	5	1.2	1.2	92.0
	Social equality	18	4.2	4.2	96.2
	Social inclusion	16	3.8	3.8	100.0
	Total	424	100.0	100.0	

Important personal issues

[Your physical health] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	284	67.0	69.1	69.1
	important	117	27.6	28.5	97.6
	less important	8	1.9	1.9	99.5
	not important	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	411	96.9	100.0	
Missing		13	3.1		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your financial situation] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	90	21.2	22.0	22.0
	important	253	59.7	61.7	83.7
	less important	64	15.1	15.6	99.3
	not important	3	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	410	96.7	100.0	
Missing		14	3.3		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your personal job situation (including unemployment)] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	138	32.5	34.2	34.2
	important	235	55.4	58.2	92.3
	less important	26	6.1	6.4	98.8

	not important	5	1.2	1.2	100.0
	Total	404	95.3	100.0	
Missing		20	4.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your relationship with your partner, your children, your relatives] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	309	72.9	76.1	76.1
	important	85	20.0	20.9	97.0
	less important	10	2.4	2.5	99.5
	not important	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	406	95.8	100.0	
Missing		18	4.2		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your relationship with your friends] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	183	43.2	44.5	44.5
	important	183	43.2	44.5	89.1
	less important	42	9.9	10.2	99.3
	not important	2	.5	.5	99.8
	don't know	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	411	96.9	100.0	
Missing		13	3.1		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your housing situation (including homelessness)] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	151	35.6	36.7	36.7
	important	209	49.3	50.7	87.4
	less important	49	11.6	11.9	99.3
	not important	2	.5	.5	99.8
	don't know	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	412	97.2	100.0	
Missing		12	2.8		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your educational achievements] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	129	30.4	32.3	32.3
	important	200	47.2	50.0	82.3
	less important	55	13.0	13.8	96.0
	not important	16	3.8	4.0	100.0
	Total	400	94.3	100.0	

Missing	24	5.7		
Total	424	100.0		

[Your happiness in life] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	263	62.0	64.5	64.5
	important	121	28.5	29.7	94.1
	less important	19	4.5	4.7	98.8
	not important	3	.7	.7	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	408	96.2	100.0	
Missing		16	3.8		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your hobbies] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	56	13.2	13.8	13.8
	important	192	45.3	47.4	61.2
	less important	133	31.4	32.8	94.1
	not important	23	5.4	5.7	99.8
	don't know	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	405	95.5	100.0	
Missing		19	4.5		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your personal fulfillment] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	139	32.8	35.2	35.2
	important	184	43.4	46.6	81.8
	less important	62	14.6	15.7	97.5
	not important	7	1.7	1.8	99.2
	don't know	3	.7	.8	100.0
	Total	395	93.2	100.0	
Missing		29	6.8		
Total		424	100.0		

[Safe and protected environment] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	122	28.8	29.9	29.9
	important	209	49.3	51.2	81.1
	less important	64	15.1	15.7	96.8
	not important	11	2.6	2.7	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	408	96.2	100.0	

Missing	16	3.8		
Total	424	100.0		

[Your professional career] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	71	16.7	17.5	17.5
	important	208	49.1	51.4	68.9
	less important	118	27.8	29.1	98.0
	not important	8	1.9	2.0	100.0
	Total	405	95.5	100.0	
Missing		19	4.5		
Total		424	100.0		

[Fun in life] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	132	31.1	32.7	32.7
	important	180	42.5	44.6	77.2
	less important	76	17.9	18.8	96.0
	not important	15	3.5	3.7	99.8
	don't know	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	404	95.3	100.0	
Missing		20	4.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your right to privacy] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	160	37.7	39.4	39.4
	important	182	42.9	44.8	84.2
	less important	51	12.0	12.6	96.8
	not important	13	3.1	3.2	100.0
	Total	406	95.8	100.0	
Missing		18	4.2		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your options to participate in public life] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	100	23.6	24.7	24.7
	important	213	50.2	52.6	77.3
	less important	75	17.7	18.5	95.8
	not important	15	3.5	3.7	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	405	95.5	100.0	
Missing		19	4.5		
Total		424	100.0		

[Other (enter text below)] What is important to you on a personal level?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very important	21	5.0	63.6	63.6
	important	5	1.2	15.2	78.8
	less important	3	.7	9.1	87.9
	not important	1	.2	3.0	90.9
	don't know	3	.7	9.1	100.0
	Total	33	7.8	100.0	
Missing		391	92.2		
Total		424	100.0		

Satisfaction with personal situation

[Your physical health] How would you judge your current situation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	99	23.3	24.6	24.6
	satisfying	233	55.0	58.0	82.6
	less satisfying	60	14.2	14.9	97.5
	not satisfying	9	2.1	2.2	99.8
	don't know	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	402	94.8	100.0	
Missing		22	5.2		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your financial situation] How would you judge your current situation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	69	16.3	17.3	17.3
	satisfying	216	50.9	54.0	71.3
	less satisfying	85	20.0	21.3	92.5
	not satisfying	30	7.1	7.5	100.0
	Total	400	94.3	100.0	
Missing		24	5.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your personal job situation] How would you judge your current situation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	86	20.3	21.9	21.9
	satisfying	188	44.3	48.0	69.9
	less satisfying	90	21.2	23.0	92.9
	not satisfying	24	5.7	6.1	99.0
	don't know	4	.9	1.0	100.0
	Total	392	92.5	100.0	
Missing		32	7.5		

Total	424	100.0		
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[Your relationship with your partner] How would you judge your current situation?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
very satisfying	187	44.1	55.3	55.3
satisfying	102	24.1	30.2	85.5
less satisfying	28	6.6	8.3	93.8
not satisfying	14	3.3	4.1	97.9
don't know	7	1.7	2.1	100.0
Total	338	79.7	100.0	
Missing	86	20.3		
Total	424	100.0		

[Your relationship with your children] How would you judge your current situation?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
very satisfying	121	28.5	60.2	60.2
satisfying	56	13.2	27.9	88.1
less satisfying	9	2.1	4.5	92.5
not satisfying	2	.5	1.0	93.5
don't know	13	3.1	6.5	100.0
Total	201	47.4	100.0	
Missing	223	52.6		
Total	424	100.0		

[Your relationship with other family members] How would you judge your current situation?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
very satisfying	105	24.8	26.7	26.7
satisfying	224	52.8	57.0	83.7
less satisfying	49	11.6	12.5	96.2
not satisfying	11	2.6	2.8	99.0
don't know	4	.9	1.0	100.0
Total	393	92.7	100.0	
Missing	31	7.3		
Total	424	100.0		

[Your relationship with your friends] How would you judge your current situation?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
very satisfying	128	30.2	32.1	32.1
satisfying	220	51.9	55.1	87.2
less satisfying	41	9.7	10.3	97.5
not satisfying	6	1.4	1.5	99.0
don't know	4	.9	1.0	100.0
Total	399	94.1	100.0	
Missing	25	5.9		
Total	424	100.0		

[Your relationship with your neighbours] How would you judge your current situation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	43	10.1	11.8	11.8
	satisfying	210	49.5	57.9	69.7
	less satisfying	68	16.0	18.7	88.4
	not satisfying	24	5.7	6.6	95.0
	don't know	18	4.2	5.0	100.0
	Total	363	85.6	100.0	
Missing		61	14.4		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your current housing situation] How would you judge your current situation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	138	32.5	34.3	34.3
	satisfying	196	46.2	48.8	83.1
	less satisfying	50	11.8	12.4	95.5
	not satisfying	15	3.5	3.7	99.3
	don't know	3	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	402	94.8	100.0	
Missing		22	5.2		
Total		424	100.0		

[Your personal fulfillment] How would you judge your current situation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	79	18.6	20.1	20.1
	satisfying	232	54.7	59.0	79.1
	less satisfying	65	15.3	16.5	95.7
	not satisfying	15	3.5	3.8	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	393	92.7	100.0	
Missing		31	7.3		
Total		424	100.0		

Satisfaction with public services

[The healthcare system in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	62	14.6	15.7	15.7
	moderately satisfying	204	48.1	51.8	67.5
	slightly satisfying	85	20.0	21.6	89.1
	not satisfying	42	9.9	10.7	99.7
	don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
	Total	394	92.9	100.0	
Missing		30	7.1		

Total	424	100.0		
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[The educational system in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	24	5.7	6.1	6.1
	moderately satisfying	150	35.4	38.4	44.5
	slightly satisfying	150	35.4	38.4	82.9
	not satisfying	65	15.3	16.6	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	391	92.2	100.0	
Missing		33	7.8		
Total		424	100.0		

[The financial situation in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	45	10.6	11.5	11.5
	moderately satisfying	155	36.6	39.7	51.3
	slightly satisfying	110	25.9	28.2	79.5
	not satisfying	76	17.9	19.5	99.0
	don't know	4	.9	1.0	100.0
	Total	390	92.0	100.0	
Missing		34	8.0		
Total		424	100.0		

[The pension system in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	26	6.1	6.7	6.7
	moderately satisfying	111	26.2	28.5	35.1
	slightly satisfying	140	33.0	35.9	71.0
	not satisfying	96	22.6	24.6	95.6
	don't know	17	4.0	4.4	100.0
	Total	390	92.0	100.0	
Missing		34	8.0		
Total		424	100.0		

[The public transport system in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	46	10.8	11.6	11.6
	moderately satisfying	194	45.8	49.1	60.8
	slightly satisfying	110	25.9	27.8	88.6
	not satisfying	43	10.1	10.9	99.5

don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
Total	395	93.2	100.0	
Missing	29	6.8		
Total	424	100.0		

[Civil protection in general is organised] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very satisfying	50	11.8	13.3	13.3
moderately satisfying	209	49.3	55.6	68.9
slightly satisfying	62	14.6	16.5	85.4
not satisfying	20	4.7	5.3	90.7
don't know	35	8.3	9.3	100.0
Total	376	88.7	100.0	
Missing	48	11.3		
Total	424	100.0		

[The police in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very satisfying	35	8.3	9.0	9.0
moderately satisfying	180	42.5	46.5	55.6
slightly satisfying	94	22.2	24.3	79.8
not satisfying	68	16.0	17.6	97.4
don't know	10	2.4	2.6	100.0
Total	387	91.3	100.0	
Missing	37	8.7		
Total	424	100.0		

[The national government in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very satisfying	13	3.1	3.3	3.3
moderately satisfying	112	26.4	28.8	32.1
slightly satisfying	130	30.7	33.4	65.6
not satisfying	127	30.0	32.6	98.2
don't know	7	1.7	1.8	100.0
Total	389	91.7	100.0	
Missing	35	8.3		
Total	424	100.0		

[The public authorities in general are] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very satisfying	17	4.0	4.4	4.4

	moderately satisfying	178	42.0	45.9	50.3
	slightly satisfying	115	27.1	29.6	79.9
	not satisfying	73	17.2	18.8	98.7
	don't know	5	1.2	1.3	100.0
	Total	388	91.5	100.0	
Missing		36	8.5		
Total		424	100.0		

[The justice system in general is] How would you rate the performance of the following institutions and public services in your country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very satisfying	40	9.4	10.4	10.4
	moderately satisfying	159	37.5	41.4	51.8
	slightly satisfying	84	19.8	21.9	73.7
	not satisfying	90	21.2	23.4	97.1
	don't know	11	2.6	2.9	100.0
	Total	384	90.6	100.0	
Missing		40	9.4		
Total		424	100.0		

Trust in institutions

[Public Hospitals] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	49	11.6	12.5	12.5
	trusted	259	61.1	65.9	78.4
	distrusted	65	15.3	16.5	94.9
	fully distrusted	17	4.0	4.3	99.2
	don't know	3	.7	.8	100.0
	Total	393	92.7	100.0	
Missing		31	7.3		
Total		424	100.0		

[General Practitioners (in the healthcare sector)] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	79	18.6	20.2	20.2
	trusted	263	62.0	67.1	87.2
	distrusted	40	9.4	10.2	97.4
	fully distrusted	6	1.4	1.5	99.0
	don't know	4	.9	1.0	100.0
	Total	392	92.5	100.0	
Missing		32	7.5		

Total	424	100.0		
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[State schools] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	39	9.2	10.0	10.0
	trusted	262	61.8	67.4	77.4
	distrusted	73	17.2	18.8	96.1
	fully distrusted	7	1.7	1.8	97.9
	don't know	8	1.9	2.1	100.0
	Total	389	91.7	100.0	
Missing		35	8.3		
Total		424	100.0		

[Universities] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	66	15.6	17.1	17.1
	trusted	254	59.9	65.6	82.7
	distrusted	61	14.4	15.8	98.4
	fully distrusted	4	.9	1.0	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	387	91.3	100.0	
Missing		37	8.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Public transport (in metropolitan areas)] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	67	15.8	17.2	17.2
	trusted	261	61.6	66.9	84.1
	distrusted	55	13.0	14.1	98.2
	fully distrusted	4	.9	1.0	99.2
	don't know	3	.7	.8	100.0
	Total	390	92.0	100.0	
Missing		34	8.0		
Total		424	100.0		

[Public transport (on the countryside)] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	33	7.8	8.8	8.8
	trusted	151	35.6	40.4	49.2
	distrusted	119	28.1	31.8	81.0
	fully distrusted	31	7.3	8.3	89.3

don't know	40	9.4	10.7	100.0
Total	374	88.2	100.0	
Missing	50	11.8		
Total	424	100.0		

[Financial institutions] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid fully trusted	13	3.1	3.3	3.3
trusted	100	23.6	25.7	29.0
distrusted	156	36.8	40.1	69.2
fully distrusted	110	25.9	28.3	97.4
don't know	10	2.4	2.6	100.0
Total	389	91.7	100.0	
Missing	35	8.3		
Total	424	100.0		

[Political parties] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid trusted	59	13.9	15.2	15.2
distrusted	203	47.9	52.2	67.4
fully distrusted	118	27.8	30.3	97.7
don't know	9	2.1	2.3	100.0
Total	389	91.7	100.0	
Missing	35	8.3		
Total	424	100.0		

[Police] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid fully trusted	38	9.0	9.7	9.7
trusted	185	43.6	47.4	57.2
distrusted	120	28.3	30.8	87.9
fully distrusted	41	9.7	10.5	98.5
don't know	6	1.4	1.5	100.0
Total	390	92.0	100.0	
Missing	34	8.0		
Total	424	100.0		

[Civil protection services (e.g. fire brigade, paramedics)] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid fully trusted	112	26.4	28.9	28.9
trusted	250	59.0	64.4	93.3

	distrusted	18	4.2	4.6	97.9
	fully distrusted	2	.5	.5	98.5
	don't know	6	1.4	1.5	100.0
	Total	388	91.5	100.0	
Missing		36	8.5		
Total		424	100.0		

[Courts] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	54	12.7	13.9	13.9
	trusted	187	44.1	48.1	62.0
	distrusted	89	21.0	22.9	84.8
	fully distrusted	44	10.4	11.3	96.1
	don't know	15	3.5	3.9	100.0
	Total	389	91.7	100.0	
Missing		35	8.3		
Total		424	100.0		

[Media] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	6	1.4	1.5	1.5
	trusted	121	28.5	31.1	32.6
	distrusted	168	39.6	43.2	75.8
	fully distrusted	87	20.5	22.4	98.2
	don't know	7	1.7	1.8	100.0
	Total	389	91.7	100.0	
Missing		35	8.3		
Total		424	100.0		

[The Government] Thinking of your country of residence, what is your opinion on the following institutions? How much do you trust these institutions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	fully trusted	6	1.4	1.5	1.5
	trusted	117	27.6	30.1	31.6
	distrusted	156	36.8	40.1	71.7
	fully distrusted	101	23.8	26.0	97.7
	don't know	9	2.1	2.3	100.0
	Total	389	91.7	100.0	
Missing		35	8.3		
Total		424	100.0		

Feelings of (in-)security

[In general I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	145	34.2	37.5	37.5
	secure	231	54.5	59.7	97.2
	insecure	7	1.7	1.8	99.0
	very insecure	3	.7	.8	99.7
	don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
	Total	387	91.3	100.0	
Missing		37	8.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Alone at home at night I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	193	45.5	49.7	49.7
	secure	182	42.9	46.9	96.6
	insecure	10	2.4	2.6	99.2
	very insecure	2	.5	.5	99.7
	don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
	Total	388	91.5	100.0	
Missing		36	8.5		
Total		424	100.0		

[Alone on the street at night I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	68	16.0	17.6	17.6
	secure	222	52.4	57.4	74.9
	insecure	81	19.1	20.9	95.9
	very insecure	15	3.5	3.9	99.7
	don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
	Total	387	91.3	100.0	
Missing		37	8.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Alone in public places I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	112	26.4	28.9	28.9
	secure	241	56.8	62.3	91.2
	insecure	28	6.6	7.2	98.4
	very insecure	4	.9	1.0	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	387	91.3	100.0	
Missing		37	8.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[In very crowded public places I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	85	20.0	22.0	22.0
	secure	212	50.0	54.9	76.9
	insecure	75	17.7	19.4	96.4
	very insecure	10	2.4	2.6	99.0
	don't know	4	.9	1.0	100.0
	Total	386	91.0	100.0	
Missing		38	9.0		
Total		424	100.0		

[When I use public transport services I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	102	24.1	26.4	26.4
	secure	252	59.4	65.3	91.7
	insecure	27	6.4	7.0	98.7
	very insecure	3	.7	.8	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	386	91.0	100.0	
Missing		38	9.0		
Total		424	100.0		

[When I use public transport services alone at night I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	59	13.9	15.4	15.4
	secure	205	48.3	53.4	68.8
	insecure	90	21.2	23.4	92.2
	very insecure	25	5.9	6.5	98.7
	don't know	5	1.2	1.3	100.0
	Total	384	90.6	100.0	
Missing		40	9.4		
Total		424	100.0		

[When I see a police officer or a police car, I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	67	15.8	17.7	17.7
	secure	198	46.7	52.2	69.9
	insecure	75	17.7	19.8	89.7
	very insecure	9	2.1	2.4	92.1
	don't know	30	7.1	7.9	100.0
	Total	379	89.4	100.0	
Missing		45	10.6		
Total		424	100.0		

[With regards to burglary I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	62	14.6	16.2	16.2
	secure	214	50.5	56.0	72.3
	insecure	78	18.4	20.4	92.7
	very insecure	24	5.7	6.3	99.0
	don't know	4	.9	1.0	100.0
	Total	382	90.1	100.0	
Missing		42	9.9		
Total		424	100.0		

[With regards to robbery I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	67	15.8	17.6	17.6
	secure	199	46.9	52.2	69.8
	insecure	74	17.5	19.4	89.2
	very insecure	33	7.8	8.7	97.9
	don't know	8	1.9	2.1	100.0
	Total	381	89.9	100.0	
Missing		43	10.1		
Total		424	100.0		

[With regards to identity theft on the internet I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	40	9.4	10.5	10.5
	secure	137	32.3	35.9	46.3
	insecure	144	34.0	37.7	84.0
	very insecure	48	11.3	12.6	96.6
	don't know	13	3.1	3.4	100.0
	Total	382	90.1	100.0	
Missing		42	9.9		
Total		424	100.0		

[In the presence of members of other ethnic groups I feel] Feelings of (in-)security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very secure	93	21.9	24.2	24.2
	secure	237	55.9	61.7	85.9
	insecure	40	9.4	10.4	96.4
	very insecure	7	1.7	1.8	98.2
	don't know	7	1.7	1.8	100.0
	Total	384	90.6	100.0	
Missing		40	9.4		
Total		424	100.0		

Future developments in the EU

[The future development of the Ukraine crisis] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	132	31.1	34.4	34.4
	concerned	178	42.0	46.4	80.7
	hardly concerned	57	13.4	14.8	95.6
	not concerned	11	2.6	2.9	98.4
	don't know	6	1.4	1.6	100.0
	Total	384	90.6	100.0	
Missing		40	9.4		
Total		424	100.0		

[Terror attacks by the "Islamic State" on European soil] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	90	21.2	23.4	23.4
	concerned	161	38.0	41.9	65.4
	hardly concerned	94	22.2	24.5	89.8
	not concerned	38	9.0	9.9	99.7
	don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
	Total	384	90.6	100.0	
Missing		40	9.4		
Total		424	100.0		

[The future development of the financial crisis in Europe] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	102	24.1	26.6	26.6
	concerned	200	47.2	52.2	78.9
	hardly concerned	72	17.0	18.8	97.7
	not concerned	7	1.7	1.8	99.5
	don't know	2	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	383	90.3	100.0	
Missing		41	9.7		
Total		424	100.0		

[Member states or your own country dropping out of the European Union] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	31	7.3	8.2	8.2
	concerned	78	18.4	20.6	28.8
	hardly concerned	138	32.5	36.5	65.3
	not concerned	123	29.0	32.5	97.9
	don't know	8	1.9	2.1	100.0

Total	378	89.2	100.0
Missing	46	10.8	
Total	424	100.0	

[The progressing climate change] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very concerned	108	25.5	28.3	28.3
concerned	160	37.7	41.9	70.2
hardly concerned	81	19.1	21.2	91.4
not concerned	32	7.5	8.4	99.7
don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
Total	382	90.1	100.0	
Missing	42	9.9		
Total	424	100.0		

[Refugees seeking asylum in the European Union] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very concerned	46	10.8	12.1	12.1
concerned	96	22.6	25.3	37.5
hardly concerned	121	28.5	31.9	69.4
not concerned	109	25.7	28.8	98.2
don't know	7	1.7	1.8	100.0
Total	379	89.4	100.0	
Missing	45	10.6		
Total	424	100.0		

[Intelligence agencies infringing your privacy] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very concerned	115	27.1	30.0	30.0
concerned	110	25.9	28.7	58.7
hardly concerned	112	26.4	29.2	88.0
not concerned	45	10.6	11.7	99.7
don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
Total	383	90.3	100.0	
Missing	41	9.7		
Total	424	100.0		

[Global Social Media Service Providers (e.g. Google, Facebook, Twitter) collecting your personal data] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very concerned	116	27.4	30.5	30.5
concerned	141	33.3	37.1	67.6
hardly concerned	84	19.8	22.1	89.7

	not concerned	39	9.2	10.3	100.0
	Total	380	89.6	100.0	
Missing		44	10.4		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rising prices for staple foods] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	73	17.2	19.1	19.1
	concerned	101	23.8	26.4	45.5
	hardly concerned	147	34.7	38.5	84.0
	not concerned	61	14.4	16.0	100.0
	Total	382	90.1	100.0	
Missing		42	9.9		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rising energy prices] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	70	16.5	18.3	18.3
	concerned	109	25.7	28.5	46.9
	hardly concerned	147	34.7	38.5	85.3
	not concerned	55	13.0	14.4	99.7
	don't know	1	.2	.3	100.0
	Total	382	90.1	100.0	
Missing		42	9.9		
Total		424	100.0		

[An Ebola outbreak in Europe] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	9	2.1	2.4	2.4
	concerned	36	8.5	9.5	11.9
	hardly concerned	116	27.4	30.7	42.6
	not concerned	211	49.8	55.8	98.4
	don't know	6	1.4	1.6	100.0
	Total	378	89.2	100.0	
Missing		46	10.8		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rising social and economic inequalities across Europe] Thinking about the effects of future developments in the European Union for your personal situation how concerned are you about

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very concerned	166	39.2	44.4	44.4
	concerned	139	32.8	37.2	81.6

	hardly concerned	46	10.8	12.3	93.9
	not concerned	23	5.4	6.1	100.0
	Total	374	88.2	100.0	
Missing		50	11.8		
Total		424	100.0		

National aims

[Rank 1] People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below there are some of the goals listed which different people would give top priority.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Maintaining order in the nation	63	14.9	17.5	17.5
	Giving people more say in important government decisions	104	24.5	28.8	46.3
	Fighting rising prices	38	9.0	10.5	56.8
	Protecting freedom of speech	156	36.8	43.2	100.0
	Total	361	85.1	100.0	
Missing		63	14.9		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 2] People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below there are some of the goals listed which different people would give top priority.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Maintaining order in the nation	61	14.4	17.0	17.0
	Giving people more say in important government decisions	128	30.2	35.8	52.8
	Fighting rising prices	71	16.7	19.8	72.6
	Protecting freedom of speech	98	23.1	27.4	100.0
	Total	358	84.4	100.0	
Missing		66	15.6		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 3] People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below there are some of the goals listed which different people would give top priority.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Maintaining order in the nation	81	19.1	22.9	22.9
	Giving people more say in important government decisions	76	17.9	21.5	44.4

	Fighting rising prices	131	30.9	37.0	81.4
	Protecting freedom of speech	66	15.6	18.6	100.0
	Total	354	83.5	100.0	
Missing		70	16.5		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 4] People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below there are some of the goals listed which different people would give top priority.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Maintaining order in the nation	142	33.5	44.0	44.0
	Giving people more say in important government decisions	48	11.3	14.9	58.8
	Fighting rising prices	101	23.8	31.3	90.1
	Protecting freedom of speech	32	7.5	9.9	100.0
	Total	323	76.2	100.0	
Missing		101	23.8		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 1] Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? And what would be the next most important? And what would be the third most important?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A stable economy	92	21.7	25.2	25.2
	Progress toward a less impersonal and more human society	163	38.4	44.7	69.9
	Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money	96	22.6	26.3	96.2
	The fight against crime	14	3.3	3.8	100.0
	Total	365	86.1	100.0	
Missing		59	13.9		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 2] Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? And what would be the next most important? And what would be the third most important?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A stable economy	97	22.9	26.9	26.9
	Progress toward a less impersonal and more human society	102	24.1	28.3	55.1
	Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money	122	28.8	33.8	88.9

	The fight against crime	40	9.4	11.1	100.0
	Total	361	85.1	100.0	
Missing		63	14.9		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 3] Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? And what would be the next most important? And what would be the third most important?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A stable economy	130	30.7	36.5	36.5
	Progress toward a less impersonal and more human society	62	14.6	17.4	53.9
	Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money	80	18.9	22.5	76.4
	The fight against crime	84	19.8	23.6	100.0
	Total	356	84.0	100.0	
Missing		68	16.0		
Total		424	100.0		

[Rank 4] Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? And what would be the next most important? And what would be the third most important?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A stable economy	38	9.0	11.8	11.8
	Progress toward a less impersonal and more human society	33	7.8	10.3	22.1
	Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money	52	12.3	16.2	38.3
	The fight against crime	198	46.7	61.7	100.0
	Total	321	75.7	100.0	
Missing		103	24.3		
Total		424	100.0		

Socio-demography

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Female	179	42.2	50.3	50.3
	Male	177	41.7	49.7	100.0
	Total	356	84.0	100.0	
Missing	System	68	16.0		
Total		424	100.0		

Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	25 y and younger	54	12.7	15.1	15.1
	26 to 35 y	88	20.8	24.6	39.7
	36 to 45 y	81	19.1	22.6	62.3
	46 to 55 y	66	15.6	18.4	80.7
	56 to 65	57	13.4	15.9	96.6
	66 y and older	12	2.8	3.4	100.0
	Total	358	84.4	100.0	
Missing	System	66	15.6		
Total		424	100.0		

Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No certificate	5	1.2	1.3	1.3
	Vocational certificate	19	4.5	5.1	6.4
	Secondary degree (10y)	8	1.9	2.1	8.5
	Secondary degree (12y)	38	9.0	10.1	18.7
	University degree (BA)	63	14.9	16.8	35.5
	University degree (MA)	140	33.0	37.3	72.8
	University degree (PhD) and equivalent	102	24.1	27.2	100.0
	Total	375	88.4	100.0	
Missing		49	11.6		
Total		424	100.0		

You hold a passport of which country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Austria	95	22.4	28.4	28.4
	United Kingdom	5	1.2	1.5	29.9
	Slovakia	45	10.6	13.5	43.4
	Belgium	6	1.4	1.8	45.2
	France	8	1.9	2.4	47.6
	Germany	90	21.2	26.9	74.6
	Ireland	3	.7	.9	75.4
	The Netherlands	46	10.8	13.8	89.2
	Norway	18	4.2	5.4	94.6
	Spain	4	.9	1.2	95.8
	Sweden	14	3.3	4.2	100.0
	Total	334	78.8	100.0	
Missing		90	21.2		
Total		424	100.0		

What is your current country of residence?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Austria	94	22.2	27.2	27.2

United Kingdom	7	1.7	2.0	29.3
Slovakia	45	10.6	13.0	42.3
Belgium	5	1.2	1.4	43.8
France	5	1.2	1.4	45.2
Germany	92	21.7	26.7	71.9
Ireland	4	.9	1.2	73.0
The Netherlands	51	12.0	14.8	87.8
Norway	25	5.9	7.2	95.1
Spain	4	.9	1.2	96.2
Sweden	13	3.1	3.8	100.0
Total	345	81.4	100.0	
Missing	79	18.6		
Total	424	100.0		

Household income after tax (monthly)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid under 450 Euro / under 350 Pounds	7	1.7	2.0	2.0
451 to 1500 Euro / 351 to 1200 Pounds	81	19.1	23.5	25.6
1501 to 2500 Euro / 1201 to 1900 Pounds	79	18.6	23.0	48.5
2501 to 4000 Euro / 1901 to 3000 Pounds	83	19.6	24.1	72.7
over 4000 Euro / over 3000 Pounds	94	22.2	27.3	100.0
Total	344	81.1	100.0	
Missing	80	18.9		
Total	424	100.0		

How do you assess your income (in comparison to the national average)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid low income	63	14.9	18.6	18.6
average	136	32.1	40.1	58.7
above average	128	30.2	37.8	96.5
very high	12	2.8	3.5	100.0
Total	339	80.0	100.0	
Missing	85	20.0		
Total	424	100.0		

Civil status

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid single	132	31.1	36.0	36.0
married/living together	200	47.2	54.5	90.5
divorced/living separately	32	7.5	8.7	99.2
widowed	3	.7	.8	100.0

Total	367	86.6	100.0
Missing	57	13.4	
Total	424	100.0	

Would you consider yourself belonging to

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid the major ethnic group in the country you are currently living in	314	74.1	90.5	90.5
an ethnic minority in the country you are currently living in	11	2.6	3.2	93.7
don't know	22	5.2	6.3	100.0
Total	347	81.8	100.0	
Missing	77	18.2		
Total	424	100.0		

You are currently living in a village/town/city with

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid between 50.000 and 100.000 inhabitants	16	3.8	4.3	4.3
between 100.000 and 250.000 inhabitants	37	8.7	9.9	14.2
between 250.000 and 500.000 inhabitants	69	16.3	18.4	32.6
between 500.000 and 1.000.000 inhabitants	63	14.9	16.8	49.5
more than 1.000.000 inhabitants	105	24.8	28.1	77.5
between 10.000 and 50.000 inhabitants	42	9.9	11.2	88.8
less than 10.000 inhabitants	42	9.9	11.2	100.0
Total	374	88.2	100.0	
Missing	50	11.8		
Total	424	100.0		

Occupation

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Academia	96	22.6	29.9	29.9
Consultant	19	4.5	5.9	35.8
Creative industries	17	4.0	5.3	41.1
Education	15	3.5	4.7	45.8
Engineer	11	2.6	3.4	49.2
Management	14	3.3	4.4	53.6
Medical field	5	1.2	1.6	55.1
Pension	11	2.6	3.4	58.6

Private sector worker	50	11.8	15.6	74.1
Public servant	29	6.8	9.0	83.2
Student	50	11.8	15.6	98.8
unemployed	4	.9	1.2	100.0
Total	321	75.7	100.0	
Missing	103	24.3		
Total	424	100.0		

Security Expert Online Survey

This survey was sent out to 980 respondents out of which 50 answered the questions. The survey was available in German, English and French. A privacy statement was part of the online survey and respondents had to agree on the privacy and data processing policy before proceeding to the main part to answer the questions. The English version of the survey is attached below.

SOURCE Expert Survey

SOCIETAL SECURITY SURVEY - Experts Survey

<http://vicesse.eu/survey/index.php/381473/lang-en>

Every year the SOURCE project (see www.societalsecurity.net) is compiling an annual societal security report. This document highlights different aspects or dimensions of societal security and attempts to identify changes and developments. It uses different data sources from European and national surveys to socio-economic indicators and analysis of different social media and web-platforms. Within the given limitation of a project budget we also collect data through interviews. This year we address the community of security experts to better understand the experts' perspective on the most pressing and future relevant problems in different domains. Starting from a comprehensive understanding of societal security informing the SOURCE project we cover a wide variety of domains from financial security to energy, logistics, political, environmental and food security. These domains are obviously connected, spill overs and cascading effects have to be considered. Nonetheless each domain has its own logic producing domain specific hazards and threats and this is where we ask for your cooperation in responding to our queries.

We have drafted a brief questionnaire that can be answered in ten minutes but also offers the opportunity to share expertise and insights in a more elaborate way. You will be guided through the online questionnaire and there is space for free text provided where you can fill in information deemed important to substantiate your view. This questionnaire will be distributed to experts from different domains across Europe working in different contexts (academia, industry, NGO/CSO, public authorities) to create a comprehensive picture of the state of societal security in Europe. The overall objective is not primarily to calculate frequencies and correlations but to cover a wide array of expert knowledge across countries and domains. Of course your responses will be treated confidential and anonymity is provided (see the privacy statement at the beginning of the questionnaire). The final results of this survey will be made public and will be accessible on our website by the end of 2015.

We would appreciate your input, cooperation and support for the SOURCE project.
Reinhard Kreissl

There are 26 questions in this survey

Data protection

Tank you for considering participation in this research. The information you provide as part of this interview will be used as part of the EU FP7 funded research Project SOURCE (Virtual centre of excellence for research support and coordination on societal security). The output of this project includes research reports and peer-reviewed journal articles. Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify you from any publications. If you have any questions about the project SOURCE or our data protection measures, do not hesitate to contact us: office@vicesse.eu. Declaration of consent I agree to participate in this online survey. I have read both the consent form as well as the introduction to this survey at www.societalsecurity.net and I understand what this research study involves. I have no further questions. I understand my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw from this study at any time without giving a reason and without any penalties resulting from this withdrawal. I understand any information collected during this study will be held confidentially and will be shared within the Project SOURCE consortium anonymously. I understand that the outcomes of this study may be published in academic journals, as well as project reports. I also understand that individuals participating in the study will not be identified in any of these reports. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Austrian Data Protection Authority (www.dsb.gv.at).

Please choose **all** that apply:

- ☐ I agree with these terms

Your field of expertise

1. Please choose the domain(s) where you consider yourself an expert:

Please choose **all** that apply:

- ☐ Finances/Economics
- ☐ Welfare
- ☐ Civil society
- ☐ Politics
- ☐ Environment
- ☐ Health or Healthcare
- ☐ Nutrition
- ☐ Infrastructure
- ☐ Energy
- ☐ Information Technologies
- ☐ Other:

2. Please select your professional role(s):

Please choose **all** that apply:

- ☐ Research
- ☐ Analysis
- ☐ Consultancy
- ☐ First responder
- ☐ Crisis management
- ☐ System maintenance
- ☐ Technology development
- ☐ Other:

3. Please indicate your professional background(s):

Please choose **all** that apply:

- ☐ Engineering / Technology
- ☐ Administration
- ☐ Law
- ☐ Economy
- ☐ Social / Political Science
- ☐ Natural Science
- ☐ Other:

Your assessment of the security (problems) in your domain

4. Please list (up to) three important security relevant events you encountered in your domain in the last years?

Please write your answer(s) here:

Event 1	
Event 2	
Event 3	

5. Event 1 (Please rate from 1 (strong reaction / effect) to 4 (no reaction / effect)) . Has this event triggered ...

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	1	2	3	4
... adequate reaction by relevant institutions/actors?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... increased awareness among those affected?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... shift in policies, technology, regulations?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

6. Event 2 (Please rate from 1 (strong reaction / effect) to 4 (no reaction / effect)). Has this event triggered ...

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	1	2	3	4
... adequate reaction by relevant institutions/actors?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... increased awareness among those affected?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... shift in policies, technology, regulations?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

7. Event 3 (Please rate from 1 (strong reaction / effect) to 4 (no reaction / effect)). Has this event triggered ...

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	1	2	3	4
... adequate reaction by relevant institutions/actors?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... increased awareness among those affected?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... shift in policies, technology, regulations?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Your assessment of the security (problems) in your domain 02

8. Could these events have been prevented, their effects mitigated and if so, what would have been necessary to prevent / mitigate the effects? (Check any that apply)

	Event 1	Event 2	Event 3
Different system / process design	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Better surveillance / early warning	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Different standard policy / performance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other 1:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other 2:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other 3:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other 1:

Please write your answer here:

Other 2:

Please write your answer here:

Other 3:

Please write your answer here:

9. Looking at the overall situation in your field: What are presently the three most prominent, pressing, imminent threats and hazards, discussed in your professional domain?

Please write your answer(s) here:

Threat / hazard 1	
Threat / hazard 2	
Threat / hazard 3	

10. Would you personally agree with this assessment of your professional peer group?

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Yes	Uncertain	No
Event 1	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Event 2	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Event 3	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

11. Considering the time scale of these hazards / threats, how would you rate their seriousness in terms of temporal dimension, impact, and reversibility?

	Threat/hazard 1	Threat/hazard 2	Threat/hazard 3
Short (week-month)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Medium (month-year)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Long (year - decade)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. How would you rate their impact: local, regional, national, or global?

	Threat/hazard 1	Threat/hazard 2	Threat/hazard 3
Local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Regional	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Global	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13. Type of damage

	Threat/hazard 1	Threat/hazard 2	Threat/hazard 3
Physical	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Looking at the future ... what will come

14. In your view are the relevant institutions/organisations/public bodies sufficiently prepared and display an awareness to handle future incidents / threats?

Please choose **only one** of the following:

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

15. Please elaborate (Please feel free to either address all cases you indicated previously or focus on one specific):

Please write your answer here:

16. What are reasons for failure?

Please write your answer here:

17. What would be needed on a technical, financial, organisational/institutional, legal level to enhance resilience?

Please write your answer here:

Socio-demographic informations**18. Your age group**

Please choose **only one** of the following:

- ☐ 18-25
- ☐ 26-30
- ☐ 31-40
- ☐ 41-50
- ☐ 51-60
- ☐ 61+

19. Please indicate your gender

Please choose **only one** of the following:

- ☐ Female
- ☐ Male

20. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Please choose **only one** of the following:

- ☐ High school or equivalent
- ☐ Vocational/technical school (2 year)
- ☐ Some college
- ☐ Bachelor's degree
- ☐ Master's degree
- ☐ Doctoral degree
- ☐ Professional degree (MD, JD, etc.)

21. Your Country of residence

Please choose **only one** of the following:

- ☐ Austria
- ☐ Belgium
- ☐ Bulgaria
- ☐ Croatia



- ☐ Cyprus
- ☐ CzechRepublic
- ☐ Denmark
- ☐ Estonia
- ☐ Finland
- ☐ France
- ☐ Germany
- ☐ Greece
- ☐ Hungary
- ☐ Ireland
- ☐ Italy
- ☐ Latvia
- ☐ Lithuania
- ☐ Luxembourg
- ☐ Malta
- ☐ Netherlands
- ☐ Poland
- ☐ Portugal
- ☐ Romania
- ☐ Slovakia
- ☐ Slovenia
- ☐ Spain
- ☐ Sweden
- ☐ UnitedKingdom
- ☐ Outside of the European Union

22. If you would be willing to answer more questions in a direct interview, please provide your email address. All information obtained in these interviews will be treated confidential. Your email address will not be shared with third parties and there will be no commercial use of your email address or information provided.

Please write your answer here:

Thank you for your participation